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The Internet of Things (IoT) presents a communication network where heterogeneous
physical devices such as vehicles, homes, urban infrastructures or industrial machinery
are interconnected and share data. For these communications to be successful, it is
necessary to integrate and embed electronic devices that allow for obtaining environ-
mental information (sensors), for performing physical actuations (actuators) as well as
for sending and receiving data (network interfaces).
This integration of embedded systems poses several challenges. It is needed for these
devices to present very low power consumption. In many cases IoT nodes are powered by
batteries or constrained power supplies. Moreover, the great amount of devices needed in
an IoT network makes power efficiency one of the major concerns of these deployments,
due to the cost and environmental impact of the energy consumption. This need for low
energy consumption is demanded by resource constrained devices, conflicting with the
second major concern of IoT: security and data privacy. There are critical urban and
industrial systems, such as traffic management, water supply, maritime control, railway
control or high risk industrial manufacturing systems such as oil refineries that will
obtain great benefits from IoT deployments, for which non-authorized access can posse
severe risks for public safety. On the other hand, both these public systems and the
ones deployed on private environments (homes, working places, malls) present a risk for
the privacy and security of their users. These IoT deployments need advanced security
mechanisms, both to prevent access to the devices and to protect the data exchanged
by them.
As a consequence, it is needed to improve two main aspects: energy efficiency of IoT
devices and the use of lightweight security mechanisms that can be implemented by
these resource constrained devices but at the same time guarantee a fair degree of
security.
The huge amount of data transmitted by this type of networks also presents another
challenge. There are big data systems capable of processing large amounts of data,
but with IoT the granularity and dispersion of the generated information presents a
new scenario very different from the one existing nowadays. Forecasts anticipate that
iii
iv
there will be a growth from the 15 billion installed devices in 2015 to more than 75
billion devices in 2025. Moreover, there will be much more services exploiting the data
produced by these networks, meaning the resulting traffic will be even higher. The
information must not only be processed in real time, but data mining processes will
have to be performed to historical data.
The main goal of this Ph.D. thesis is to analyze each one of the previously described
challenges and to provide solutions that allow for an adequate adoption of IoT in
Industrial, domestic and, in general, any scenario that can obtain any benefit from the
interconnection and flexibility that IoT brings.
Resumen
La internet de las cosas (IoT o Internet of Things) representa una red de intercomu-
nicaciones en la que participan dispositivos f́ısicos de toda ı́ndole, como veh́ıculos,
viviendas, electrodomésticos, infraestructuras urbanas o maquinaria y dispositivos in-
dustriales. Para que esta comunicación se pueda llevar a cabo es necesario integrar
elementos electrónicos que permitan obtener información del entorno (sensores), realizar
acciones f́ısicas (actuadores) y enviar y recibir la información necesaria (interfaces de
comunicaciones de red).
La integración y uso de estos sistemas electrónicos embebidos supone varios retos. Es
necesario que dichos dispositivos presenten un consumo reducido. En muchos casos
deberán ser alimentados por bateŕıas o fuentes de alimentación limitadas. Además,
la gran cantidad de dispositivos que involucra la IoT hace necesario que la eficiencia
energética de los mismos sea una de las principales preocupaciones, por el coste e
implicaciones medioambientales que supone el consumo de electricidad de los mismos.
Esta necesidad de limitar el consumo provoca que dichos dispositivos tengan unas
prestaciones muy limitadas, lo que entra en conflicto con la segunda mayor preocupación
de la IoT: la seguridad y privacidad de los datos. Por un lado existen sistemas cŕıticos
urbanos e industriales, como puede ser la regulación del tráfico, el control del suministro
de agua, el control maŕıtimo, el control ferroviario o los sistemas de producción industrial
de alto riesgo, como refineŕıas, que son claros candidatos a beneficiarse de la IoT, pero
cuyo acceso no autorizado supone graves problemas de seguridad ciudadana. Por otro
lado, tanto estos sistemas de naturaleza pública, como los que se desplieguen en entornos
privados (viviendas, entornos de trabajo o centros comerciales, entre otros) suponen
un riesgo para la privacidad y también para la seguridad de los usuarios. Todo esto
hace que sean necesarios mecanismos de seguridad avanzados, tanto de acceso a los
dispositivos como de protección de los datos que estos intercambian.
En consecuencia, es necesario avanzar en dos aspectos principales: la eficiencia en-
ergética de los dispositivos y el uso de mecanismos de seguridad eficientes, tanto
computacional como energéticamente, que permitan la implantación de la IoT sin
comprometer la seguridad y la privacidad de los usuarios.
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Por otro lado, la ingente cantidad de información que estos sistemas puede llegar
a producir presenta otros dos retos que deben ser afrontados. En primer lugar, el
tratamiento y análisis de datos toma una nueva dimensión. Existen sistemas de big
data capaces de procesar cantidades enormes de información, pero con la internet de
las cosas la granularidad y dispersión de los datos plantean un escenario muy distinto
al actual. La previsión es pasar de 15.000.000.000 de dispositivos instalados en 2015
a más de 75.000.000.000 en 2025. Además existirán multitud de servicios que harán
un uso intensivo de estos dispositivos y de los datos que estos intercambian, por lo
que el volumen de tráfico será todav́ıa mayor. Asimismo, la información debe ser
procesada tanto en tiempo real como a posteriori sobre históricos, lo que permite
obtener información estad́ıstica muy relevante en diferentes entornos.
El principal objetivo de la presente tesis doctoral es analizar cada uno de estos retos
(eficiencia energética, seguridad, procesamiento de datos e interacción con el usuario)
y plantear soluciones que permitan una correcta adopción de la internet de las cosas
en ámbitos industriales, domésticos y en general en cualquier escenario que se pueda
beneficiar de la interconexión y flexibilidad de acceso que proporciona el IoT.
Resumo
O internet das cousas (IoT ou Internet of Things) representa unha rede de intercomuni-
cacións na que participan dispositivos f́ısicos moi diversos, coma veh́ıculos, vivendas,
electrodomésticos, infraestruturas urbanas ou maquinaria e dispositivos industriais.
Para que estas comunicacións se poidan levar a cabo é necesario integrar elementos
electrónicos que permitan obter información da contorna (sensores), realizar accións
f́ısicas (actuadores) e enviar e recibir a información necesaria (interfaces de comunicacións
de rede).
A integración e uso destes sistemas electrónicos integrados supón varios retos. En
primeiro lugar, é necesario que estes dispositivos teñan un consumo reducido. En
moitos casos deberán ser alimentados por bateŕıas ou fontes de alimentación limitadas.
Ademais, a gran cantidade de dispositivos que se empregan na IoT fai necesario que a
eficiencia enerxética dos mesmos sexa unha das principais preocupacións, polo custo e
implicacións medioambientais que supón o consumo de electricidade dos mesmos. Esta
necesidade de limitar o consumo provoca que estes dispositivos teñan unhas prestacións
moi limitadas, o que entra en conflito coa segunda maior preocupación da IoT: a
seguridade e privacidade dos datos. Por un lado existen sistemas cŕıticos urbanos e
industriais, como pode ser a regulación do tráfico, o control de augas, o control maŕıtimo,
o control ferroviario ou os sistemas de produción industrial de alto risco, como refineŕıas,
que son claros candidatos a obter beneficios da IoT, pero cuxo acceso non autorizado
supón graves problemas de seguridade cidadá. Por outra parte tanto estes sistemas de
natureza pública como os que se despreguen en contornas privadas (vivendas, contornas
de traballo ou centros comerciais entre outros) supoñen un risco para a privacidade e
tamén para a seguridade dos usuarios. Todo isto fai que sexan necesarios mecanismos
de seguridade avanzados, tanto de acceso aos dispositivos como de protección dos datos
que estes intercambian.
En consecuencia, é necesario avanzar en dous aspectos principais: a eficiencia enerxética
dos dispositivos e o uso de mecanismos de seguridade eficientes, tanto computacional
como enerxéticamente, que permitan o despregue da IoT sen comprometer a seguridade
e a privacidade dos usuarios.
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Por outro lado, a inxente cantidade de información que estes sistemas poden chegar
a xerar presenta outros retos que deben ser tratados. O tratamento e a análise de
datos toma unha nova dimensión. Existen sistemas de big data capaces de procesar
cantidades enormes de información, pero coa internet das cousas a granularidade e
dispersión dos datos supón un escenario moi distinto ao actual. A previsión é pasar
de 15.000.000.000 de dispositivos instalados no ano 2015 a máis de 75.000.000.000 de
dispositivos no ano 2025. Ademais existirán multitude de servizos que farán un uso
intensivo destes dispositivos e dos datos que intercambian, polo que o volume de tráfico
será áında maior. Do mesmo xeito a información debe ser procesada tanto en tempo
real como posteriormente sobre históricos, o que permite obter información estat́ıstica
moi relevante en diferentes contornas.
O principal obxectivo da presente tese doutoral é analizar cada un destes retos
(eficiencia enerxética, seguridade, procesamento de datos e interacción co usuario) e
propor solucións que permitan unha correcta adopción da internet das cousas en ámbitos
industriais, domésticos e en xeral en todo aquel escenario que se poda beneficiar da
interconexión e flexibilidade de acceso que proporciona a IoT.
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The Internet of Things (IoT) paradigm proposes a communications network where
heterogeneous physical devices such as vehicles, homes, urban infrastructures or in-
dustrial machinery are interconnected and share data. For these communications to
be successful, it is necessary to integrate and embed electronic devices that allow
for obtaining environmental information (sensors), for performing physical actuation
(actuators), as well as for sending and receiving data (network interfaces).
This integration of embedded systems poses several challenges. First, it is needed for
these devices to present very low power consumption. In many cases IoT nodes are pow-
ered by batteries or constrained power supplies. Moreover, the large amount of devices
needed in an IoT network makes power efficiency one of the major concerns of these
deployments, due to the cost and environmental impact of their energy consumption.
This need for low energy consumption is critical in resource constrained devices, since
it gets in conflict with the second major IoT concern: security and data privacy. There
are critical urban and industrial systems, such as traffic management, water supply,
maritime control, railway control or high risk industrial manufacturing systems such
as oil refineries that will obtain great benefits from IoT deployments, but for which
non-authorized access can posse severe risks. In addition, public IoT systems as well as
the ones deployed on private environments (e.g., homes, working places, malls) involve
both privacy and security risks for the users. Therefore, such IoT deployments need
advanced security mechanisms, both to prevent access to the devices and to protect the
data exchanged by them.
As a consequence, two main aspects need to be improved: the energy efficiency of IoT
devices and the use of lightweight security mechanisms that can be implemented by
resource-constrained devices that have to guarantee a fair degree of security.
Finally, the huge amount of deployed devices and data transmitted by this type of
networks presents another issue: device orchestration and data analysis are really
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challenging. There are Big Data systems capable of processing large amounts of data,
but with the IoT the granularity and dispersion of the generated information creates a
new scenario that is very different from the one existing nowadays. In fact, forecasts
estimate that there will be a significant growth from the 15 billion installed devices
in 2015 to more than 75 billion devices in 2025. Moreover, there will be much more
services exploiting the data produced by these networks, which will result in higher
traffic. The collected information will not only be processed in real time, but data
mining processes will have to be performed using historical data. As a consequence,
new network and communication architectures must be implemented to allow the data
to be processed as close as possible to where they will be consumed.
1.1 Objectives of the thesis
The main objective of this thesis was to analyze the current state of the main factors
that have a direct impact on the feasibility of current and future IoT deployments, and
to provide solutions that will improve and expedite the adoption of such systems. As it
was briefly explained in the Introduction, there are three basic issues that need to be
correctly addressed to guarantee the success of any IoT deployment: energy efficiency,
security and network architecture. Traditionally, these aspects have been addressed
individually and during the latest steps of the system design process or even after the
initial implementation. Such an approach yields systems that do not take advantage of
the close relationship between the mentioned three elements. As a consequence, the
final implementation would have lacks on some or all the mentioned aspects.
1.2 Contributions of the thesis
1.2.1 Main contributions
The main original contributions derived from this thesis can be summarized as follows:
• Analysis of the state-of-the-art regarding IoT energy-efficient high-security mecha-
nisms and novel network architectures.
• Implementation of a testbed to analyze the impact on energy consumption of
different security mechanisms for IoT.
• Study of the performance and energy impact of different IoT network architectures
in a real Industrial IoT (IIoT) environment.
1.2. Contributions of the thesis 3
1.2.2 General discussion on the contributions
The concept of IoT refers to a paradigm where physical devices (e.g., home appliances,
environmental sensors and actuators, vehicles) are interconnected using a communication
network that allows for real-time data exchange and control. Smart environments rely
on the constant availability of sensor and actuator devices, whose power consumption is
a concern due to the large number of sensor nodes to be deployed. IoT networks make
it possible the required integration and connectivity with already available networks,
thus enabling sensor networks to reach integration levels that are impossible to achieve
with traditional approaches.
The rise of this paradigm is expected to connect to the Internet more than 75 billion
devices by 2025. This unprecedented number of devices, along with their estimated fast
growth, raises three main concerns: security, energy consumption and scalability. The
access and communication flexibility that IoT brings come with numerous threats that
introduce the need for computational and energy-demanding security mechanisms and
new network architectures. Since IoT allows sensor and actuator devices to communicate
end-to-end through the Internet, the performance and security techniques implemented
by IoT end-nodes impact the rest of the involved devices. From fog gateways to cloud
and backend infrastructures, along with routers and network devices, they are all
affected by the way IoT end-nodes behave.
When moving from traditional client-server models to IoT network environments,
there are several factors that should be considered. First, IoT devices are usually
constrained in terms of hardware, with very low power and computational capabilities.
When trying to implement security protocols on this kind of devices, traditional
cryptographic algorithms are often too expensive in terms of energy and computing
resources. Communications and computing efficiency have to be also considered on
the server side. IoT servers have to be able to attend a very high number of devices
requests in comparison to traditional servers. Moreover, a large number of requests
from IoT devices does not contain any data to be stored or processed by the cloud (e.g.,
keep alive packets to maintain an open TCP connection). In other cases, the data of
several requests could be aggregated into a single request to be handled by the cloud.
All of the previously mentioned factors contributed to the development of new IoT-
oriented network topologies such as Fog or Mist computing, and the use of novel
cryptographic systems to secure IoT communications. The contribution of this thesis
that the author presented in [1] provides a comparison between Elliptic-Curve Cryp-
tography (ECC) and Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) in terms of energy consumption
and network throughput on a Fog Computing environment. Fog computing extends
cloud computing to the edge of a network, thus enabling new IoT applications and
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services, which may involve critical data that require privacy and security. In an IoT
fog computing system, three elements can be distinguished: IoT nodes, which collect
data; the cloud; and interconnected IoT gateways that exchange messages with the IoT
nodes and with the cloud. Specifically, the work presented in [1] focuses on securing IoT
gateways, which are assumed to be constrained in terms of computational resources,
but are also able to offload some processing from the cloud and to reduce the latency in
the responses to the IoT nodes.
In addition, the work in [1] considers IoT scenarios where it is not granted that IoT
gateways have direct access to the electrical grid, like it occurs in mission-critical
applications for natural disaster relief or environmental monitoring, where it is common
to deploy IoT nodes and gateways in large areas where electricity comes from solar or
wind energy that charge the batteries that power every device. The work in [1] analyzes
how to secure IoT gateway communications while minimizing power consumption. The
throughput and power consumption of RSA and ECC are considered, since they are
really popular, but have not been thoroughly analyzed when applied to IoT scenarios.
For such a purpose, a hardware testbed was created, which allows for using the latest
Transport Layer Security (TLS) implementations and cipher suites, while being able to
perform energy consumption and data throughput tests in a real scenario. The devised
power consumption measurement system guarantees precise and unbiased samples, since
it is fully isolated from the rest of the elements being measured.
Although the most widespread TLS cipher suites make use of RSA as the main public
key-exchange algorithm, the key sizes needed are not practical for most IoT devices
and cannot be scaled to high security levels. In contrast, ECC represents a much
lighter and scalable alternative. Thus, RSA and ECC are compared in [1] for equivalent
security levels, and power consumption and data throughput are measured using the
implemented power measurement systems. It is important to remark the importance
of comparing algorithms that provide the same security level. When the strength of a
cryptographic algorithm is assessed, the main parameter that is usually considered is
its key size in bits. Using the same cryptosystem, larger key lengths make brute force
attacks more difficult, thus creating more secure systems. One important consideration
is that key size defines an upper-bound on the security that an algorithm can provide,
but the actual strength of the algorithm can be lower: the security level that a certain
algorithm provides is a way of measuring the effort needed to break its trapdoor function.
Regarding the results obtained in [1], they indicate that, in the proposed fog com-
puting scenario, ECC is clearly a much better alternative than RSA, obtaining energy
consumption reductions of up to 50% and a data throughput that doubles RSA in most
scenarios. These conclusions are then corroborated by a frame temporal analysis of
Ethernet packets.
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In addition, different data compression algorithms were evaluated in [1]. The obtained
results allow for concluding that, when dealing with the small payloads related to IoT
applications, compression algorithms do not pay off in terms of real data throughput and
power consumption. These results allowed not only for demonstrating the importance
of selecting proper security mechanisms in order to optimize both performance and
energy consumption, but also for highlighting the importance of real-world testing.
The network architectures studied in [1] were further explored through a collaboration
with Navantia, which allowed for performing tests on a real industrial environment.
Navantia, one of the 10 largest shipbuilders in the world, was studying the application of
Augmented Reality (AR) (among other technologies) in different shipyard environments
in a project called Shipyard 4.0. In such scenarios, replacing direct cloud communication
with Fog gateways with reduced hardware capabilities seems to be the best alternative
in terms of both network communications efficiency and hardware costs. However,
there are scenarios where this approach is not feasible, since processes that involve high
computational loads must be performed by the layer on top of IoT devices. This is
the scenario analyzed in the contribution presented in [2], where a Fog Computing and
Cloudlet-based AR system is presented in order to be used in an Industry 4.0 Shipyard.
It is important to note that AR services need low-latency and QoS-aware applications
that decrease the network traffic and the computational load of traditional cloud
computing systems. The IAR communications architecture proposed in [2] was evaluated
in real-world scenarios with payload sizes according to demanding Microsoft HoloLens
applications and when using a cloud, a cloudlet and a fog computing system. The fog
computing system hardware was the same as the one used in [1] (a resource-constrained
Single-Board Computer (SBC)). For the Cloud and Cloudlet systems the same hardware
was used, but the Cloudlet server was deployed locally and the Cloud was deployed on
a remote Internet location. With such three different architectures, different tests were
preformed in order to analyze response latency and sample processing rates under high
loads. The obtained results were compared for the three architectures and when using
a wide range of payload sizes. The results showed that for small payload sizes the Fog
solution is the most efficient, but, when increasing the concurrency and the payload
sizes, the cloudlet is faster and the only one capable of providing a 100% success rate.
In contrast, the Cloud solution falls short in both response time for small payloads and
success rate when using large payloads. The results obtained in the proposed industrial
scenario emphasize again the benefits of performing real-world tests, since, eventually,
the fog computing approach was insufficient after considering the high data volumes
needed for an AR solution, but it was showed that it could be used depending on the
expected concurrency level.
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A similar scenario but with different data transmission and processing requirements
was evaluated in [3]. Such a paper presented a Fog Computing based cyber-physical
system (CPS) for the automation of pipe-related tasks in an Industry 4.0 shipyard. The
main difference with the use case analyzed in [2] was the number and the size of the
messages transmitted: in [3] the payloads were smaller but the number of messages was
larger.
Specifically, the system described in [3] relies on a Radio Frequency Identification
(RFID) tag system that made use of several RFID readers distributed through a shipyard
workshop. The RFID tags were attached to pipes and other physical elements that
needed to be tracked, and the information about the RFID tag signals was obtained
from the RFID Readers. The system then used such an information to keep track of all
the elements equipped with an RFID tag. Cloud and fog architectures were compared,
by using a virtual RFID tag management system, which emulated the behaviour of
the real RFID tags but allowed for easily changing the number of working tags for the
different tests performed. The implementation of this emulation system mimics the
operation of the real RFID system but it allows for using a larger number of readers
and RFID tags.
In order to determine the performance of the system in both fog and cloud scenarios,
their positioning service response latency was measured. Two sets of tests were per-
formed. The first one was aimed at determining which system responded faster under
regular loads (when managing less than 1000 tags). The goal of the second test was
to find out the maximum number of supported tags. For such a purpose, both the
cloud and the fog-based architectures were tested under abnormal high loads, when
more than 10000 tags sent information concurrently. The cloud-architecture not only
presented worst latency results for all the tested scenarios, but also presented a lower
upper limit in the total number of tags that it could process. Even though the cloud
server was much more powerful than the fog server, the network latency limited the
maximum number of tags to 10000, while the fog architecture was able to process more
than 30000 RFID tags.
The testbed presented in [1] allowed for measuring the energy consumption and
performance of only one IoT device. In order to analyze the behaviour of two IoT
devices that communicated with each other, the testbed was improved for the work
detailed in [4]. In such an article RSA and ECC-based TLS cipher suites were compared
when making use of Fog and mist computing devices. As it was already discussed
in [1–3], edge-centric architectures allow for unburdening higher layers from part of
their computational and data processing requirements. This allows for faster and
more energy-efficient communications. In the specific case of fog computing systems,
they reduce greatly the requirements of cloud-centric systems by processing in fog
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gateways part of the data generated by end devices, thus providing services that were
previously offered by a remote cloud. Thanks to recent advances in System-on-Chip
(SoC) energy efficiency, it is currently possible to create IoT end devices with enough
computational power to process the data generated by their sensors and actuators while
providing complex services, which in recent years derived into the development of the
mist computing paradigm. To allow mist computing nodes to provide the previously
mentioned benefits and guarantee the same level of security as in other architectures,
end-to-end standard security mechanisms need to be implemented.
In the work detailed in [4], a high-security energy-efficient fog and mist computing
architecture and a testbed were presented and evaluated. The testbed made use
of TLS 1.2 ECC and RSA cipher suites (that comply with the TLS 1.3 standard
requirements), which were evaluated and compared in terms of energy consumption
and data throughput for a fog gateway and two mist end-devices. The obtained results
concluded that ECC outperforms RSA in both energy consumption and data throughput
for all the tested security levels. Moreover, the importance of selecting a proper ECC
curve was demonstrated, showing that, for the tested devices, some curves present
worse energy consumption and data throughput than other curves that provide a higher
security level. As a result, this article not only presented a novel mist computing
testbed, but also provided guidelines for future researchers to find out efficient and
secure implementations for advanced IoT devices.
The final work of this thesis was presented in [5] and analyzed the impact of the clock
frequency of constrained IoT devices on the performance of the previously evaluated
cipher suites. Such an analysis was related to the fact that, although many resource-
constrained IoT devices allow for using advanced security mechanisms such as TLS,
several configuration factors impact both the performance and the energy consumption
of IoT systems. One important consideration when securing the communications of
resource-constrained devices is the possibility of modifying the hardware configuration
to improve both performance and energy consumption. In this aspect, IoT SoC clock
frequency is a factor that usually presents a relevant impact, since cryptographic
algorithms require high computational capabilities. Moreover, it is possible to modify
and test the impact of different SoC frequencies on different hardware platforms
with minimum modifications. In contrast, other hardware optimizations such as the
modification of the memory mapping are platform-specific and therefore more difficult
to implement and test.
Finally, in the study presented in [5], two of the most used TLS authentication algo-
rithms (Elliptic-Curve Digital-Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) and RSA) were compared
when executed on a resource-constrained IoT node based on the ESP32 SoC, which was
tested at different clock frequencies (80, 160 and 240 MHz) when providing different
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security levels (from 80 to 192 bits). With every tested configuration, energy con-
sumption and average time per transaction were measured with the testbed presented
in [1] and improved in [4]. The results showed that ECDSA outperforms RSA in all
the performed tests and that certain software implementations may lead to scenarios
where higher security-level alternatives outperform cryptosystems that are theoretically
simpler and lighter in terms of energy consumption and data throughput. Moreover,
the performed experiments allowed for concluding that higher clock frequencies provide
better performance in terms of throughput and, in contrast to what may be expected,
less energy consumption.
1.3 Conclusions
The objective of this thesis was to discover, analyze and improve the factors that
have a greater impact on the adoption of IoT deployments. Different elements that
affect the security, performance and energy consumption of IoT devices were analyzed.
The works presented on this thesis cover from a thorough analysis of the state of
the art of hardware, software, network architectures and security mechanisms, to the
implementation of a testbed and real-world experiments. One of the main findings was
the importance of performing tests on real-world devices and network infrastructures.
The developed testbed allowed for accurately measuring and comparing both the energy
consumption and the performance of different hardware devices, as well as different
network architectures. It also allowed for comparing different security algorithms
and software optimizations of such algorithms. The obtained results demonstrate
that the assumptions made on the impact of different variables on performance and
energy consumption do not always translate to real-world scenarios. The importance
of using metrics that allowed for a fair comparison of security mechanism proved to
be a key factor for measuring the impact of the selected algorithm in the performed
communications. The use of security level as opposed to key length allowed for a
better comparison of the RSA and ECDSA public-key cryptosystems. Moreover, the
tests performed using the testbed showed that, even when using the same public-key
algorithm, implementations of more secure algorithms can outperform less secure ones
due to software optimizations. In the performed tests it was shown that, in particular,
ECC outperforms RSA. This finding remarks the importance of developing resource-
constrained oriented algorithms in order to enable high security and efficient IoT
deployments. Other aspects of data transmission in IoT architectures, such as payload
compression, were found to provide performance gains only when large payloads were
transmitted. Regarding network topologies, several novel approaches were analyzed and
tested, in particular edge-computing solutions such as mist and fog computing. Such
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topologies were compared to the typical cloud approaches, and the use of cloudlets was
tested to analyze scenarios where high computational power is needed. It was shown
that moving the computation and data processing closer to the origin provides better
results in most cases. However, it was also found that depending on the amount of
end-devices and the size of the data they transmit, the use of more powerful devices such
as cloudlets is preferred over constrained-devices like the typical fog gateways. Finally,
it was shown that modifying hardware parameters, such as the clock speed, also had a
great impact on the communications performance. The results obtained showed again
the importance of testing on real hardware and deployments. Counterintuitively, higher
clock frequencies were more efficient, since the speed-up of the cryptographic operations
resulted in less time spent on transmitting the data. The extra energy consumption of
using higher frequencies was compensated with the reduction in RF communications
time.
Taking all of this into account, it can be concluded that:
• Testing on real hardware using real-world deployments and using different amounts
of devices and payload sizes is key for optimizing both energy consumption and
data throughput.
• The impact of network topologies and algorithms such as data compression is
dependent on the number of devices and the size of the transmitted payloads.
• Energy-efficient algorithms for securing IoT communications must be implemented,
not only on IoT end-devices but also in the intermediate devices.
• When comparing different algorithms, metrics that allow for a fair comparison
must be used. In the case of public-key cryptography security level must be used
over key length.
• Hardware parameters such as clock speed impact the performance and the energy
consumption of securing IoT communications.
• Software optimizations of cryptographic algorithms have a great impact on the
performance and energy consumption of IoT devices.
1.4 Compendium of publications
This thesis is presented in the form of a compendium of publications, attached in their
original form in Appendix A. The contributions of this thesis were published in five
original articles on the online journal Sensors. The current impact factor of Sensors,
as of writing, is 3.031 and the 5-year impact factor is 3.302. The journal is ranked
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under the JCR category Instruments & Instrumentation in the position 15/61 (Q1).
Thus, the following are the mentioned publications, whose number of citations has been
obtained from Google Scholar:
• Suárez-Albela, M; Fernández-Caramés, T. M.; Fraga-Lamas, P.; Castedo, L. A
Practical Evaluation of a High-Security Energy-Efficient Gateway for IoT Fog
Computing Applications. Sensors. 2017, 17, 1978. Impact factor 2018: 3.031
(Q1/T1 15/61 INSTRUMENTS & INSTRUMENTATION). 67 citations.
• Fernández-Caramés, T. M.; Fraga-Lamas, P.; Suárez-Albela, M; Vilar-Montesinos,
M. A Fog Computing and Cloudlet Based Augmented Reality System for the
Industry 4.0 Shipyard. Sensors. 2018, 18, 1798. Impact factor 2018: 3.031
(Q1/T1 15/61 INSTRUMENTS & INSTRUMENTATION). 34 citations.
• Fernández-Caramés, T. M.; Fraga-Lamas, P.; Suárez-Albela, M; Dı́az-Bouza, M.A.
A Fog Computing Based Cyber-Physical System for the Automation of Pipe-
Related Tasks in the Industry 4.0 Shipyard. Sensors. 2018, 18, 1961. Impact
factor 2018: 3.031 (Q1/T1 15/61 INSTRUMENTS & INSTRUMENTATION). 34
citations.
• Suárez-Albela, M; Fraga-Lamas, P.; Fernández-Caramés, T. M. A Practical
Evaluation on RSA and ECC-Based Cipher Suites for IoT High-Security Energy-
Efficient Fog and Mist Computing Devices. Sensors. 2018, 18, 3868. Impact
factor 2018: 3.031 (Q1/T1 15/61 INSTRUMENTS & INSTRUMENTATION). 18
citations.
• Suárez-Albela, M; Fraga-Lamas, P.; Castedo, L.; Fernández-Caramés, T. M.
Clock Frequency Impact on the Performance of High-Security Cryptographic
Cipher Suites for Energy-Efficient Resource-Constrained IoT Devices. Sensors.
2019, 19, 15. Impact factor 2018: 3.031 (Q1/T1 15/61 INSTRUMENTS &
INSTRUMENTATION). 9 citations.
1.5 Additional Publications
Although the main work of the thesis is focused on the articles cited in Section 1.4,
the Ph.D. candidate has also contributed to the following publications related to this
Thesis:
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1.5.1 International conferences
1. Suárez-Albela, M.; Fernández-Caramés, T.M.; Fraga-Lamas, P.; Castedo, L. A
Practical Performance Comparison of ECC and RSA for Resource-Constrained IoT
Devices. In Proceedings of the 2018 Global Internet of Things Summit (GIoTS),
Bilbao, Spain, 4-7 June 2018.
2. Fernández-Caramés, T. M.; Blanco-Novoa, O.; Suárez-Albela, M; Fraga-Lamas, P.
A UAV and Blockchain-Based System for Industry 4.0 Inventory and Traceability
Applications. In Proceedings of the 5th International Electronic Conference on
Sensors and Applications (ECSA-5), 15–30 Nov. 2018.
3. Fraga-Lamas, P.; Celaya-Echarri, M.; Lopez-Iturri, P.; Fernández-Caramés, T.M.;
Azpilicueta, L.; Aguirre, E.; Suárez-Albela, M.; Falcone, F.; Castedo, L. Analy-
sis, Design and Empirical Validation of a Smart Campus Based on LoRaWAN.
In Proceedings of the 5th International Electronic Conference on Sensors and
Applications (ECSA-5), 15–30 Nov. 2018.
1.5.2 National conferences
1. Suárez-Albela, M.; Fraga-Lamas, P.; Fernández-Caramés T.M.; González-López, M.
Sistema domótico con auto-configuración y auto-detección rápida de transductores.
In XXXI Simposium Nacional de la Unión Cient́ıfica Internacional de Radio
(URSI), Madrid, Spain, 5–7 Sept. 2016.
2. Suárez-Albela, M; Fernández-Caramés, T. M.; Fraga-Lamas, P.; Castedo, L.
Impact of Clock Frequency on the Performance and Consumption of a Secure IoT
Node. In XXXIII Simposium Nacional de la Unión Cient́ıfica Internacional de
Radio (URSI), Granada, Spain, 5–7 Sept. 2018.
1.5.3 Book chapters
1. Fernández-Caramés, T. M.; Fraga-Lamas, P.; Suárez-Albela, M.; Castedo, L.
A methodology for evaluating security in commercial RFID systems. In Radio
Frequency Identification, 1st ed.; Crepaldi, P. C.; Pimenta, T. C.; INTECH: Rijeka,
Croatia, 2017.
1.5.4 Patent applications
1. Suárez-Albela, M.; Fraga-Lamas, P.; Fernández-Caramés T.M., “Procedure, con-
trol system, node of transducers, computer program product to do, by a node
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transducers and/or part of a control system, that one or more transducers within
the node accessible through a transducer network when the node is connected to
the transducer network”. Application number: P201300895, grant date: 4 May
2016. Spanish Patent and Trademark Office, National patent.
2. Suárez-Albela, M.; Fernández-Caramés T.M.; Fraga-Lamas, P., “Device to obtain
the position of a product, subproduct, active or physical element along the supply
chain of the naval industry”. Application number: P4457ES00, grant date: 24
Apr 2018. Spanish Patent and Trademark Office, National patent.
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Abstract: Fog computing extends cloud computing to the edge of a network enabling new Internet
of Things (IoT) applications and services, which may involve critical data that require privacy
and security. In an IoT fog computing system, three elements can be distinguished: IoT nodes
that collect data, the cloud, and interconnected IoT gateways that exchange messages with the IoT
nodes and with the cloud. This article focuses on securing IoT gateways, which are assumed to
be constrained in terms of computational resources, but that are able to offload some processing
from the cloud and to reduce the latency in the responses to the IoT nodes. However, it is usually
taken for granted that IoT gateways have direct access to the electrical grid, which is not always
the case: in mission-critical applications like natural disaster relief or environmental monitoring,
it is common to deploy IoT nodes and gateways in large areas where electricity comes from solar
or wind energy that charge the batteries that power every device. In this article, how to secure IoT
gateway communications while minimizing power consumption is analyzed. The throughput and
power consumption of Rivest–Shamir–Adleman (RSA) and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) are
considered, since they are really popular, but have not been thoroughly analyzed when applied to IoT
scenarios. Moreover, the most widespread Transport Layer Security (TLS) cipher suites use RSA as the
main public key-exchange algorithm, but the key sizes needed are not practical for most IoT devices
and cannot be scaled to high security levels. In contrast, ECC represents a much lighter and scalable
alternative. Thus, RSA and ECC are compared for equivalent security levels, and power consumption
and data throughput are measured using a testbed of IoT gateways. The measurements obtained
indicate that, in the specific fog computing scenario proposed, ECC is clearly a much better alternative
than RSA, obtaining energy consumption reductions of up to 50% and a data throughput that doubles
RSA in most scenarios. These conclusions are then corroborated by a frame temporal analysis of
Ethernet packets. In addition, current data compression algorithms are evaluated, concluding that,
when dealing with the small payloads related to IoT applications, they do not pay off in terms of real
data throughput and power consumption.
Keywords: ECC; ECDSA; RSA; ECDHE; IoT; IoT gateway; TLS; power consumption; performance;
IoT security; cryptographic security; energy efficiency; fog computing
1. Introduction
The Internet of Things (IoT) refers to a paradigm where physical devices (e.g., home appliances,
environmental sensors and actuators, vehicles) are interconnected using a communication network that
allows for real-time data exchange and control. Smart environments rely on the constant availability
of sensor and actuator devices, whose power consumption is a concern due to the large number of
Sensors 2017, 17, 1978; doi:10.3390/s17091978 www.mdpi.com/journal/sensors
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sensor nodes to be deployed. IoT networks make possible the required integration and connectivity
with already available networks, thus enabling sensor networks to reach integration levels impossible
to achieve with traditional approaches.
Cloud computing has been a success thanks to offloading clients from computational-intensive tasks.
However, in scenarios where latency and communications have to be minimized, other paradigms have
arisen by moving the capabilities of the cloud towards the edge of the network [1]. Fog computing
is one of such paradigms, being regarded as an extension of cloud computing where part of the
computational and communication capabilities of the cloud are moved close to the sensor nodes [2].
Such a movement derives on the following remarkable benefits [3]:
• Latency minimization allows for providing new IoT real-time applications.
• The fog distributes computational and storing resources, which is ideal for large and widely
distributed sensor networks.
• The resource distribution also improves mobility and location awareness, providing services to
mobile and location constrained users.
• The fog connects devices in different physical environments, enabling their interaction, which may
lead to provide new services and functionality.
• The fog is highly flexible, being really easy to scale the network.
To provide such benefits, an IoT fog computing system requires three elements: IoT nodes,
IoT gateways and a cloud. IoT nodes are usually composed of one or more sensors (e.g., temperature,
relative humidity, human presence, CO2 level), a wired or wireless transceiver, a computing device
(e.g., a microcontroller, an ASIC (Application-Specific Integrated Circuit), a SoC (System-on-Chip))
and a power source. The cloud is basically a server or a set of servers with large computational power
and storing capabilities that receives, processes and analyzes all the data collected from the IoT nodes.
IoT gateways connect the IoT nodes with the cloud and among them.
In terms of energy efficiency, researchers have traditionally focused on the nodes, since they
are usually battery operated [4], but, in the last few years, the energy consumption on the cloud has
been also thoroughly studied [5,6]. There is also some research on the energy efficiency of the IoT
gateways [7], but it is usually assumed that they have direct access to the grid, which is not always the
case: in applications for precision agriculture [8], smart cities [9], and Industry 4.0 [10,11], it is common
to deploy IoT nodes and gateways in large areas where a power outlet is not available and electricity
has to be harvested to charge the batteries that power every device. In addition, note that the main
target of fog computing is the reduction of both the computing and networking energy consumptions
through adaptive horizontal (e.g., intra-fog nodes) and vertical (e.g., inter-fog nodes) scaling of the
overall available resource pool [12].
IoT gateways can be improved in different ways to reduce power consumption, but, in this paper,
how to increase energy efficiency and maximize data throughput while guaranteeing high security in
the communications between IoT gateways and with the cloud is analyzed. Note that, although this
improvement in the energy efficiency is especially useful for battery-operated gateways, the increase
on the level of security may also benefit other IoT applications like home automation [13–15], defense
and public safety [16], transportation and connected vehicles [17], or healthcare, where security issues
can pose risks for human safety and privacy [18,19] and which can be the target of cyberwarfare
attacks [20].
It is also important to emphasize that security in IoT and fog computing systems is often
overlooked or not completely addressed [18,21,22], slowing down the broad adoption of IoT.
Furthermore, one of the main barriers for not implementing security mechanisms to protect the
communications is the low computing capabilities of most IoT nodes, which is a topic to be researched
in the next years.
In comparison to the cloud or to regular computers, IoT gateways and nodes are
resource-constrained and usually embed low-cost computing devices that consume little power [23].
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Resource-constrained devices are designed limiting their memory, storing capacity and processing
power, as well as their network communication capabilities, including their data rate, in order
to reduce power consumption. In the case of a Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN), low-power
consumption requirements make difficult the implementation of the complex and heavy operations
required by ciphering algorithms to encrypt and secure communications [24–27]. Thus, securing IoT
communications at IoT gateways must be addressed carefully to achieve a good trade-off between
security, energy efficiency and performance.
Since IoT fog computing networks usually rely on Internet protocols, the use of already existing
and proven security protocols seems to be the best approach in terms of reliability and implementation
efficiency. As explained in [16], the fog layer must provide horizontal integration between different
layer protocols. IoT nodes and intermediate devices implement heterogeneous protocols; thus, the IoT
fog paradigm relies on the gateways to translate between them and allow for the data aggregation
needed to provide the required services. For this reason, IoT fog gateways are assumed to support
Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP).
A generic IoT fog computing architecture considering all of these aspects is described in Figure 1.
The scenario presented considers three different IoT networks and a fog layer that allows for the
communications among the nodes between the networks and to the cloud. The bidirectional arrows
between the different elements represent data transmissions. Three layers of gateways were considered,
the one placed at the top being responsible for providing a single access point to the fog. This layered
approximation works similarly to the different cache memory levels in a computer, which are designed
to reduce the latency for accessing the processor memory. In this case, the layer closest to the IoT
nodes is the one that responds faster, but it has less computational and memory resources. Services are
then distributed among the gateways in the fog layer. Depending on each service need (e.g., latency,
computational capacity, data aggregation), they will be deployed closer to the nodes or to the cloud.
It is important to note that, since IoT networks adopt heterogeneous topologies, the architecture
presented in Figure 1 does not fit in every possible IoT deployment. Nevertheless, the vast majority of
IoT fog computing systems will follow this architecture to some extent. From bottom-up, the amount
of data transmitted with each transaction grows, as well as the computational capabilities of the
gateways. This increase in data throughput and computational capabilities as we get closer to the top
layers is represented by the big arrow on the left. The requests exchanged between IoT nodes from
the same network consist of small payloads, whereas transactions between different IoT networks are
usually larger, since protocol translations may be needed. Furthermore, IoT gateways can aggregate
information collected from several IoT nodes, allowing the top layers to provide more complex services.
Therefore, the first layer of the fog transmits more data than the IoT nodes, but less than the second
upper layer of gateways. This leads the IoT fog layer to exchange payloads with a wide range of sizes.
When securing IoT devices and its communications, several new challenges have to be addressed
since the topology and size of the networks, as well as the communication schemes, are new and not
completely explored. IoT deployments have some unique characteristics that have a direct impact on
the security of the data and the communications involved:
• Resource-constrained end- and intermediate-devices: the devices forming IoT networks are
constrained in terms of available data storage and computational capabilities. Security mechanisms
must be aware of these limitations, reducing both the need for data storage and the computational
load of the required algorithms.
• Number of devices: IoT networks are formed by thousands of devices with heterogeneous
communication needs. The transmission of data between devices tends to be asynchronous,
creating high requirements for backend and middleware applications in terms of availability
and data throughput. Gateways and backend servers have to be capable of handling very large
numbers of secure connections, and at the same time processing the relevant data to provide the
necessary services.
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• Scalability: IoT networks tend to grow very fast. The infrastructure supporting them has to be
able to cope with a variable number of devices while keeping secure connections and maintaining
reasonable response times.
• Hardware and software evolution: the strength of a security algorithm can be compromised by
two main factors. One is the computational capabilities of processors growing at a fast pace.
The second factor is that new software solutions may speed up the breaking of a security algorithm.
Because of this fact, the security mechanisms chosen must allow for increasing the security level
at any time while maintaining reduced data storage and computational needs.
Figure 1. Generic Internet of Things (IoT) fog computing architecture.
In an IoT fog computing scenario, Transport Layer Security (TLS) arises as one of the best
positioned candidates, but it has the problem that most popular standard ciphering suites available
were not designed having in mind the limitations of resource-constrained and battery-operated devices.
This fact has been changing in the last years, since lighter and more future-proof alternatives are being
supported and implemented widely by the standard.
This article includes three main contributions aimed at fostering security in resource-constrained
energy-efficient IoT fog computing gateways. First, it presents a detailed review of the main and the
latest security concerns in IoT systems. Such a review is completed with a clear description of the most
used mechanism for securing Internet communications, TLS. Moreover, several comparative studies of
Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) and Rivest–Shamir–Adleman (RSA) in terms of performance and
energy efficiency are analyzed. Second, a series of tests are conducted to determine the performance
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and power-consumption impact of using TLS over plain HTTP communications and to measure
the differences between RSA and ECC in a real-world scenario in terms of security, scalability,
power consumption, and data throughput when implemented in an IoT network. Third, the RSA
results are then compared to those obtained by a more suitable approach for IoT gateways, consisting
of using ECC algorithms with key sizes that guarantee an acceptable security level for years to come.
The rest of this article is organized as follows. Section 2 enumerates the main state-of-the-art
hardware platforms and security concerns in IoT fog computing systems, describes the basics of TLS,
and compares RSA and ECC in terms of complexity and performance. Section 3 describes the hardware
and software of the testbed designed. In Section 4, multiple experiments are conducted and their
results are analyzed. Finally, Section 5 is devoted to conclusions.
2. Related Work
2.1. Performance and Security of IoT Hardware for Resource-Constrained Energy-Efficient Gateways
The number of IoT hardware platforms that can be integrated as gateways in a fog computing
system has grown from a few alternatives to a large and heterogeneous ecosystem. In recent years,
the evolution of embedded hardware power efficiency and integration has allowed IoT development
boards to achieve computer-like computational capabilities. This fast evolution makes it very difficult
to give a precise definition of resource-constrained devices in terms of memory size or processor clock
rate. One definition of constrained-node networks can be found in [28]. Three levels of constrained
devices are defined attending at RAM and flash memory available. Because of the fast evolution of
embedded hardware capabilities, this classification fails to give an updated definition of constrained
device. As it can be seen in Table 1, even the less powerful boards available nowadays greatly exceed
the memory values defined by each of the three classes. Some of the boards presented in the table are
also analyzed in [29], where an overview of power efficient development boards for IoT applications
is presented.
As it was mentioned in Section 1, security in IoT systems is often overlooked or addressed
lightly by using weak or ad hoc approaches. For instance, in the case of [23], although TLS tests
are performed, a Pre-Shared Key (PSK) cipher suite (i.e., PSK-AES-128-CCM-8) is used. Since only
symmetric key operations are used for authentication [30], it does not require as much memory as
asymmetric cipher suites. The use of this type of cipher suites constrains the devices to a very specific
scenario (e.g., since PSK is used, it has to be established manually and set up in advance). On top of
that, this cipher suite is also considered insecure and not recommended [31].
A comparison of the computational capabilities of some of the latest hardware platforms available
to implement secure resource-constrained energy-efficient IoT gateways is presented in Table 1.
The table shows the name of the board, the clock rate along with the number of cores of the main
processor, the secondary processor (if available), the amount of embedded RAM and use references.
Table 1. Characteristics of some of the latest Internet of Things (IoT) development boards.
Name Clock Rate Cores RAM References
Meshlium 4.0 1 GHz 4 2 GB [32]
UDOO X86 Basic 2.00 GHz 4 2 GB [33]
Raspberry Pi3 1.2 GHz 4 1 GB [34,35]
Tessel 2 580 MHz/48 MHz 1/1 64 MB [36]
UDOO NEO BASIC 1 GHz/200 MHz 1/1 512 MB [37]
BeagleBoneBlack 800 MHz 1 512 MB [38]
Intel Edison Module 500 MHz 2 1 GB [39]
Arduino Yún 400 MHz/16 MHz 1/1 64 MB/2.5 KB [40,41]
Arduino TIAN 560 MHz/48 MHz 1/1 64 MB/32KB [42]
ESP32 240 MHz 2 512 KB [43]
Particle Photon 120 MHz 1 128 KB [44]
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2.2. IoT Security
The IoT paradigm raises public security concerns, including personal privacy issues, threats
of cyber-attacks, and organized crime [45]. In order to confront the uniqueness of IoT in terms
of the upcoming security challenges, several approaches have been proposed in the literature.
For instance, Vasilomanolakis et al. [46] devised a comprehensive list of privacy and security
requirements with the aim of establishing a standard set of security specifications for IoT technologies.
Moreover, Atamli et al. [47] introduced a threat model as a method to analyze the impact of
threats in different applications. From such a threat model, the authors deduce the security and
privacy requirements.
Leo et al. [48] focused on the design of an architecture for secure exchanges in IoT services. Such
researchers proposed an architecture that is mainly devoted to deploying and managing a federated
environment for an authority delegation mechanism, identity-based capabilities, and dynamic context
information. Another piece of architecture for supporting privacy and security in IoT systems is
presented in [49].
Numerous vulnerabilities have also been detected in IoT communication technologies,
middleware, and Machine-to-Machine (M2M) communications. For example, Grabovica et al. [50]
explored the security protocols provided by communication technologies like Radio-Frequency
IDentification(RFID), Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, and ZigBee. Furthermore, Ngu et al. [51] presented a
survey on the capabilities and challenges of IoT middleware architectures ranging from cloud-based,
service-based and actor-based architectures. A cloud-based IoT middleware architecture is limited
for what is available on the cloud and it varies widely among the different cloud-based platforms.
Typically, their functionalities are exposed as a set of Application Programming Interfaces (APIs).
The functionalities provided can be as simple as a high performance storage system or a powerful
computation engine with predefined monitoring and analysis tools. In the case of a service-based
architecture, a high-performing middleware is generally deployed on multiple nodes running in the
cloud or on powerful gateways between IoT devices and the applications. It is not designed to be
deployed in resource-constrained IoT devices and does not support device-to-device communications.
In an actor-based architecture, the middleware is designed to be lightweight and can be embedded
into all the layers (i.e., sensory layer, mobile access layer, and the cloud). The basic middleware
computation units are thus distributed in the network. It provides the best latency and scalability
for large-scale connected IoT devices. Regarding M2M communications, Barki et al. [52] provided
a survey that addresses the security challenges and threats that arise when dealing with a fusion of
heterogeneous networks.
Furthermore, other researchers suggested security enhancements that rely on a layer-based
approach [53]. An exhaustive analysis on the security protocols and mechanisms available, together
with its operational layer and the security properties and functionality supported, is presented in [54].
In addition, it is worth mentioning that security based on random physical media and objects
is a fast-growing field. The unique and unclonable character of disordered physical structures can
be exploited to address many vulnerabilities. A classification of past and ongoing work in physical
disorder-based security along with security analyses and implementation examples is given in [55].
To enable end-to-end security in constrained network environments, some researchers focused on
different IP-based security protocols for IoT, like Datagram TLS (DTLS) [56], the HIP Diet EXchange
(DEX), and minimal IKEv2. For instance, Hummen et al. [57] identified the challenges that arise when
employing such protocols and provide a high-level overview of approaches proposed to counteract
the design-level protocol issues identified. Moreover, Abeele et al. [58] present an approach that relies
on a trusted gateway to mitigate the overhead of the DTLS handshake in IP-based networks, providing
the flexibility needed to support a variety of security requirements.
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2.3. Securing TCP/IP Communications: TLS
Most IoT deployments, such as the home automation system evaluated in [13], are based on
TCP/IP communications. In order to secure the data transmission in the auto-configuration and
auto-registration protocol, along with the subsequent transducer access, the best option is to use the
TLS [59] standard. For systems that do not depend on TCP/IP, another option could be to use DTLS, the
TLS alternative for User Datagram Protocol (UDP)-based protocols. It was developed for covering the
security needs of new protocols, such as Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP), which uses UDP
instead of TCP. CoAP is basically a reduced HTTP implementation designed to work over 6LoWPAN
networks for IoT applications [54]. CoAP’s main objective is to minimize the overhead created by
the non-payload data required by HTTP. One problem of this approach is that UDP communications
are unreliable. To solve this issue, CoAP defines a reliability mechanism based on request-response
messages that acts as a lightweight TCP implementation using UDP. CoAP was designed having
resource-constrained devices in mind, so security is addressed lightly, with a lot of limitations, such as
the use of pre-shared keys or raw public key cipher suites [60]. Certificates can also be used, but the
cipher suites supported have low security levels. Furthermore, Sehgal et al. [23] concluded that DTLS
uses more RAM and stack memory than TLS, meaning that, for the same security level, there is no
advantage on using DTLS instead of TLS. Hence, only TLS is considered for further analysis.
The primary goal of TLS is to provide privacy and data integrity to the communications performed
over the Internet. One advantage of TLS is that it is independent from the application protocol.
Higher-level protocols can layer on top of the TLS protocol transparently. For instance, the commonly
used HTTPS [61], the protocol to secure Internet web page access and transactions, uses TLS to secure
the communications channel. A large set of protocols, such as File Transfer Protocol over SSL (FTPS),
Simple Mail Transfer Protocol Secure (SMTPS), Real Time Streaming Protocol (RTSP), Internet Message
Access Protocol over SSL (IMAPS) and many more, rely on TLS.
The main goals of the TLS protocol are the following:
• Cryptographic security: TLS can be used to establish a secure connection between two parties.
• Interoperability: two different programmers should be able to develop applications that can
establish a secure communication successfully, without any knowledge of each other’s code,
making use of TLS.
• Extensibility: TLS seeks to provide a framework into which new public key and encryption
methods can be incorporated. This removes the need for new protocol creation or entire library
implementations, reducing the risk of introducing new weaknesses.
• Relative efficiency: cryptographic operations tend to be Central Processing Unit (CPU) intensive,
particularly public key operations. TLS aims to be as efficient as possible while achieving the
security level required.
The protocol is composed of two layers: the TLS Record Protocol and the TLS Handshake Protocol.
The TLS Record Protocol provides connection security with two basic properties:
• Connection privacy: communications are encrypted by using symmetric cryptography
(e.g., AES, RC4). The symmetric keys involved are generated uniquely for each connection and are
based on a secret negotiated previously by another protocol (e.g., the TLS Handshake Protocol).
• Connection reliability: The message transport includes message integrity and authenticity checks
using a keyed Message Authentication Code (MAC). This is achieved by using secure hash
functions (e.g., SHA-1) for MAC computations.
The TLS Handshake Protocol allows server and client to authenticate each other and to negotiate
an encryption algorithm along with the cryptographic keys needed for the application protocol to
transmit or receive data. The three basic properties that the TLS Handshake Protocol grants are:
• The peers involved are authenticated using public key (i.e., asymmetric) cryptography
(e.g., RSA, Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA)).
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• It is secure to negotiate a shared secret. As it was mentioned before, the TLS Record Protocol uses
symmetric key cryptography. The shared secret can be negotiated whilst remaining unavailable
to eavesdroppers and, for an authenticated connection, the secret cannot be obtained, even using
a Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attack.
• The negotiation is reliable: it is not possible for an attacker to modify the negotiation
communications without being detected by the parties involved in such communications.
The TLS Handshake Protocol has three subprotocols that are used to allow peers to agree upon
security parameters for the record layer (i.e., the cipher suite to be used), to authenticate themselves,
to instantiate the security parameters negotiated, and to report error conditions to each other.
2.4. TLS Handshake Procedure and TLS Cipher Suites
The TLS Record Protocol is the one in charge of securing the connection once the TLS Handshake
Protocol takes place and after agreeing on the parameters to use during the TLS session.
A cipher suite is defined by its name, which indicates the algorithms involved in both the TLS
Handshake and the TLS Record operations. For example, the cipher suite ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM
-SHA256 uses:
• ECDHE-RSA: Elliptic curve Diffie–Hellman Ephemeral (ECDHE) with RSA signing for the
key-exchange algorithm.
• AES128-GCM: Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) with a key length of 128 bits as the block
cipher. GCM stands for Galois/Counter Mode and defines the mode of operation of the symmetric
key block cipher. AES is a symmetric encryption algorithm, and the secret used to derive the
ciphering key is the one obtained by the previous use of ECDHE-RSA during the TLS Handshake.
• SHA256: Secure Hash Algorithm with a hash result of 256 bits. This is used as the Pseudo-random
Function (PRF) to ensure the cryptographic integrity of the handshake messages.
In the case of ECC, a more detailed explanation of its cipher suites can be found in [62].
There are two main subgroups of cipher suites recommended for TLS [31]: RSA and ECDHE.
RSA-based cipher suites use RSA as the key-exchange algorithm, while the ECDHE-based ones use
an algorithm that makes use of Ephemeral Diffie–Hellman based on Elliptic Curves. The Ephemeral
part means that the key is regenerated after each session, providing Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS) in
contrast to the variants based on RSA.
Figure 2 illustrates the messages exchanged during the handshake when using the cipher suite
with a ECDHE key-exchange algorithm. dx refers to private keys, while public keys are the ones
defined as Qx. The procedure takes place as follows:
• The client sends a ClientHello specifying its supported cipher suites.
• The server responds with a ServerHello with the cipher suite selected. This is the cipher suite that
is going to be used during the whole TLS session.
• The server sends its certificate in a Certificate message. Along with it, the public key (Qcert) of the
aforementioned certificate is sent.
• The server generates a key pair (ds, Qs) needed for the ECDHE algorithm and sends the public
key to the client, encrypted with the private key of the certificate (dcert(Qs)). This corresponds to
the ServerKeyExchange message.
• Once the client receives the ServerKeyExchange, it uses the certificate’s public key received in
the Certificate message to check the authenticity of the ECDHE public key by verifying the RSA
signature (Qcert(dcert(Qs))), thus obtaining the ECDHE public key (Qs) of the server.
• Finally, the client generates its own ECDHE key pair (dc, Qc) and sends the public key to the server.
• At this point, both server and client can obtain the Session Secret by performing an operation (ECC
dot product) with one’s own private key and the other party’s public-key. For instance, the client
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will perform the dot product of its own private key and the server public key (dcQs) obtaining
as a result a the coordinates of an elliptic curve point (xk, yk). The x-coordinate of this point is
then used to generate the session key needed for the AES128-GCM block cipher, by using a Key
Derivation Function (KDF) [63]. The client sends a finished message encrypted using AES-128
and the server responds with an equivalent message.
Figure 2. Transport Layer Security (TLS) Handshake procedure for ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-
SHA256 and similar cipher suites.
It is important to note that many connections can be established using the same session through
the resumption feature of the TLS Handshake Protocol, but eventually sessions must be renegotiated.
Moreover, it is not always possible to accommodate the use of TLS resumption on IoT fog gateways,
and, depending on the number and periodicity of the connections, its benefits can be limited.
2.5. Cipher Suites for IoT Fog Computing Applications
As explained in Section 2.4, ECDHE can be used as the key-exchange algorithm to obtain
PFS. Note that DHE can also be used, but it is clearly outperformed by ECDHE [64]. The only
reason to use DHE instead of ECDHE is the existence of possible incompatibility issues, but nearly
every TLS implementation supports both algorithms [65–68]. ECDHE-RSA cipher suites signs the
ServerKeyExchange message using the RSA public key certificate. In addition, certificates can be
generated with different public key sizes, 2048-bit RSA being the minimum size considered secure
nowadays. In addition, 768-bit RSA was factored in 2010 using the number field sieve factoring
method [69] and a 1024-bit RSA implementation of OpenSSL was successfully broken using a
fault-based security attack in less than 100 h [70]. However, note that the use of a 2048-bit certificate
on an ephemeral key-exchange algorithm introduces heavy overhead and computing requirements,
which are very difficult to accommodate on the constrained hardware capabilities of most IoT devices.
The encryption and decryption processes take place every time a device accesses or sends data over
a secure connection. Although expensive public-key operations are needed only in the beginning of
the communications (i.e., during the TLS Handshake), they are renegotiated when a new session is
established. Moreover, IoT gateways, that need to manage a great number of connections are even
more affected by this encryption overhead, reducing throughput, and increasing power consumption.
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2.5.1. Public-Key Security Levels
In order to understand better why RSA needs such a big key size to be considered secure,
this section gives an overview of how public-key sizes relate to security.
Public key cryptography is based on the theoretical robustness of trapdoor functions. A trapdoor
function is a mathematical expression that can be easily computed in one direction, but it is very
difficult to compute in the inverse way without some specific information, which is called the
trapdoor. The security level of a public-key cryptosystem is a way of measuring the effort to break its
trapdoor function. The effort is generally expressed as the number of operations needed to break the
cryptographic primitive, meaning that a k-bit security level will need 2k operations to be broken and,
thus, it offers a security level k. With symmetric cryptosystems, the key-length selected directly relates
to the security level offered by the cryptosystem. However, when applying this concept to public-key
schemes, it is not easy to give a value for the security level relying on the length of the key.
For example, the RSA trapdoor function is based on the assumption that factorizing large integer
numbers that are the result of two large prime numbers is a difficult problem to solve. If the prime
numbers used are big enough, the resultant encryption is considered secure.
The process of finding the required prime numbers is fairly simple and the operations required
are not computationally expensive. The problem with the RSA system is that existing algorithms such
as Quadratic Sieve [71] or General Number Field Sieve [72] allow for a faster integer factorization than
brute force or prime guessing approximations. The problem is even worse, due to the fact that these
algorithms work much better the larger the number they are trying to factorize. As a consequence,
the security level that RSA can provide does not grow lineally with key size. This behavior can be
observed in Figure 3, where RSA, ECC, and symmetric ciphers are compared. The key size needed for
the different security levels presented is described in Table 2 [73]. The actual values shown in Figure 3
are taken from TLS curve implementations [62] in the range of these key size values. It can be observed
that even for low security levels, RSA key sizes are much larger than ECC key sizes.
Figure 3. Key size needed for different security levels using symmetric, Rivest–Shamir–Adleman (RSA)
and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) ciphers.
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Table 2. Comparable strengths for symmetric, Rivest–Shamir–Adleman (RSA) and Elliptic Curve
Cryptography (ECC) ciphers.
Security Symmetric RSA ECC
Level Key Algorithms Key Size Key Size
80 2TDEA 1024 bits 160–223 bits
112 3TDEA 2048 bits 224–255 bits
128 AES-128 3072 bits 256–383 bits
192 AES-192 7680 bits 384–511 bits
256 AES-256 15,360 bits 512+ bits
Note that there is not a direct correspondence between security levels and key sizes. For instance,
as described in Table 2, for a 112 security level, a 2048-bit key size must be used if an RSA cipher
is selected, but only a 224-bit key size is needed if the cipher uses ECC. Moreover, these differences
increase with the security level. A comprehensive explanation of security levels, why they can be
misleading and how they are obtained for each type of cipher can be found in [74].
As a final conclusion, it can be stated that security levels offer a much better understanding of how
secure a given algorithm is instead of only relying on the key-size used. In the following sections, the
values presented in Table 2 for ECC and RSA are considered as the reference of the security provided.
2.5.2. ECC vs. RSA: Power Consumption and Performance
Until today, techniques like RSA and ECC were not used in IoT nodes because they have resource
demanding requirements. Thus, other alternatives have been studied. For example, research work in
key management schemes has been conducted in [75,76]. Mbarek et al. [77] compared and analyzed
two different authentication protocols: Security Protocols for sensor Networks (SPINS) and TinySec.
For such an analysis, the authors made use of the Network Simulator version 2 (NS-2) to compare the
performance of both authentication protocols.
Recent research has been focused on the usage of RSA and ECC for resource-constrained
devices and studied the basic operations of Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)
and Elliptic curve Diffie–Hellman (ECDH) [78]. For instance, in [79], both algorithms are analyzed,
and the application of ECC is recommended to increase security and speed. However, the authors
remark that, in order to maximize the performance in chips, the ECC implementation would need
consistent enhancements.
A time performance comparison between ECC (secp160r1, secp192r1, secp224r1) and RSA
(1024 and 2048 bits) is conducted in [80] using 8-bit CPUs. In such a paper, the researchers describe
the implementation of the algorithms and present execution times and detailed information about the
more time-consuming operations. The authors conclude that ECC outperforms RSA for the key sizes
tested, and that it would be even more efficient for larger key sizes.
Other authors studied the communications overhead that a TLS handshake requires when used
in conjunction with ECC [81]. The experiments presented focused on the number of messages
exchanged by third-party cipher suites and by their own ECC library for embedded systems.
Their results represent a useful guide when considering a trade-off between security and performance
in resource-constrained scenarios.
ECC and RSA power consumption has been also studied in different scenarios [24,82,83].
Moreover, a framework for analyzing power consumption of cryptographic algorithms and security
protocols is proposed in [84]. In such a paper, the authors examine several cryptographic algorithms
from the three main classes (i.e., asymmetric, symmetric, and hash) jointly with a comprehensive
analysis of the energy requirements of the security mechanisms. They also study the power
consumption requirements of the transport-layer security protocol (Secure Socket Layer (SSL))
considering the impact of various parameters at the protocol level (such as cipher suites, authentication
mechanisms, and transaction sizes) and the cryptographic algorithm level (i.e., cipher modes, strength).
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The researchers carried out the evaluation on a Compaq iPAQ H3670 Pocket PC, which contains an
Intel SA-1110 with a Strong ARM processor clocked at 206 MHz, 64 MB of RAM, and 16 MB of Flash
ROM. The paper presents the power consumption of the different steps involved in the algorithms
analyzed (e.g., key generation, key exchange, signing, verifying). They also tested the SSL protocol
to transmit payloads that range from 1 KB to 1 MB. After the analysis, the authors presented five
conclusions. First, asymmetric and hash algorithms have the highest and least energy costs, respectively.
Second, the energy cost of asymmetric algorithms is dependent on key size, while symmetric algorithms
are not significantly affected. Third, the power consumption of a symmetric algorithm depends not only
on the bulk data encryption and decryption cost, but also on the key set-up cost. Fourth, wide variations
in power consumption exist within the same family of cryptographic algorithms, and finally, a trade-off
between the level of security provided by the algorithm and energy savings can be achieved by tuning
the parameters.
All the works mentioned provide interesting conclusions and insight into the ECC versus RSA
dilemma. Power consumption and performance results comparing both algorithms are presented,
but all of them fall short at some point. Not taking into account security levels, comparing the
algorithms with an ad hoc implementation and in an isolated way, providing an approximated
value of the energy consumption or not measuring it with external devices, or the use of hardware
platforms that do not provide mid-term valid results are some of the drawbacks found. Furthermore,
some references do not use real communication protocols or use insecure key-lengths or deprecated
cipher suites. None of them compares together power consumption and throughput for real-life IoT
fog computing scenarios with adequate security levels.
3. Evaluating Power Consumption and Throughput in Resource-Constrained IoT Gateways
In this section, a series of tests are conducted to evaluate the impact of TLS on IoT communications
performed by IoT gateways. Since the selected IoT gateways have to cope with constrained resources
(i.e., they require reduced power consumption and have limited computing power) and they are
usually deployed for extended periods of time, cryptographic schemes should be designed to be
efficient, lightweight, and robust.
The objective is to determine the performance and power-consumption impact of using TLS over
plain HTTP communications, and measure the differences between RSA and ECC in a real-world
scenario. Note that the use of HTTP is due to the fact that a fog abstraction layer hides the platform
heterogeneity by providing generic APIs [85], which are usually implemented by using plain HTTP or
HTTP-like APIs that are accessed through horizontal and vertical links (i.e., by performing intra-fog
and inter-fog communications).
3.1. Hardware Testbed
The hardware testbed proposed needs to meet two major objectives. First, it has to support the
cipher suites selected in Section 3.4 and allow for using well-known and tested implementations of
TLS. The usage of specific hardware with ad hoc TLS implementations could bias the results due to the
ciphering algorithm implementations. Therefore, by using some open-source and extensively used TLS
implementation such as OpenSSL [86], the performance and energy consumption differences between
ciphering algorithms should be as close as possible across different hardware and software platforms.
Second, in order to provide medium- and long-term valid conclusions, the selected hardware must
fulfill future performance expectations for energy-efficient IoT gateways.
To comply with all these requirements, it was decided to use a Single Board Computer (SBC)
based on a low power consumption SoC. The Cortex-A7 [87] was chosen since it fits the requirements
and it is the most efficient ARMv7-A processor and the most commercially successful with more than
a billion units in production.
Note also that three SBCs are actually needed: one running as server, another running as client,
and a third in charge of measuring power consumption. Several SBCs were evaluated and Orange Pi
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PCs [88] were finally selected, since they offer a good trade-off between features and cost (as of writing,
its price starts as low as $15). This SBC uses an Allwinner H3 SoC [89] with a quad-core Cortex-A7
configuration. The detailed PCB layout of an Orange Pi PC is depicted in Figure 4. Using a different
SBC or SoC-based platform could yield different total power consumption results, but the conclusions
obtained when comparing cipher suites should not change.
It is worth mentioning that, during the tests, in order to measure power consumption, external
hardware was used instead of the Advanced Configuration and Power Interface (ACPI) of the SBCs.
In this way, current readings are independent from the particular ACPI-related hardware of the SBC
and the setup remains valid for any other SBC.
Figure 4. Orange Pi PC Printed Circuit Board (PCB). Top view (A) and bottom view (B).
The main characteristics of the Orange Pi PC are:
• 1 GB DDR RAM.
• Allwinner H3 SoC, A7 quad-core 1.6 GHz processor.
• 100 Mbit Ethernet.
• 3 USB 2.0 ports.
• 5 V/2 A power input.
• HDMI output.
Although the Allwinner H3 SoC has hardware-accelerated encryption support powered by a
Crypto Engine (CE), it was not used during the tests, since it can distort the results obtained. Moreover,
it must be mentioned that, as of writing, the driver available for the CE does not support RSA or
ECDSA acceleration [90].
During the experiments, the Orange Pi PCs were connected using a TP-Link TL-SG108 Gigabit
switch and ad hoc Cat 5e Ethernet patch cables. To power up the system, a fixed 5 V/12 A power
source was used. The SD cards used were four 32 GB Samsung Evo MB-MP32DA/EU cards.
To measure the current being drawn, an Adafruit INA219 was selected, since it offers enough
precision (it can be configured in high precision mode measuring 0.1 mA steps with a maximum of
±400 mA or in low precision mode measuring 0.8 mA steps and a maximum of ±3.2 A), and allows
for measuring up to 26 V. The Inter-Integrated Circuit I2C bus used by the INA219 makes it easy to
configure the device and to measure values in an automatized way. For instance, an INA219 was
utilized by GreenMiner [91], a framework aimed at measuring the real energy consumption of a
given application running in an actual smartphone. Figure 5 shows the four SBCs (three used for the
experiments and one used as a gateway to allow external access to the testbed) along with the INA219,
the switch, the power supply, and one fan for cooling purposes.
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Figure 5. Testbed. (A) Orange Pi PC Single Board Computers (SBCs); (B) INA219; (C) switch; (D) power
supply; (E) cooling fan.
3.2. Testbed Architecture
The different hardware components described in the previous subsection are organized in the
architecture described in Figure 6. The 5 Volt supply powers directly the Orange Pi PC in charge of
acquiring the energy consumption samples. Between the power supply and the other two Orange Pi
PCs (one acting as a server and the other acting as a client), two INA219 modules are installed, one
for each PC. The INA219 modules are also connected to the third Orange Pi PC using the I2C bus,
allowing it for accessing the modules and reading the desired values. A Gigabit switch is in charge of
providing network connectivity to the three SBCs. A PC with Wireshark installed is also connected
to the switch, in order to perform a frame time analysis. Finally, the Gigabit switch is connected to
the Internet using a domestic Gateway (do not confuse with the concept of IoT gateway), in order to
provide Internet access to the Orange Pi PC in charge of acquiring the energy consumption samples.
The Internet connectivity is only needed for simplifying the process of extracting the values obtained
during the tests, so they can be processed and analyzed. In this way, the results are uploaded to a
server where they can be easily accessed.
Figure 6. Detailed testbed architecture.
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3.3. Software
The operating system installed on the Orange Pi PC was ARMbian [92], a modified Debian
distribution for ARM-powered devices.
The HTTP servers used for the tests were Apache2 and Nginx. These two web servers were
chosen since they are, as of writing, the most popular [93], with a market share of 51.5% and 31.3%,
respectively. During the experiments, the same tests were run in two different web servers to eliminate
any bias that could be introduced by the server implementation or configuration. In addition, both
servers used the same TLS library (OpenSSL).
To automate the HTTP/HTTPS request generation process, an HTTP benchmark software was
used. Some alternatives were studied, such as Apache Benchmark [94], Httperf [95] or Siege [96].
Eventually, Siege was selected because, although significant differences were not found among the
different benchmark software in terms of features, Siege was easier to run and parse, and presented all
the necessary configuration parameters needed for the tests.
The configuration used for Apache2 and Nginx was left to default values. Both servers were
installed using Aptitude and the default repositories of the ARMBian distribution. It was verified
that both servers were configured for using all four logical processors available on the Orange Pi PC
SOCs. The only change in configuration was made to enable and disable GNU ZIP (GZIP) compression
and configure the same compression level on both Apache2 and Nginx when compression was used.
A compression level of 6 was selected, since it provides a good trade-off between computational cost
and size reduction on the resulting compressed data.
The specific versions of the software used were:
• ARMBIAN Debian GNU/Linux 8 (jessie) 3.4.112-sun8i / #10 SMP PREEMPT Sun Oct 23 16:06:55
CEST 2016 armv7l.
• Apache/2.4.10 (Debian) Sep 16 2016 10:04:38.
• nginx/1.6.2.
• OpenSSL 1.0.1t May 3rd 2016.
• SIEGE 3.0.8.
3.4. Selected Cipher Suites and Certificate Generation
The main algorithms involved in a cipher suite were examined previously in Section 2.4.
The public key authentication, where the signing and verifying processes are performed during
the TLS handshake, demands the highest computational power. To analyze the impact of ECC and
RSA, two identical cipher suites were selected, with the only difference being the signing algorithm
used during the key exchange (i.e., RSA and ECDSA):
• ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256.
• ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256.
It is important to note that both cipher suites use ECC in the key-exchange process (i.e., ECDHE),
but the key signing and verifying processes are carried out using RSA and ECDSA, respectively.
Both cipher suites chosen are among the few recommended by the National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) guidelines for cipher suite selection and configuration [31], sharing all the
parameters but the signing algorithm.
As explained in [62], ECDHE_ECDSA cipher suite certificates must contain an ECDSA-capable public
key and the ServerKeyExchange parameters must be signed with this key. Equivalently, ECDHE_RSA
cipher suite certificates must contain an RSA-capable public key. Thus, two different certificates are
needed, one for each cipher suite.
OpenSSL was used in order to generate the certificates. The selected key sizes for each certificate
are obtained from Table 2, for a strength level of 112. For RSA, a 2048-bit key size was selected, and,
for ECC, the secp256r1 curve (also known asprime256v1 andNIST P-256) was chosen. Such a curve
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corresponds to a 256-bit ECC key size; therefore, the ECC certificate is closer to a strength level of 128
than to a 112 strength level. This difference in strength level obeys for two reasons. First, 2048-bit RSA
is one of the most used signing systems for TLS and the curve secp256r1 is one of the TLS ECC curves
with greater support. Second, the experiments were designed to show the advantages of ECC over




To evaluate the performance differences between the selected RSA and ECDSA cipher suites,
a series of tests were performed. A set of files using JSON data were created using lorem ipsum
extracts [97], along with randomly generated strings to obtain the desired file sizes. JSON data files
were generated through a Python script using the library Faker (version 0.7.3) [98]. This file generation
process was conceived with two goals in mind: to allow for creating files with the exactly desired size,
and to make use of data structures similar to the ones usually transmitted by IoT devices, achieving
GZIP compression ratios similar to real scenarios. An analysis on the compression ratios that can be
reached for different types of data can be found in [99]. The sizes of the files generated ranged from
32 bytes to 131,072 bytes (128 kilobytes) in a base-2 exponential progression. The x-axis spacing of the
charts presented in this section correspond to the value log 2(bytes), but the byte values are presented
instead of the logarithmic value for a more intuitive representation.
The impact of the signing algorithm used in the TLS handshake (i.e., ECDSA or RSA for the
cipher suites selected) is independent of the size of the payload transmitted by the underlying HTTP
communications. Since the aim of the tests performed was to determine the relative impact of the
ciphering algorithm in a real IoT scenario, payloads with different sizes were used. Typical payloads
transmitted by IoT gateways when managing requests from a few IoT nodes are represented with the
lower values used in these tests (i.e., from 32 to 1024 bytes). Nevertheless, IoT gateways can transmit
larger payloads as a result of carrying out data aggregation for several IoT nodes. Payloads as large as
128 kilobytes are used to determine whether input/output operations and network transactions have
an impact on power consumption and data throughput when using different cipher suites. These tests
allow not only determining the suitability of ECDSA over RSA for small fog computing networks,
but also for densely populated IoT networks.
For each file size, Siege was run making use of the multiple configuration parameters it offers,
which allow for varying the number of concurrent clients, the amount of requests per client, the delay
between requests, and much more. The configuration used was as follows:
• Benchmark mode: no delay between client requests.
• 200 requests per client.
• Concurrent clients from 2 to 128 in a base-2 exponential progression.
Combining the file sizes with the number of concurrent Siege clients, a total of 91 separate tests
were performed for each cipher suite and web server. The same tests were also conducted for plain
HTTP to determine a reference baseline where no encryption algorithms were used. All tests were run
using both GZIP compression and no compression at all. Thus, Siege was run 1092 separate times to
obtain the results presented. The same tests were performed two times, one for measuring the server
side power consumption and another to measure the client side.
4.2. Baseline Power Consumption Test
In order to analyze the impact of the hardware platform and the Linux distribution on the power
consumption, several tests were performed. For an interval of ten minutes, an instantaneous power
consumption sample was obtained each second for three different scenarios.
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• Idle state: the Orange Pi PC was running the Linux system while the Nginx web server was left in
an idle state, with all the other services running.
• Load state: using another Orange Pi PC board, Siege was executed with 16 concurrent clients
against the Orange Pi PC while running the Nginx server. This test was performed by
downloading a 512 byte file with Siege configured in benchmark mode. This test was performed
using two different configurations:
– HTTPS and Nginx configured to use the ECDSA cipher suite.
– Plain HTTP.
With these tests, three different power consumption baselines were obtained, as it is illustrated
in Figure 7.
Figure 7. Power consumption during 10 min for idle state and 16 concurrent clients accessing a 512 byte
payload served by Nginx using HTTPS and HTTP.
As it can be observed, power consumption remains stable when the board is idling, with minimal
and low amplitude deviations. When using HTTP, power consumption increases, but it presents
several drops that even reach idle power consumption values. This is explained due to the fact
that the HTTP requests are processed extremely fast, leading to very short time intervals where no
input/output or network operations are being carried out by the Nginx server. As expected, HTTPS
power consumption is the highest and it presents less amplitude variation. Compared to plain HTTP,
the use of TLS is more CPU intensive and leads to longer lasting transactions that keep the CPU
from idling.
After analyzing these results, it can be concluded that the hardware and software of the testbed
has a very stable base power consumption. Furthermore, it can be stated that any relevant energy
consumption differences observed during the next tests can be attributed directly to the cipher suite
algorithms evaluated.
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4.3. Analysis of the Effect of Compression, Server Implementation, and Cipher Suite Selection on Power
Consumption and Data Throughput
Figure 8 shows the server side energy consumption values for both Apache and Nginx running
the ECC and RSA cipher suites, as well as for plain HTTP communications. Both GZIP compression
(solid lines) and no compression (dotted lines) test results are represented, using all the different
payload size files except the ones for which compression causes larger payloads to be transmitted due
to GZIP overhead (32, 64, and 128 bytes). For the sake of clarity, only the 16 concurrent client test charts
are shown. As it can be observed in the next figures, the results with this number of clients are more
stable than the ones obtained with less concurrency. By using more concurrent clients, the absolute
energy consumption value varies, but the differences between implementations remain constant. As it
can be seen, there is almost no difference in energy consumption for each curve until the payload
size exceeds 4096 bytes. With 4096 bytes or more, all six combinations of cipher suite and web server
present an increment on energy consumption when using GZIP compared with using no compression.
This is due to the fact that the compression of large files takes more time and power, and in a general
IoT scenario, the gains of sending less data through the network do not compensate for the effort of
compressing data in terms of total energy consumption.
Figure 8. Server-side page size versus energy consumption for Apache2 and Nginx with 16 concurrent
clients, with and without GNU ZIP (GZIP) compression.
Similarly, Figure 9 presents the results for the same test, but measuring the energy consumption
at the client side. In this case, the difference starts to be noticeable when the payload size exceeds
8192 bytes, although the absolute difference is smaller than in the server case. These differences were
expected, since GZIP is asymmetric, the computational cost of compression being greater than the
computational cost of decompression. To sum up: GZIP decreases the energy efficiency for large
payloads and does not enhance it for smaller payloads.
For a better visualization of the differences in energy consumption, Tables 3 and 4 present the
relative energy consumption, expressed as a percentage, of using GZIP compression compared to
no compression. These results correspond to the same test results presented in Figures 8 and 9.
For example, in the case of using Apache as a server, Table 3 shows, for a 256-byte payload, that
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compression makes the system consume 1.9% more in the case of RSA, 4.3% more in the case of
ECDSA, and 83.7% more in the case of HTTP. However, when the same tests are run at the client side
(whose results are shown in Table 4), it can be observed that the use of compression consumes 1.6%
and 4.4% less for RSA and ECDSA, respectively, than when no compression is used. These differences
between client and server are explained in Section 4.3 and are due to the asymmetric nature of the
compression algorithms. In any case, the gains are minimal and only present at the client side.
Table 3. Server-side page size versus energy consumption difference (in percentage) between GNU
ZIP (GZIP) compression and no compression for Apache2 and Nginx with 16 concurrent clients.
Bytes Apache RSA Nginx RSA Apache ECDSA Nginx ECDSA Apache HTTP Nginx HTTP
256 1.9% 1.7% 4.3% 1.1% 83.7% 39.8%
512 1.7% 0.9% 3.5% 1.5% 112.2% 34.3%
1024 1.1% 1.6% 4.2% 0.6% 136.4% 25.0%
2048 2.8% 2.3% 5.5% 0.4% 131.2% 68.2%
4096 2.8% 2.5% 8.0% 1.8% 140.1% 69.1%
8192 5.0% 4.6% 11.5% 3.8% 187.0% 72.4%
16,384 10.0% 8.9% 22.6% 13.2% 179.7% 117.0%
32,768 23.4% 18.9% 54.9% 38.2% 197.9% 179.5%
65,536 58.0% 55.7% 125.7% 93.3% 209.3% 291.1%
131,072 118.2% 122.3% 198.0% 146.2% 209.8% 337.4%
With the results presented it can be concluded that, in terms of energy efficiency, GZIP is not
recommended for large payloads, and has almost no effect on the payloads that will be typically
involved in IoT node communications. For payloads of 128 bytes and less, using GZIP compression
will not only increment power consumption, but it will also increase the size of the original data,
resulting in more data being transmitted through the network. Because of this, the results presented in
the next subsections were obtained without using any kind of compression.
Figure 9. Client-side page size versus energy consumption for Apache2 and Nginx with 16 concurrent
clients, with and without GNU ZIP (GZIP) compression.
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Table 4. Client-side page size versus energy consumption difference (in percentage) between GNU ZIP
(GZIP) compression and no compression for Apache2 and Nginx with 16 concurrent clients.
Bytes Apache RSA Nginx RSA Apache ECDSA Nginx ECDSA Apache HTTP Nginx HTTP
256 −1.6% −1.3% −4.4% −5.0% 46.0% 19.2%
512 0.5% −1.5% −5.0% −5.2% 48.6% −3.2%
1024 0.1% − 1.3% −4.3% −4.5% 50.6% 11.4%
2048 0.5% −1.7% −4.2% −4.7% 60.8% 10.4%
4096 1.2% −0.6% −4.5% −7.1% 50.6% 9.8%
8192 2.1% 1.1% −1.8% −6.3% 41.3% −4.4 %
16,384 5.3% 2.6% 1.6% −3.9% 37.0% −3.4%
32,768 13.6% 9.8% 6.7% 3.8% 40.1% 8.8%
65,536 33.7% 24.8% 23.4% 10.5% 73.2% 28.9%
131,072 61.3% 41.9% 46.7% 23.5% 87.8% 43.6%
4.4. Comparative Analysis of RSA and ECC Energy Consumption and Data Throughput
Figures 10–12 present the energy consumption on the server-side expressed in mWh for different
payloads using 2, 16, and 128 concurrent clients, respectively. These three cases were selected to
illustrate low, medium, and high client-transaction load scenarios. Other amounts of concurrent client
tests are omitted since their results are very similar. Note that the oscillation of the two-concurrent
client curves (Figure 10) is higher than in the other two cases. This is due to the lower number
of samples averaged for this case, since only 400 requests are used, in contrast to 3200 and 51,200
requests for the 16 and 128 concurrent client scenarios. Therefore, increasing the number of concurrent
clients smooths the results and the differences between the cipher suites due to the larger number of
transactions averaged.
Figure 10. Server-side page size versus energy consumption for Apache2 and Nginx with two
concurrent clients.
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Figure 11. Server-side page size versus energy consumption for Apache2 and Nginx with
16 concurrent clients.
Figure 12. Server-side page size versus energy consumption for Apache2 and Nginx with
128 concurrent clients.
Figure 10 shows that, for two concurrent clients, energy consumption is reduced by half when
using ECC. For 16 and 128 concurrent clients, ECC energy consumption savings achieve a 60%
reduction respect to the RSA implementation. Note that the gain with two concurrent clients is not
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larger due to the fact that the SBC processor is more time idle than in the cases when more clients are
sending requests. With 16 and 128 concurrent clients, the difference in energy consumption drops to
about a 40% reduction for a 128 kilobyte payload. Thus, large payloads increase energy consumption
due to internal input–output data operations and network data transmissions. This diminishes the
impact of the cipher suite in the energy consumption values, thus reducing the savings and the final
difference between cipher suites. Furthermore, by observing the HTTP energy consumption curve of
Figure 10, it can be concluded that the effect of large payloads on the energy consumption does not
depend on TLS or on the cipher suite selected.
Figure 13 presents the throughput expressed in requests per second for HTTP, ECDSA, and RSA
for different amounts of concurrent clients and for a payload size of 512 bytes. Figure 14 presents
the same results, but it removes the HTTP curves to observe better the differences between RSA and
ECDSA. A drop in performance can be seen for Apache as the number of concurrent clients rises,
both for RSA and ECDSA. This figure is a good example of how the implementation and configuration
influence the servers and justifies the presence in the comparison of Apache and Nginx instead of
showing results for only one server.
Once a minimal number of concurrent clients is reached, in this case 8, the server is constantly
responding to requests. This causes the requests per second to remain constant even if the number
of concurrent clients is increased. Comparing ECC with RSA, the former is able to handle more than
twice requests per second. This can be seen as a relevant result only for servers or IoT gateways that
need to handle multiple requests coming from hundreds or even thousands of IoT nodes.
Note that the inverse of requests per second value (i.e., 1/requests/second) represents the mean
response time for a single request. When calculating such a metric, a result can be obtained that an
RSA transaction takes approximately 0.012 s, while, when using ECC, it only takes 0.005 s. These delay
values are critical when real time actuation over IoT devices is required, and, since ECC is 2.5 times
faster than RSA, it represents a better option for these types of applications.
Figure 13. Server-side concurrent clients versus throughput for Apache2 and Nginx with 512 bytes
of payload for Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA), Rivest–Shamir–Adleman (RSA),
and HTTP.
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Figure 14. Server-side concurrent clients versus throughput for Apache2 and Nginx with 512 bytes of
payload for Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) and Rivest–Shamir–Adleman (RSA).
Figure 15 presents the requests per second per mWh (i.e., requests/s/mWh) for a 512-byte payload
and different concurrent clients. Once again, it can be observed that ECC consumes less energy than
RSA: is requires between 2 and 2.5 times less energy per request than RSA, depending on the total
number of concurrent clients.
Figure 15. Server-side concurrent clients versus requests/mWh for Apache2 and Nginx with 512 bytes
of payload for Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) and Rivest–Shamir–Adleman (RSA).
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The same power measurements were taken at the client-side. Figures 16–18 represent the same
results of Figures 10–12, but for the client. As it can be observed, at the client-side, ECDSA is still more
energy-efficient than RSA, but the difference is less dramatic than at the server-side. This difference
is due to the fact that, in the case of RSA, signing and verifying processes require asymmetric
computational operations costs, but they are almost symmetric for ECDSA, as other authors have also
observed [84]. It is important to note that, in the experiments performed, a 112-bit security level key is
being used for RSA in contrast with a more secure 128-bit security level key for ECDSA: even with
this difference, ECC is more efficient at both the server- and the client-side. It is also important to
remark that, in the tests performed, only server authentication was used. Client authentication might
be needed in some scenarios: in such a case, the server- and client-sides would obtain similar energy
consumption values, since both carry out signing and verifying operations.
Figure 19 shows the results for the same tests as Figure 15, but at the client-side. The results
present a reduction in the difference of energy consumption per request between RSA and ECDSA
compared to the obtained in server side. However, ECDSA still consumes about 20% less energy per
request than RSA.
Finally, Figure 20 illustrates the total energy consumption at server- and client-sides for a 512-byte
payload and 32 concurrent users. The total energy consumption is reduced about 50% when using
ECDSA instead of RSA. The specific energy consumption values for server- and client-side, expressed
in mWh, are shown in Table 5.
Figure 16. Client-side page size versus energy consumption for Apache2 and Nginx with two
concurrent clients.
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Figure 17. Client-side page size versus energy consumption for Apache2 and Nginx with 16
concurrent clients.
Figure 18. Client-side page size versus energy consumption for Apache2 and Nginx with 128
concurrent clients.
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Figure 19. Client-side concurrent clients versus requests/mWh Apache2 and Nginx with 512 bytes of
payload for Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) and Rivest–Shamir–Adleman (RSA).
Figure 20. Total energy consumption for a 512-byte payload for 32 concurrent clients. Client and
server-side consumption stacked for Apache and Nginx using Elliptic Curve Digital Signature
Algorithm (ECDSA), Rivest–Shamir–Adleman (RSA), and plain HTTP.
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Table 5. Total energy consumption for a 512-byte payload for 32 concurrent clients. Client and
server-side consumption for Apache and Nginx using Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
(ECDSA), Rivest–Shamir–Adleman (RSA), and plain HTTP.
Server and Cipher 1 Server Consumption (mWh) Client Consumption (mWh)
Apache RSA 17.28 8.38
Nginx RSA 16.36 8.02
Apache ECDSA 6.79 7.00
Nginx ECDSA 6.08 6.60
Apache HTTP 0.28 0.27
Nginx HTTP 0.26 0.28
1 Cipher or plain HTTP.
4.5. Frame Analysis
The main reasons to choose HTTP over other protocols oriented towards energy consumption
optimization, like CoAP or Message Queue Telemetry Transport (MQTT), are the repeatability of the
tests performed and the need for IoT fog gateways to support TCP/IP. HTTP is the most used protocol
on network communications, hence we consider it as the best option in terms of consistency and
implementation efficiency. The tests performed were aimed at determining the differences between
RSA and ECC when securing network communications. To understand better how the communications
protocol and compression affect the tests, as well as how both RSA and ECDSA cipher suites compare
to plain HTTP communications, an Ethernet frame analysis was carried out. The IoT scenario remained
the same as in the previous tests, but a desktop computer running Wireshark [100] was sniffing the
packets exchanged between the Orange Pi PCs. To transmit the frames to the desktop computer,
it was necessary to modify the TL-SG108 switch configuration to mirror the packages received in the
ports connected to the Orange Pi PCs to the port connected to the desktop computer. Note that the
time instants presented in the next figures are not the exact times when the data were received at the
Orange Pi PCs, but the instants when the frames reached the desktop computer running Wireshark.
While using a dedicated switch and a controlled network environment, these times can vary and have
to be treated as approximations.
Figures 21 and 22 present the handshake and data transmission times when sending 512 byte
and 128 kilobyte packets. The results were obtained using Apache and Nginx for all the cipher suites
and compression combinations tested in the previous experiments. In the figures, the handshake
time also contains the first compression steps when GZIP is enabled. As it can be seen in the figures,
when using GZIP, the first transmitted payload frame takes longer to be sent, since data have to be
compressed. The total transmission time is also higher, being more noticeable when using a 128 kilobyte
payload. For 512 byte payloads, there is a minimal difference in the total time when using Nginx.
Apache presents very similar times, being even faster when RSA is used. For 128 kilobyte payloads,
using no compression is always faster, with reductions in time of up to 46%. This makes GZIP not
recommended both in terms of energy consumption (as concluded in Section 4.4) and in terms of
actuation delay and throughput.
Comparing ECDSA with RSA, it can be seen that, for 128 kilobyte payloads, ECDSA greatly
reduces the total transaction time, being the main time reduction produced in the handshake as
expected. The differences in the handshake times between GZIP and no GZIP are due to the fact that
the time presented for the handshake also includes the first GZIP operations. For 512 byte payloads
and using NGINX, the time differences are even larger, since the savings in the handshake remain
constant, and the data transmission time is reduced. For Apache and 512 byte payloads, the times are
almost the same for all of the tests performed. The reason behind this unexpected behavior seems to
be an Apache implementation performance inefficiency in the TLS Handshake when ECDSA is used,
as explained in the analysis of Figure 23.
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Figure 21. Handshake and payload communication times for 512-byte and a 128-kilobyte payloads
using Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA), Rivest–Shamir–Adleman (RSA), and HTTP,
with and without GNU ZIP (GZIP) compression using Apache2. * HTTP handshake for HTTP, Transport
Layer Security (TLS) and HTTP handshakes for ECDSA and RSA.
Figure 23 presents a detailed analysis of the time involved in the main TLS handshake steps
and data transmission. The size of each colored bar represents the time elapsed from the previous
frame. It is important to note that for a 512 byte payload size using Apache with ECDSA, the Client
Key-Exchange frame is delayed compared to the other scenarios. This explains why Figure 23 presents
very similar time values for ECDSA and RSA, compared with Figure 22, where a clear difference can
be seen. It also explains the gap in requests per second between Apache and Nginx that can be seen in
Figure 14 and, consequently, the same gap in terms of requests per mWh in Figure 15. The reason for
this delay can be attributed to some kind of performance drawback due to Apache implementation
or concurrency configuration, although the specific cause remains unknown. Apart from that, it can
be observed that, in every scenario, the first frame containing a data payload is always transmitted
sooner when using ECDSA.
Table 6 shows the number of total data transmitted through the network, along with the number
of frames needed for each server and cipher suite, for a 512 byte and a 128 kilobyte payload, in the
cases when GZIP compression is enabled or disabled. Taking a closer look at the no-compression
transactions, it can be observed that, for a 512-byte payload, the RSA cipher suite transmits about 15%
more data than the ECC cipher suite. Likewise, the ECC cipher suite transmits about 130% more data
than plain HTTP.
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The number of frames is almost the same in both cipher suites, but such an amount is larger
than without security, due to the TLS handshake messages transmitted at the beginning of the
communications. However, for a 128 kilobyte payload, the total data transmitted is almost the
same for both cipher suites and plain HTTP. Specifically, RSA is the one that requires less frames,
followed by ECDSA and HTTP. This behavior is due to cumulative Acknowledgements ACKs, where
the same ACK frame is used to confirm several received frames. When using TLS, processing each
received frame takes more time than when using plain HTTP. In this interval of time, other frames can
arrive, and, in this case, only the ACK is sent to confirm all of them. Thus, the number of ACKs and
the total data transmitted are reduced.
Figure 22. Handshake and payload communication times for 512-byte and a 128-kilobyte payloads
using Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA), Rivest–Shamir–Adleman (RSA), and HTTP,
with and without GNU ZIP (GZIP) compression using Nginx. * HTTP handshake for HTTP, Transport
Layer Security (TLS) and HTTP handshakes for ECDSA and RSA.
As an example, and using the Apache results, if we take the Maximum Transmission Unit
(MTU) of our network (1514 bytes of frame length), each TCP frame contains 1448 bytes of payload.
For HTTP, only one package of data is sent, corresponding to the 128 kilobyte JSON. This results in
approximately 91 TCP segments. Taking into account the handshake (five frames) and FIN message
(three frames), a total of 190 frames should be sent if, for each TCP frame, an ACK is also sent, but only
160 frames are transmitted. Using the ECDSA cipher suite, the 128 kilobyte JSON is divided into
partitions of 16 kilobytes, corresponding to the TLS Record size, and then each of these partitions
is sent over TCP. Since the MTU is 1448 bytes, each partition will need 12 frames to be transmitted
(i.e., 16, 384/1448 = 11.31 rounded up to 12 whole frames, since no partial frames can be sent),
leaving a total of 96 TCP segments. Once again, taking into account the TLS handshake in this
case (10 frames) and the FIN message (six frames), 208 frames would be needed, but only 158 are
transmitted. With HTTP, 61 ACKs are sent, and with ECDSA, only 46 are sent, which results in an
average of 0.63 ACKs per TCP frame in HTTP and 0.48 ACKs per TCP frame in ECDSA.
Using GZIP compression for a 512 byte payload presents some data reduction and heavily
reduces the data and number of frames transferred for a 128 kilobyte payload, but, as it was seen
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before, these gains in network traffic do not compensate for the cost of compression and decompression
in terms of power efficiency.
Figure 23. Time elapsed until each main step of the Transport Layer Security (TLS) handshake, start and
end of the data transmission. * The frame contains several messages besides the Server Hello/Client
Key Exchange/Handshake Messages.
Table 6. Total data and frames transmitted using GNU ZIP (GZIP) and no compression for 512 byte
and 128 kilobyte payloads.
No Compression GZIP
512 Bytes 128 Kilobytes 512 Bytes 128 Kilobytes
Server and Cipher 1 Bytes Frames Bytes Frames Bytes Frames Bytes Frames
Apache RSA 4206 16 142,303 127 4141 16 85,777 90
Nginx RSA 4104 15 142,428 129 3957 15 85,177 91
Apache ECDSA 3626 16 143,770 158 3561 16 85,395 93
Nginx ECDSA 3524 15 143,366 152 3438 16 84,598 91
Apache HTTP 1613 10 142,081 160 1519 10 83,272 95
Nginx HTTP 1531 9 144,263 163 1450 9 83,346 98
1 Cipher or plain HTTP.
4.6. Comparison to Previous Studies in Terms of Energy Consumption
In this subsection, previous similar studies are analyzed, taking into consideration the results
obtained and the testing methodology employed. Main references are presented in Table 7. For each
reference, the closest results to our test experiments are presented. Moreover, the table presents a brief
description of the used hardware, the algorithms that each solution compares, the energy consumption
results and, finally, an evaluation of the methodology employed. In the last column, the resemblance
and dissimilarity with our analysis and testing methodology are remarked on in order to perform a
fair comparison for each reference.
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Table 7. Analysis of the main RSA and ECC comparisons available.







Energy consumption savings of 16.7 % for a
7.9KB payload when using the ECC cipher
suite compared to the RSA one.








RSA and 160-bit ECC
Energy consumption savings of 76.2 %
when using ECC-160 compared to
RSA-1024.







192, 224 and 521-bit
ECC and 192, 256 and
512-bit RSA
Up to 93.02 % reduction of energy
consumption when using ECC compared
to RSA.
It is a direct comparison between both algorithms using the same
key sizes. The relative security levels are not taken into account.
Energy consumptions are aggregated for each algorithm, without
presenting individual results for the different key sizes employed.






ECDSA key generation found to be more
than 73 times faster than RSA. Total time of
generation and verification found to be
almost 16 times faster for ECDSA
compared to RSA.




with Core 2 Duo CPU
@ 2.0 GHz/4 GB RAM
2048-bit RSA and
163-bit ECDSA
Up to 4 times faster TLS-OBC [103]
certificate generation when using ECDSA
compared to RSA.
Only client authentication times are measured. Personal
computer environment. No energy consumption
metrics presented.
[104]
Intel XScale PXA250 @
400 MHz/64 MB





Up to 78 % energy consumption reduction
when using ECDSA compared to RSA for
PXA250. Only 18 % energy consumption
savings for PXA270.
This solution tests cryptographic algorithms but no actual
network transactions involving them are conducted. Power
consumption is estimated with reference values obtained from
battery status information using a software approach without
external hardware. Battery status information is obtained using
the same device that runs the cryptographic algorithm.
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After analyzing all of them, it can be concluded that none of the references present a fair
comparison of ECC and RSA valid for current and future IoT scenarios. The hardware platforms
presented were not chosen having an IoT scenario in mind. Some references use outdated
algorithms, insecure key sizes, or make unfair comparisons without taking into account security
levels. Other authors employ ad hoc implementations that are not useful in real IoT deployments.
Various references do not present energy consumption metrics, or the power consumption values are
estimated and not measured with precise hardware. Moreover, the vast majority perform isolated tests
where no network communications are taken into account.
Contrarily, the tests presented in this paper take into account all of these details. The hardware
testbed was chosen to remain comparable with future platforms in the years to come. Furthermore,
the cipher suites and the key sizes employed guarantee acceptable security levels for current and
future IoT gateway developments. The chosen security library is OpenSSL, an open and widely used
implementation of the TLS standard. For instance, the two most extensively used web servers (Apache
and Nginx) are employed and compared, and the network communications are carried out over a real
network environment. On top of that, energy measurements are performed using isolated and precise
hardware with a dedicated SBC.
5. Conclusions
In this article, the suitability and possible gains of using ECC digital signing algorithms, instead
of the extensively used RSA for securing IoT fog computing gateway communications, was evaluated.
It can be stated that even a small difference in energy consumption and computational load results in a
huge impact on IoT gateways, especially on the ones with a constrained power supply, so determining
the best way of securing their communications is a critical step for a successful and broad deployment.
Therefore, this article made three main contributions aimed at fostering security in
resource-constrained IoT gateways. First, in order to establish the basics, it presented a detailed
review of the current security, performance capabilities and the problems related to IoT gateways
for fog computing. Such a review analyzed the hardware limiting factors, the current state-of-the
art hardware platforms and security mechanisms, and its estimated evolution for the near-future,
using a general IoT fog computing architecture as a reference. The review was completed with a clear
description of TLS. Moreover, the main cipher suites for IoT applications and the state-of-the-art of
performance and energy consumption comparisons between ECC and RSA were analyzed. Special care
was taken to identify the main limitations when applying the power consumption and performance
analysis techniques available in the literature to IoT environments. A detailed explanation of these
limitations, and how they are sorted out by the suggested testbed, was also presented.
Second, a hardware testbed was created that allows for using the latest TLS implementations
and cipher suites, and performing energy consumption and data throughput tests in a real scenario.
The power consumption measurement system guarantees precise and unbiased samples, since it is fully
isolated from the rest of the elements being measured. At the same time, the low power consumption
and computing capabilities of the Orange Pi PC employed represent the current and short-term future
of the energy-efficient IoT gateways that will be essential in low-latency fog computing networks.
Moreover, the baseline power consumption test performed proved the suitability of the testbed.
Third, several tests were conducted to evaluate the impact of TLS in IoT communications (between
gateways and between the cloud and a gateway), in order to measure the differences between RSA and
ECC in terms of security, scalability, power consumption, and data throughput. To make a rigorous
comparison in a real-world scenario, the two cipher suites compared (i.e., ECC and RSA) were selected
following the NIST guidelines. Nevertheless, the key size used for the ECC cipher suites provides
greater level of security than the key size selected for RSA (256-bit ECC provides a strength of 128
while 2048-bit RSA provides a strength of 112).
The experiments made use of two different HTTP servers, with the aim of eliminating any
possible bias introduced by the particular server implementation considered. As it is shown in the
Sensors 2017, 17, 1978 33 of 39
experiments, there is a small difference in power consumption and throughput between both servers,
but a substantial difference can be observed between RSA and ECC across all the tests performed.
ECC greatly outperformed RSA in terms of both power efficiency and communications
throughput. In an IoT fog scenario as the one described in Figure 1, the gateways can act both
as servers and clients since data requests can be horizontal and vertical, involving IoT nodes or other
fog devices. The tests performed allowed for accurately determining the impact of each cipher suite
on both sides of the communications. The server-side power consumption when using RSA doubles
the one obtained with ECC, while the client-side presents a 15–20% lower power consumption for the
ECC scheme. It is important to note that in the tests performed only the server was using a certificate
(i.e., only Server Authentication was used), but in most IoT scenarios, client authentication would be
also needed. In terms of throughput, ECC is always better than RSA, being able to double the number
of requests per second when moderate levels of concurrency are reached.
IoT end devices are usually treated as clients, since the embedded hardware used to
implement them is not able to accommodate the necessary certificates and the ciphering algorithms,
while maintaining reduced power consumption and reasonable response times. By using ECC, the new
emerging hardware platforms for end devices could overcome these limitations and perform as servers
or implement client authentication. More work has to be performed to determine the feasibility of
using ECC certificates on such devices.
The tests also demonstrated that in the case of transmitting payloads of less than 128 bytes, the use
of compression causes larger amounts of data to be transmitted, and, for any of the payload sizes
tested, slower transactions and higher power consumption.
A detailed frame analysis showed that the handshake takes more time in the RSA cipher suite than
in the ECC one, with remaining data transmission time unaffected. This was the expected result, since
both cipher suites only differ in the public key algorithms, the symmetric key and hash algorithms
being exactly the same. Therefore, once the TLS Handshake protocol finishes, the TLS Record protocol
will perform the same in both cases. Moreover, the total data transmitted is almost the same between
both cipher suites, although they differ in the number of frames exchanged due to cumulative ACKs.
After all the experiments were performed, it can be concluded that, in specific resource-constrained
IoT scenarios where energy efficiency and throughput are essential, ECC cipher suites should replace
RSA cipher suites. Moreover, for the security levels required nowadays, measurements indicate that
ECC obtains power consumption reductions of up to 50% and a data throughput that doubles RSA
in most scenarios. Furthermore, considering the near-term prospects of more secure levels, the key
sizes needed in RSA will make it impractical not only for IoT fog computing applications, but for any
secure connection.
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Abbreviations
ACPI Advanced Configuration and Power Interface




DSA Digital Signature Algorithm
DTLS Datagram Transport Layer Security
ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography
ECDHE Elliptic Curve Diffie–Hellman Ephemeral
ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
FTPS File Transfer Protocol over SSL
GCM Galois/Counter Mode
HMAC Hash Message Authentication Code
IMAPS Internet Message Access Protocol over SSL
IoT Internet of Things
KDF Key Derivation Function
MAC Message Authentication Code
MitM Man-in-the-Middle Attack
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
PFS Perfect Forward Secrecy
PUF Physical Unclonable Functions
RSA Rivest–Shamir–Adleman
RTSP Real Time Streaming Protocol
SBC Single Board Computer
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SMTPS Simple Mail Transfer Protocol Secure
SSL Secure Socket Layer
TDES Triple Data Encryption Standard
TDEA Triple Data Encryption Algorithm
TLS Transport Layer Security
WSN Wireless Sensor Network
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Abstract: Augmented Reality (AR) is one of the key technologies pointed out by Industry 4.0 as a
tool for enhancing the next generation of automated and computerized factories. AR can also help
shipbuilding operators, since they usually need to interact with information (e.g., product datasheets,
instructions, maintenance procedures, quality control forms) that could be handled easily and more
efficiently through AR devices. This is the reason why Navantia, one of the 10 largest shipbuilders
in the world, is studying the application of AR (among other technologies) in different shipyard
environments in a project called “Shipyard 4.0”. This article presents Navantia’s industrial AR (IAR)
architecture, which is based on cloudlets and on the fog computing paradigm. Both technologies are
ideal for supporting physically-distributed, low-latency and QoS-aware applications that decrease
the network traffic and the computational load of traditional cloud computing systems. The proposed
IAR communications architecture is evaluated in real-world scenarios with payload sizes according to
demanding Microsoft HoloLens applications and when using a cloud, a cloudlet and a fog computing
system. The results show that, in terms of response delay, the fog computing system is the fastest
when transferring small payloads (less than 128 KB), while for larger file sizes, the cloudlet solution is
faster than the others. Moreover, under high loads (with many concurrent IAR clients), the cloudlet in
some cases is more than four times faster than the fog computing system in terms of response delay.
Keywords: augmented reality; Industry 4.0; shipyard; industrial augmented reality; Microsoft
HoloLens; industrial operator support; fog computing; cloudlet; IIoT
1. Introduction
Industry 4.0 is aimed at changing the way modern factories operate thanks to the application of
some of the latest technologies associated with the Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) [1], Big Data [2]
or robotics [3]. Some Industry 4.0 technologies are already mature, but others are still being studied
by manufacturers and academia for their application in industrial environments [4–9]. One of
such technologies is Augmented Reality (AR), which, although it is based on different pioneering
works performed in the 1960s [10,11], it was not until the late 1990s that it was actually pushed
by academia [12] and by the industry (in this latter case, thanks to the support of the German
government [13,14]). Since the 1990s, AR has been proposed to be used at different manufacturing
stages [15], in assembly processes [16] or in nano-manufacturing [17]. The automotive industry
has been the most active in the development of AR applications, creating solutions for the design
phases [18,19] or for car assembly [20].
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It is important to note that AR hardware and software have to include certain characteristics
(e.g., ruggedness, battery life, robustness) to be used in industrial environments, which led to the
concept of Industrial Augmented Reality (IAR). IAR devices usually have to receive data wirelessly
and in real or quasi-real time in order to provide an attractive user experience. However, factories and
other industrial environments are often a tough place for electro-magnetic wireless communications
because of the presence of numerous and large metal objects that create reflections and even block
signal propagation [21,22]. In addition, in an Industry 4.0 factory, IAR solutions are expected to
provide dynamic on-demand information, which requires fast responses from remote data servers.
Furthermore, such information may vary in payload size, because IAR devices can request from just a
few kilobytes of text content to several megabytes of video. Therefore, IAR systems not only need to
provide AR functionality, but also have to be able to exchange and manage content as fast as possible.
In the past, researchers have addressed the high-detail 3D content transfer speed limitations mainly
by trying to simplify or decimate such content [23–25], but although this can be useful in some cases,
the loss of certain details in industrial designs may derive into problems (e.g., when using a simplified
3D design as a reference during manufacturing or in quality checks).
To tackle the previous issues, this article proposes the use of an IAR architecture based on the fog
computing paradigm [26], which allows for supporting physically-distributed, low-latency and Quality
of Service (QoS) aware applications that decrease the network traffic and the computational load of
traditional cloud computing systems. In addition, note that fog gateways are usually constrained in
terms of computing power [27], so, if an IAR system demands real-time rendering or compute-intensive
services, other approaches, like cloudlets, are a better fit [28]. Therefore, the proposed architecture
also includes a local cloudlet for performing the most demanding tasks. Thus, this paper presents the
design, implementation and practical evaluation of such an IAR architecture. The following are the
main contributions of the article, which, as of writing, have not been found together in the literature:
• It presents a novel architecture that merges cloudlets and fog computing devices to provide fast
IAR device communications.
• It evaluates cloud, fog and cloudlet systems in real IAR scenarios when transferring payloads of
different sizes.
• It also shows a performance evaluation in a scenario when up to 240 virtual IAR clients are
transmitting payloads with a size according to demanding Microsoft HoloLens [29] applications.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes briefly the latest commercial
and academic IAR systems, enumerates promising IAR applications for a shipyard and analyzes
the most relevant IAR architectures. Section 3 presents the design and implementation of the IAR
system proposed, while Section 4 studies the performance of the system in terms of latency response
in different practical scenarios. Finally, Section 5 is devoted to conclusions.
2. State of the Art: AR in the Shipyard
2.1. Commercial and Academic Systems
There are not many well-documented AR and IAR solutions devised explicitly for shipbuilding
environments. Regarding commercial systems, it is worth mentioning the work carried out by
companies like BAE Systems, IndexAR or Newport News Shipbuilding. BAE Systems is currently
developing IAR solutions [30,31] and has already tested virtual reality solutions at certain construction
stages of the offshore patrol vessels and Type 26 frigates [32]. IndexAR [33] has developed diverse IAR
applications for shipbuilding, mainly for easing construction, operation and maintenance processes.
Similarly, Newport News Shipbuilding [34] developed an IAR system for enhancing safety, training,
operation and maintenance processes performed in ships and shipyards.
In the academic field, although the first documented industrial developments date back to the
early 1990s [35], just a few researchers have focused their work on developing novel AR and IAR
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solutions for shipbuilding. For instance, in [36] an augmented reality helmet is presented for welding
that shows information, suggestions and possible errors on the tasks performed. Welding systems
are also proposed in [37,38]. In [37] an IAR interface is described to control a welding robot in a ship
under construction. In contrast, in [38] a training system is presented that makes use of a pair of smart
glasses and a torch to simulate welding processes.
The use of IAR in design processes is popular in different industries, but there are not many
examples for shipbuilding. An example is the work presented in [39], which describes an IAR solution
for detecting differences between a design model and the real construction. In the case of finding
a discrepancy, operators can notify it and then modify the CAD model or some elements of the
construction to make them match.
Finally, it is important to note the possibilities that IAR can bring to maintenance tasks, which,
traditionally, have been performed by using manuals that require previous instruction. Thus,
systems like the one created by Havard et al. [40] allow for replacing traditional paper and electronic
maintenance documents with a tablet that shows step-by-step instructions on the maintenance
procedure.
2.2. Potential IAR Applications in a Shipyard
IAR can help shipbuilding processes in many scenarios. The most relevant are the following:
• Providing plant information. In the case of Navantia’s shipyards, most information about products
and procedures is stored digitally, but operators still rely on paper documents.
• Performing quality controls. At the manufacturing stage most processes require a supervisor
to perform a quality control where it is necessary to compare the design model with the actual
product, which involves consulting datasheets and determining if the product requirements are
fulfilled [41].
• Assisting operators during assembly and manufacturing processes. The manufacturing process
of the products created in a shipyard (e.g., pipes, metal sheets) requires sequential steps that
must be followed in a specific order. IAR can help operators by providing them with step-by-step
instructions through intuitive interfaces, which have proved to reduce significantly the number of
human errors [42].
• Locating items. Shipyard workshops are usually quite large, what makes it difficult to locate
certain items. An IAR system can help operators by pointing at the specific location of the item
or at the area where it is placed. In certain cases, this functionality may be implemented into
the IAR software, but, in large spaces, it is more common to make use of sensors or third-party
location systems. For example, in Navantia’s pipe workshop a pipe location system is deployed
based on active Radio Frequency IDentification (RFID) tags [43–45] that can exchange data with
IAR applications.
• Guiding and navigating environments. Shipyards are often quite large. In the case of Navantia’s
shipyard in Ferrol (Galicia, Spain), it occupies 1,000,000 square meters. Therefore, it would be
useful to guide operators through the optimal route when they go from one place to another [46].
Moreover, a guiding system may help indoors, in the workshops and warehouses, when looking
for specific items or areas.
• Visualizing hidden areas. In many shipyard installations and inside a ship, part of the piping and
wiring is installed behind walls or bulkheads, which makes it difficult to carry out maintenance
procedures and to detect the origin of certain faults. An IAR display can superimpose digital 3D
models with reality and then ease the location of the underlying infrastructure [47].
• System monitoring. IAR can work together with IIoT to show the information collected from
sensors scattered throughout the shipyard [48]. Moreover, an IAR interface enables user-friendly
and real-time interactions with certain objects and machines that behave as actuators [49].
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• Performing predictive maintenance. The use of IIoT, Big Data techniques and IAR devices can help
to detect and to warn operators about anomalies that may cause imminent or future problems [50].
• Augmented collaboration. In Navantia’s shipyards, like in other shipbuilding companies,
communication systems usually only involve voice communications (e.g., walkie-talkies,
mobile phones). IAR systems are able to provide first-person video and audio content to
remote collaborators, which enriches the communication and eases remote guidance on the
resolution of incidents [51]. In addition, IAR devices usually allow for creating enriched notes,
enhancing dramatically traditional text-based reports [52].
2.3. IAR Architectures
IAR is a technology that projects digital information on displays, so it demands low-latency
responses in order to create an attractive user experience. For this reason, the digital content is usually
stored locally, first in permanent memory and then in RAM, which guarantees low data access times.
Although such an approximation is fine for static content, an Industry 4.0 environment is characterized
by being dynamic, especially when information collected from IIoT and third-party networks has to
be displayed.
One strategy to load information dynamically is caching: when the IAR solution predicts that
there is a high likelihood that certain information will be required, an IAR device can download
through a background process such content. However, note that when using local caching, algorithms
become more complex, since the prediction algorithm has to be effective and it has to be checked
periodically if the memory contains the latest version of the data. Moreover, cache synchronization
becomes expensive in terms of energy cost in the case of exchanging large files that may end up not
being used.
Because of the previously mentioned limitations, researchers have modified traditional AR
architectures. The most common variation consists in adding local PCs to the network in order to
increase computational capabilities. For instance, an interesting work is described in [53], where it
is studied how to deploy AR systems in vehicles. Although the researchers state that it is easy to
create centralized in-vehicle AR systems when relying on traditional Engine Control Units (ECUs),
such an approach derives into an increasing response latency due to the multiple tasks to be carried
out (e.g., image acquisition and display, protocol conversions, sensor value collection and processing).
Moreover, the researchers indicate that the latest trends in car manufacturing regarding vehicle
architecture design prefer to go for architectures divided into domains (for instance, there might be
a domain for the powertrain, one for the transmission and another one for chassis control), among
which an automotive AR system would distribute its functionality.
The use of remote processing servers has also been proposed, which led to central server-based
and cloud computing-based architectures. An example of such a kind of architecture is detailed in [54].
In such a paper, an AR solution is presented based on a five-layer architecture that focuses most of the
processing in a central server, which exchanges data through HTTP while relying on web services.
The latest trend in processing for AR solutions consists in the use of edge computing. Note that
such a paradigm is really close to fog computing and, in fact, some authors consider fog computing
as one of the possible implementations of edge computing, together with cloudlets and mobile edge
computing [28]. An example of an AR application that uses edge computing is presented in [55].
There, the authors emphasize the fact that current mobile AR devices still have to progress in terms of
computational and graphical performance, being essential to decrease end-to-end latency, especially
for video transmissions. To tackle such issues, the researchers propose an AR edge computing
architecture to offload the demanding real-time AR algorithms to a high-end PC placed in the local
network. During the experiments, the authors measured an end-to-end latency of roughly 50 ms when
transmitting compressed video frames, which they consider acceptable for handheld AR devices,
but too high for most Head-Mounted Display (HMD) solutions. Moreover, the researchers conclude
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that nowadays the transmission of raw video data still requires communication interfaces with higher
bit rates and smaller latencies.
3. System Design and Implementation
3.1. Communications Architecture
After analyzing the state of the art and the requirements of potential shipbuilding IAR applications,
the communications architecture was proposed, as shown in Figure 1, which is a three-layer
edge computing architecture. The layer at the bottom includes the IAR devices, which make
use of WiFi connectivity since Navantia’s shipyard in Ferrol has already deployed IEEE 802.11
b/g/n/ac infrastructure and because it is the most popular medium-range wireless standard used





















IIoT Services Augmented Reality Services
Cloudlet
Figure 1. Proposed IAR communications architecture.
Each IAR device exchanges data with a local Edge Layer gateway, which is usually the one that is
physically closer. All the local gateways are part of a fog computing sub-layer that provides different
low-latency services, which include, in the case of the proposed IAR system, sensor fusion and data
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caching for sending content to the IAR devices. Although most of the time only one gateway provides
fog services to a specific IAR device, the gateways of the Fog Layer can cooperate to offer complex
services, to distribute compute-intensive tasks and to ease the collaboration between remote IAR
devices. In Figure 1 every local gateway is represented by a Single-Board Computer (SBC), which
is a reduced-size low-cost computer that can be installed easily in any shipyard workshop. Thus,
the architecture assumes that SBCs that act as gateways are scattered throughout the shipyard.
In addition, the Edge Layer contains cloudlets, which are able to carry out compute-intensive tasks
like rendering or image processing. Since a cloudlet is really close to the IAR devices that request its
services, their response latency is lower than the one offered by traditional cloud computing systems.
Finally, at the top of Figure 1 is Navantia’s cloud, where the services that require more processing
power are executed. The cloud also connects with third-party systems that are part of Navantia’s
IT core. Specifically, software from SAP [57] is used as Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) and
Manufacturing Execution System (MES), PTC’s Windchill [58] is the Product Life-cycle Management
(PLM) software, shipbuilding models are created with FORAN [59], and ThingWorx [60] is being
tested as an IIoT platform.
3.2. IAR Software and Hardware
Both software and hardware are key in IAR applications [48]. Regarding the hardware, it is
possible to use regular smartphones and tablets, although, for industrial environments, they should
be protected against dirt, dents and drops. The evolution of the technology in the last years has led
the manufacturers to develop solutions embedded into smart glasses [61–63], helmets [29,64] or HMD
devices [65], which are really promising, but that are still expensive (between US $500 and $5,000) and
can be considered experimental in terms of features for industrial environments. Such ideal features
include: being as light as possible, the battery should last through the whole working day, the field of
view should be as wide as possible, and devices should embed voice-recognition features to enable
hands-free operation.
With respect to the software, there are many AR Software Development Kits (SDKs) that can be
used for developing IAR implementations, like ARToolkit [66], Mixare [67], Vuforia [68] or Wikitude [69].
An SDK should include the following features to be able to create successful IAR applications [15]:
• It should be as accurate as possible, reliable and provide fall-back alternatives.
• An IAR application should be user-friendly, making as easy as possible its setup and the
learning period.
• The application should be scalable, since factories involve many users interacting concurrently.
The advantages and disadvantages of cloud and fog computing architectures have to be weighted
in order to determine which fits better depending on the user requirements.
For the tests performed in this article, among the different hardware devices available, Microsoft
HoloLens smartglasses were selected. Although they are not cheap (around US $3000 as of writing),
they are one the most promising AR headsets on the market thanks to its power (it contains a custom
Holographic Processing Unit (HPU), 2 GB of RAM and 64 GB of on-board storage), embedded sensors,
display (it includes see-through holographic lenses, automatic pupillary distance calibration, 2.3 million
light points of holographic resolution) and potential interfaces (voice commands, gaze tracking and
gesture recognition). In addition, the smartglasses can be connected to other devices through WiFi
(IEEE 802.11 ac) or Bluetooth 4.1, and its battery lasts approximately 2 to 3 h with intensive use
(two weeks in stand-by).
Furthermore, It should be mentioned that the HoloLens tracking system operates in a different
way with respect to traditional marker-based AR systems [56], since the smartglasses make use of two
visible-light black and white cameras that observe the features of the environment. Once such features
are determined, the smartglasses fuse the information about them with the Inertial Measurement
Unit (IMU) data in order to locate the user within the environment. Therefore, video tracking is
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performed entirely by the HoloLens so the developer does not have to worry about the position of the
virtual markers, but only about the virtual content to be displayed.
4. Experiments
4.1. Experimental Setup
In order to determine the performance of the proposed architecture in terms of response
delay, three scenarios were evaluated depending on where the augmented reality services were
provided. This resulted in the three architectures depicted in Figures 2–4 (for cloud, fog computing
and cloudlet-based architectures). Each architecture contains a subset of the components of the
edge-computing architecture previously illustrated in Figure 1. In the case of Figure 2, the different
IAR devices are connected through WiFi access points to Navantia’s cloud, which runs the augmented
reality services. In contrast, in Figure 3, such services are provided by the different SBCs of the fog
layer. In Figure 4, a cloudlet is the device responsible for executing the mentioned services.
Before carrying out the experiments, the transfer speed requirements of the system when running
wirelessly were determined, at a medium distance (roughly three meters from the IAR server); there are
two representative IAR applications on the Microsoft HoloLens smartglasses:
• A Holo app (an application for HoloLens) that embedded Skype for remote augmented
collaboration in the shipyard’s pipe workshop. Figure 5 shows a screenshot of the application.
In the Figure, one of the moments when a remote worker (who is using Skype) guides the
operator wearing the Microsoft HoloLens through the steps for performing a specific maintenance
procedure on a bending machine is shown. Figure 6 shows the mentioned operator following
the remote instructions. The data exchanged by the HoloLens with the upper layers of the
architecture were basically Skype frames, which make use of a closed-source protocol that is able
to stream audio (voice-over-IP from the HoloLens towards the remote collaborator and from such
a collaborator towards the operator with the HoloLens) and video (it was only streamed video
from the HoloLens front-facing camera to the remote collaborator).
• The second Holo app was a streaming application that projected highly polygonal models.
Such models were extracted from FORAN in JT and OBJ formats. Since the total file size of the
raw 3D models was actually large (1.5 GB), before including them in the Holo app, they were
polished with Blender [70] to reduce the number of required triangles (the raw 3D models were
made of 630,477 triangles). The final models only use 65 MB of disk and 28,726 triangles. Figure 7
shows a screenshot of the app when projecting a ship block during a design meeting. The models
were first downloaded into the HoloLens and then they were projected in a specific place (selected
by the user) of the meeting room. The mixed reality 720p video captured by the HoloLens was
then sent via WiFi through a streaming service to a remote computer that was connected to an
HDMI projector.
For both tested applications, the exchanged data were sniffed using WireShark and the average
data transfer speeds were determined. In the case of the Skype-embedded Holo app it was 8780 KB/s,
while the video streaming app averaged 369 KB/s. It is also interesting to identify the type and
amount of the exchanged data. In the case of the Skype-embedded Holo app, when performing a
maintenance operation in the bending machine that took 632 s, 28,643 packets were exchanged between
a remote PC and the HoloLens, transferring a total of 9.49 MB. Most of this traffic (98%) was related
to compressed audio/video data, being that the rest of the packets were associated with network
signaling and control protocols. A similar ratio between data and control frames was obtained by the
video streaming Holo app, but the amount of exchanged data depended heavily on the complexity of
the exchanged 3D models.


































Figure 3. Implemented fog computing-based architecture.

















Figure 4. Implemented cloudlet-based architecture.
Figure 5. Microsoft HoloLens collaborative IAR application.
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Figure 6. One of the tests in the pipe workshop with the HoloLens augmented collaboration application.
Figure 7. Ship block projected during a meeting.
Then, in order to automate the tests and to be able to increase the number of concurrent IAR
devices, a laptop (Intel i7-5500U@2.4 GHz processor, 250 GB SSD, 8 GB of RAM and a Gigabit Ethernet
connection) with a virtual machine (64-bit Debian 9) was used to carry out IAR file exchanges. To limit
the performance of the laptop when simulating the use of a true IAR device, the virtual machine was
configured to use only two cores and 2 GB of RAM. Note that a laptop was selected due to practical
reasons and because what was measured was the latency response, but the measurement methodology
and conclusions would be identical when performed through the actual smartglasses. However, it is
worth mentioning that all the communications performed by the Holo apps are exclusively wireless,
while the laptop allows for using an Ethernet connection, thus avoiding the impact on the latency
response of the wireless scenario (e.g., distance to access points, obstacles, presence of metal) and
therefore providing a fairer evaluation of the different architectures.
In the case of the fog computing scenario, an Orange Pi SBC was used. Such a device integrates
a low power-consumption System-on-Chip (SoC) running a quad-core ARM Cortex-A7 processor
at 1.6 GHz, 1 GB of RAM, a 10/100 Mbit Ethernet interface and a micro-SD card slot. The cloudlet
consisted of a 64-bit Debian 9 virtual machine deployed on a Dell PowerEdge R415 local server
configured with one core (AMD Opteron@3.1 GHz), 2 GB of RAM and a Gigabit network interface.
In these two scenarios, the exchanges were always performed inside the local network of the shipyard,
without needing to reach the Internet. In such a local network, under regular network traffic conditions,
the minimum/average/maximum round-trip times to the cloudlet were 0.935/1.034/1.695 ms,
while the same times were 0.895/0.977/1.074 ms for the local fog gateway. Finally, in a third scenario,
the performance of the cloud computing architecture was evaluated, which, for the sake of fairness,
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made use of the same server as the cloudlet, but it was deployed in a remote Internet location with
minimum/average/maximum round-trip times of 47.25/49.3/62.87 ms.
The software for the experiments was configured exactly in the same way for all the tests. In the
server-side, four concurrent processes waited for requests. At the client-side 20 concurrent clients were
simulated. The clients asked for files (i.e., plain data or multimedia objects) that were required by the
local IAR software. Such a number of clients was selected for the sake of fairness when comparing
the different architectures, due to the hardware constraints of the fog gateways. Therefore, it was
assumed that, in a real deployment, in the physical area covered by a fog gateway in a shipyard, there
would be up to 20 workers using IAR devices simultaneously. In such scenarios, every exchanged file,
whose size varied from 32 B to 8 MB, was downloaded 1000 times.
4.2. Response Latency Comparison
One of the main challenges of IAR deployments is that IAR devices should be able to obtain
and display the required information fast enough to be presented seamlessly to the user. This speed
limitation is determined by different factors (e.g., involved hardware, communication technology,
evaluated scenario), but, during the experiments, most of them were fixed, thus reducing their impact
on the obtained absolute results. The only exception was the network traffic, since the experiments
were carried out on local and Internet-connected networks shared with other users (their influence can
be decreased by averaging many tests). Therefore, in this subsection, the performance of the proposed
fog, cloud and cloudlet-based architectures was evaluated in order to determine which should be used
when exchanging IAR payloads of different sizes.
Figures 8 and 9 compare the response latencies for the three scenarios. For the sake of clarity,
the results were split into two different figures, distinguishing between small file sizes (Figure 8)
and large file sizes (Figure 9). Small files are mainly related to certain contextual data (for instance,
characteristics of the pipes obtained from SAP), while large files would be associated with video
streaming of design models from FORAN.
Figure 8. Response latencies for 32 B to 32 KB file sizes.
Before drawing conclusions from the Figures, it is important to note that, for the largest files
(4 and 8 MB), Table 1 must be taken into account. Such a table shows the percentage of 4 and 8 MB
files that were transmitted successfully. While for other file sizes there was a 100% success rate, for the
largest sizes, the rate dropped remarkably in fog and cloud computing scenarios due to the joint effect
of file size, the internal processing lag (in the case of the fog gateways) and communication delays
(that mainly affect the cloud). Therefore, as a result, Figures 8 and 9 show the average results for the
successfully transmitted files.
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Figure 9. Response latencies for 64 KB to 8 MB file sizes.
In addition, note that slight fluctuations can be observed in the Figures due to the network load,
but they do not alter the conclusions.
Table 1. Successful transmissions of 4 MB and 8 MB files.




For small file sizes (up to 128 KB), fog gateways respond faster, despite their hardware
constraints, thanks to their low communication latency. Moreover, it can be observed that cloud-based
communications are clearly slower. However, in the case of large files (more than 128 KB), the cloudlet
architecture is the one that obtains the smallest latencies, both thanks to its proximity to the IAR
devices and to its computing power, which is superior to the one of a fog SBC. Nonetheless, the latency
differences between the fog computing and the cloudlet-based systems may not seem as large as
expected when taking into account their difference in power and cost. In spite of the lack of such
differences, what makes the cloudlet system a clear winner for large file exchanges is that, as it can be
observed in Table 1, it is the only system capable of providing a 100% transmission success rate.
4.3. Sample Processing Rates under High Loads
The previous tests allowed for establishing a performance baseline for fog and cloudlet scenarios
and for discarding a cloud deployment, since it presents excessive response latency. To compare in a
fair IAR scenario the performance of the proposed fog and cloudlet architectures, a new set of tests was
carried out by taking into account the actual Microsoft HoloLens data transfer speeds for the two Holo
apps previously described in Section 4.1. The methodology used for obtaining such transfer speeds
was also applied to the scenarios evaluated in the previous section and it was concluded that the closest
values to the HoloLens data transfer rates (8780 B/s for the Skype-embedded Holo app and 369 KB /s
for video streaming) were achieved when downloading the 64 KB and the 32 B files, which obtained
practical data transfer rates of 392.45 KB/s and 13.15 KB/s, respectively. With these two file sizes, a total
of 50,000 file transfers were performed for different concurrency levels: from 30 to 240 simultaneous
clients. To cope with such a large number of concurrent connections, a virtual machine that had four
cores and 8 GB of RAM that was hosted on a server with an Intel Core i7-4790 @ 3.6 GHz, 32 GB of
RAM and a 500 GB SSD was used.
The obtained results are presented in Figures 10 and 11. As it can be observed, when a large
number of concurrent users requests data from the server, the fog deployment rapidly falls behind the
cloudlet in terms of response latency and throughput. In the case of the largest number of concurrent
clients, the response latency of the fog computing based system is four times greater than the one of
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the cloudlet for both 32 B and 64 KB file sizes. Regarding successful transaction rates, both the cloudlet
and the fog deployments reach 100% for all the tests, but, at the view of the response latencies, it is
clear that, in high-load scenarios, the cloudlet outperforms the fog computing system.
Figure 10. Latencies for 32 B and 30 to 240 concurrent clients.
Figure 11. Latencies for 64 KB and 30 to 240 concurrent clients.
4.4. Key Findings
After analyzing the results of the tests described in the previous subsections, the following
conclusions can be drawn:
• When a single IAR device operates in a specific shipyard area, for files of up to 128 KB,
fog gateways respond faster despite being less powerful, cheaper and less energy demanding
than a cloud or than the typical high-end PC used by a cloudlet.
• In the case of exchanging large files, the cloudlet-based solution is the fastest of the three
tested architectures. However, in some scenarios it might be less expensive to make use of
fog computing and SBCs, which are slightly slower, but cheaper in terms of acquisition cost and
energy consumption.
• When a relevant number of IAR devices transmit concurrently, a cloudlet responds faster than a
remote cloud or a fog gateway.
In addition, it must be emphasized that, despite the previously mentioned results, in a real
environment, several types of IAR data and applications are involved, so the ideal architecture would
consist in the combination of the three alternatives that conform to the proposed edge computing
architecture. In this way, an IAR device would have to choose in real time the data source that would
optimize the user experience. In addition, for every specific scenario it should be considered whether
the content can be previously simplified in terms of detail in order to decrease the amount of data
transferred to the operator’s IAR device.
Furthermore, at the view of the obtained results, it can be concluded that the proposed
communications architecture (previously depicted in Figure 1) may be scaled to the whole shipyard by
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adding infrastructure to every area where IAR devices need to be used. Working areas differ in size
depending on the workshop and on the tasks to be performed, but for the currently planned needs of
the evaluated shipyard (in terms of potential IAR devices that are planned to operate concurrently),
a cloudlet would be enough for every workshop and a fog computing gateway would be required for
covering a working area of 1000 square meters. However, note that the scale of the infrastructure is
highly dependent on the number of potential IAR devices operating in the workshop (in the case of
cloudlets) or in a specific area (when determining the number of fog computing gateways).
Finally, it is worth indicating the advantages and disadvantages collected from the operators
after testing the Holo apps. First, it must be pointed out that all workers were really impressed by
the augmented reality experience provided by HoloLens. In fact, the feeling of having an immersive
experience was unanimous. Under a regular use, no relevant lag was experienced, except for certain
moments when the WiFi connection was dropped or when large image files were transferred to the
operator that wore the HoloLens.
After all the practical tests, the plant operators found the remote collaboration application
useful. However, while the Holo app that projects ship 3D models made a great impression on
Navantia’s designers, plant operators consider that such an app would not be used frequently in their
everyday tasks.
In addition, it has to be mentioned that, after carrying out experiments with both applications at
different workshops of the shipyard, even with the presence of operators performing welding tasks or
using other machinery and tools, reliability issues (e.g., object tracking problems) were not observed.
This can be mainly attributed to the feature extraction algorithm based on two black and white cameras
and to the use of IMU data to estimate pose continuously. Note that, in contrast, other traditional AR
systems based on markers are heavily influenced by lighting and by the characteristics of the camera,
so their performance falls dramatically under low light conditions or when there is a high contrast [56].
Despite all the benefits of the proposed system, several issues arose:
• Although, in general, the smartglasses were easy to adjust to the worker head, in some specific
cases it took time to find the right position to align the operator’s sight with the display.
• In certain areas of the shipyard where helmets were required, it was difficult for the operator to
wear both the HoloLens and the safety helmet at the same time. Therefore, future IAR devices
should take safety procedures into account.
• Since virtual and real objects live together under the operators point of view, it is possible that
certain virtual objects may hide relevant events of the real world. Although operators can move
most virtual objects around the working environment, occlusions have to be prevented as much
as possible in order to avoid possible accidents.
• Although the operators did not complain about the comfort of the smartglasses, after using them
for a certain time (around an hour), the users had use marks on their noses due to pressure.
There were no complaints about headaches, nausea or loss of visual acuity.
• The system was not tested during a whole working shift (around eight hours), but at certain
production stages for less than two hours in total, since that is how long the batteries lasted.
Therefore, future IAR devices would have to extend battery life, while preserving a light weight.
• Despite HoloLens’ excellent performance for tracking objects, note that their memory is limited,
which implies that they can only map a limited area. Such an area is related to the size of the
triangle mesh created by the smartglasses. In the experiments performed inside large workshops,
the mesh reached roughly 600,000 triangles and the tested apps kept on working flawlessly.
However, it is important to emphasize that the number of triangles depends highly on the
scenario, so a large and complex environment like a shipyard cannot be mapped directly into
the HoloLens’ memory. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that most shipyard operators work in
very specific areas (i.e., their work is performed in a certain area of a workshop) and that, in the
case of requiring to map large areas, it is possible to make use of spatial-mapping mesh-caching
Sensors 2018, 18, 1798 15 of 18
techniques to load content dynamically from the fog computing or cloud system depending on
the detected area.
5. Conclusions
IAR can be a really useful technology for the Industry 4.0 shipyard, but current architectures
still have to be optimized and analyzed to adapt to the fast responses required by certain dynamic
IAR applications. In this article Navantia’s IAR architecture has been described, which makes use
of cloudlets and fog computing to reduce latency response and offload traditional cloud-based
systems. After detailing the proposed architecture, it was evaluated in different real scenarios and for
diverse payload sizes, concluding that, in terms of response delay, fog gateways are the fastest when
transferring small payloads, but a cloudlet is faster for medium and large IAR payloads. In addition,
when many IAR clients access concurrently the IAR service, the cloudlet is also remarkably faster
than the fog computing system (in some cases more than four times faster). In any case, the proposed
architecture is able to provide low-latency responses by mixing elements of both computing paradigms
that may enable the development of future real-time IAR applications for the Industry 4.0 shipyard.
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ERP Enterprise Resource Planning
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PLM Product Life-cycle Management
RFID Radio Frequency IDentification
SBC Single Board Computer
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References
1. Fraga-Lamas, P.; Fernández-Caramés, T.M.; Castedo, L. Towards the Internet of Smart Trains: A Review on
Industrial IoT-Connected Railways. Sensors 2017, 17, 1457. [CrossRef] [PubMed]
2. Qi, Q.; Tao, F. Digital Twin and Big Data Towards Smart Manufacturing and Industry 4.0: 360 Degree
Comparison. IEEE Access 2018, 6, 3585–3593. [CrossRef]
3. Robla-Gómez, S.; Becerra, V.M.; Llata, J.R.; González-Sarabia, E.; Torre-Ferrero, C.; Pérez-Oria, J. Working
Together: A Review on Safe Human-Robot Collaboration in Industrial Environments. IEEE Access 2017,
5, 26754–26773. [CrossRef]
4. Fernández-Caramés, T.M.; Fraga-Lamas, P. A Review on Human-Centered IoT-Connected Smart Labels for
the Industry 4.0. IEEE Access 2018, accepted. [CrossRef]
5. Hernández-Rojas, D.L.; Fernández-Caramés, T.M.; Fraga-Lamas, P.; Escudero, C.J. Design and Practical
Evaluation of a Family of Lightweight Protocols for Heterogeneous Sensing through BLE Beacons in IoT
Telemetry Applications. Sensors 2018, 18, 57. [CrossRef] [PubMed]
Sensors 2018, 18, 1798 16 of 18
6. Fraga-Lamas, P. Enabling Technologies and Cyber-Physical Systems for Mission-Critical Scenarios. May 2017.
Available online: http://hdl.handle.net/2183/19143 (accessed on 1 May 2018).
7. Blanco-Novoa, O.; Fernández-Caramés, T.M.; Fraga-Lamas, P.; Castedo, L. An Electricity-Price Aware
Open-Source Smart Socket for the Internet of Energy. Sensors 2017, 17, 643. [CrossRef] [PubMed]
8. Fraga-Lamas, P.; Fernández-Caramés, T.M.; Suárez-Albela, M.; Castedo, L.; González-López, M. A Review
on Internet of Things for Defense and Public Safety. Sensors 2016, 16, 1644. [CrossRef] [PubMed]
9. Fernández-Caramés, T.M.; Fraga-Lamas, P.; Suárez-Albela, M.; Castedo, L. A Methodology for Evaluating
Security in Commercial RFID Systems, Radio Frequency Identification. In Radio Frequency Identification,
1st ed.; Crepaldi, P.C., Pimenta, T.C., Eds.; INTECH: Rijeka, Croatia, 2016.
10. Sutherland, I.E. The Ultimate Display. In Proceedings of the IFIP 65, New York, NY, USA, 24–29 May 1965;
pp. 506–508.
11. Sutherland, I.E. A head-mounted three dimensional display. In Proceedings of the AFIPS 68, San Francisco,
CA, USA, 9–11 December 1968; pp. 757–764.
12. Azuma, R.T. A survey of augmented reality. Presence Teleoperators Virtual Environ. 1997, 6, 355–385. [CrossRef]
13. Wohlgemuth, W.; Triebfürst, G. ARVIKA: Augmented Reality for development, production and service.
In Proceedings of the DARE 2000, Elsinore, Denmark, 12–14 April 2000; pp. 151–152.
14. Friedrich, W. ARVIKA-Augmented Reality for Development, Production and Service. In Proceedings of the
International Symposium on Mixed and Augmented Reality, Darmstadt, Germany, 1 October 2002; pp. 3–4.
15. Navab, N. Developing Killer Apps for Industrial Augmented Reality. IEEE Comput. Graph. Appl. 2004,
24, 16–20. [CrossRef] [PubMed]
16. Novak-Marcincin, J.; Barna, J.; Janak, M.; Novakova-Marcincinova, L.; Torok, J. Visualization of intelligent
assembling process by augmented reality tools application. In Proceedings of the 14th IEEE International
Symposium on Logistics and Industrial Informatics, Smolenice, Slovakia, 5–7 September 2012; pp. 33–36.
17. Li, G.; Xi, N.; Chen, H.; Saeed, A. Augmented reality enhanced “top-down” nano-manufacturing.
In Proceedings of the 4th IEEE Conference on Nanotechnology, Munich, Germany, 16–19 August 2004;
pp. 352–354.
18. Fruend, J.; Grafe, M.; Matysczok, C.; Vienenkoetter, A. AR-based product design in automobile industry.
In Proceedings of the First IEEE International Workshop Augmented Reality Toolkit, Darmstadt, Germany,
29 September 2002.
19. Gausenmeier, J.; Matysczok, C.; Radkowski, R. AR-based modular construction system for automobile
advance development. In Proceedings of the IEEE International Augmented Reality Toolkit Workshop,
Tokyo, Japan, 7 October 2003.
20. Park, H.S.; Choi, H.W.; Park, J.W. Augmented Reality based Cockpit Module Assembly System.
In Proceedings of the International Conference on Smart Manufacturing Application, Gyeonggi-do,
South Korea, 9–11 April 2008; pp. 130–135.
21. Arumugam, D.D.; Engels, D.W. Characterization of RF Propagation in Helical and Toroidal Metal Pipes for
Passive RFID Systems. In Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on RFID, Las Vegas, NV, USA,
16–17 April 2008; pp. 269–276.
22. Wong, S.F.; Zheng, Y. The effect of metal noise factor to RFID location system. In Proceedings of the IEEE
International Conference on Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management, Bangkok, Thailand,
10–13 December 2013; pp. 310–314.
23. Mocanu, B.; Tapu, R.; Petrescu, T.; Tapu, E. A experimental evaluation of 3D mesh decimation techniques.
In Proceedings of the International Symposium on Signals, Circuits and Systems, Lasi, Romania,
30 June–1 July 2011; pp. 1–4.
24. Ma, T.; Gong, G.; Yan, J. A 3D model simplification algorithm based on edge-collapse. In Proceedings
of the IEEE 10th International Conference on Industrial Informatics, Beijing, China, 13 September 2012;
pp. 776–779.
25. Ng, K.W.; Low, Z.W. Simplification of 3D Triangular Mesh for Level of Detail Computation. In Proceedings of the
11th International Conference on Computer Graphics, Imaging and Visualization, Singapore, 23 October 2014;
pp. 11–16.
26. Bonomi, F.; Milito, R.; Zhu, J.; Addepalli, S. Fog Computing and its Role in the Internet of Things.
In Proceedings of the First Edition of the MCC Workshop on Mobile Cloud Computing, Helsinki, Finland,
17 August 2012; pp. 13–16.
Sensors 2018, 18, 1798 17 of 18
27. Suárez-Albela, M.; Fernández-Caramés, T.M.; Fraga-Lamas, P.; Castedo, L. A Practical Evaluation of a
High-Security Energy-Efficient Gateway for IoT Fog Computing Applications. Sensors 2017, 17, 1978.
[CrossRef] [PubMed]
28. Dolui, K.; Datta, S.K. Comparison of edge computing implementations: Fog computing, cloudlet and mobile
edge computing. In Proceedings of the Global Internet of Things Summit (GIoTS), Geneva, Switzerland,
6–9 June 2017; pp. 1–6.
29. Microsoft HoloLens Official Web Page. Available online: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/hololens
(accessed on 1 May 2018).
30. Augmented Reality Systems Set to Revolutionise Battlefield Operations. Available online: https://www.baes
ystems.com/en/article/augmented-reality-systems-set-to-revolutionise-battlefield-operations (accessed on
1 May 2018).
31. BAE Systems Unveils Latest Wearable Display Technology at DSEI. Available online: https://www.baes
ystems.com/en-uk/article/bae-systems-unveils-latest-wearable-display-technology-at-dsei (accessed on
1 May 2018).
32. Virtual Reality Technology Transforms Design of UK Warships. Available online: http://www.baesystems
.com/en/article/virtual-reality-technology-transforms-design-of-uk-warships (accessed on 1 May 2018).
33. Index AR Solutions Official Web Page. Available online: https://www.indexarsolutions.com/about-us
(accessed on 1 May 2018).
34. Newport News Shipbuilding Official Web Page. Available online: http://nns.huntingtoningalls.com/ar
(accessed on 1 May 2018 ).
35. Mizell, D.W. Virtual Reality and Augmented Reality in Aircraft Design and Manufacturing. In Proceedings
of the WESCON/94, Anaheim, CA, USA, 27–29 September 1994.
36. Aiteanu, D.; Hillers, B.; Graser, A. A step forward in manual welding: demonstration of augmented reality
helmet. In Proceedings of the Second IEEE and ACM International Symposium on Mixed and Augmented
Reality, Tokyo, Japan, 10 October 2003; pp. 309–310.
37. Andersen, R.S.; Bøgh, S.; Moeslund, T.B.; Madsen, O. Task space HRI for cooperative mobile robots in fit-out
operations inside ship superstructures. In Proceedings of the 25th IEEE International Symposium on Robot
and Human Interactive Communication (RO-MAN), New York, NY, USA, 26–31 August 2016; pp. 880–887.
38. Fast, K.; Gifford, T.; Yancey, R. Virtual training for welding. In Proceedings of the third IEEE and ACM
International Symposium on Mixed and Augmented Reality, Arlington, VA, USA, 5 November 2005;
pp. 298–299.
39. Olbrich, M.; Wuest, H.; Riess, P.; Bockholt, U. Augmented reality pipe layout planning in the shipbuilding
industry. In Proceedings of the 10th IEEE International Symposium on Mixed and Augmented Reality, Basel,
Switzerland, 26–29 October 2011; pp. 269–270.
40. Havard, V.; Baudry, D.; Louis, A.; Mazari, B. Augmented reality maintenance demonstrator and associated
modelling. In Proceedings of the IEEE Virtual Reality (VR), Arles, France, 23–27 March 2015; pp. 329–330.
41. Goode, O.R.; Dallinger, J.F. Quality control in shipbuilding. Naval Eng. J. 1964, 76, 397–407. [CrossRef]
42. Loch, F.; Quint, F.; Brishtel, I. Comparing Video and Augmented Reality Assistance in Manual Assembly.
In Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Intelligent Environments (IE), London, UK, 14–16
September 2016; pp. 147–150.
43. Fraga-Lamas, P.; Noceda-Davila, D.; Fernández-Caramés, T.M.; Díaz-Bouza, M.A.; Vilar-Montesinos, M.
Smart Pipe System for a Shipyard 4.0. Sensors 2016, 16, 2186. [CrossRef] [PubMed]
44. Fraga-Lamas, P.; Fernández-Caramés, T. M.; Noceda-Davila, D.; Vilar-Montesinos, M. RSS Stabilization
Techniques for a real-time passive UHF RFID Pipe Monitoring System for Smart Shipyards. In Proceedings
of the IEEE International Conference on RFID, Phoenix, AZ, USA, 9–11 May 2017; pp. 161–166.
45. Fraga-Lamas, P.; Fernández-Caramés, T.M.; Noceda-Davila, D.; Díaz-Bouza, M.; Vilar-Montesinos, M.;
Pena-Agras, J.D.; Castedo, L. Enabling automatic event detection for the pipe workshop of the shipyard 4.0
In Proceedings of the 2017 56th FITCE Congress, Madrid, Spain, 14–15 September 2017; pp. 20–27.
46. Narzt, W.; Pomberger, G.; Ferscha, A.; Kolb, D.; Müller, R.; Wieghardt, J.; Hörtner, H.; Lindinger, C.
Augmented reality navigation systems. Univers. Access Inf. Soc. 2005, 4, 177–187. [CrossRef]
47. Kalkofen, D.; Veas, E.; Zollmann, S.; Steinberger, M.; Schmalstieg, D. Adaptive ghosted views for Augmented
Reality. In Proceedings of the IEEE International Symposium on Mixed and Augmented Reality (ISMAR),
Adelaide, Australia, 1–4 October 2013; pp. 1–9.
Sensors 2018, 18, 1798 18 of 18
48. Fraga-Lamas, P.; Fernández-Caramés, T.M.; Blanco-Novoa, Ó.; Vilar-Montesinos, M.A. A Review on
Industrial Augmented Reality Systems for the Industry 4.0 Shipyard. IEEE Access 2018, 6, 13358–13375
[CrossRef]
49. Berning, M.; Riedel, T.; Karl, D.; Schandinat, F.; Beigl, M.; Fantana, N. Augmented service in the factory of
the future. In Proceedings of the International Conference on Networked Sensing (INSS), Antwerp, Belgium,
11–14 June 2012; pp. 1–2.
50. Cordonnier, M.; Martino, S.; Boisseau, C.; Paslier, S.; Recapet, J.-P.; Blanc, F.; Augustin, B. Contribution
of augmented reality to the maintenance of network equipment. Open Access Proc. J. 2017, 2017, 87–90.
[CrossRef]
51. Smparounis, K.; Mavrikios, D.; Pappas, M.; Xanthakis, V.; Viganó, G.P.; Pentenrieder, K. A virtual and
augmented reality approach to collaborative product design and demonstration. In Proceedings of the IEEE
International Technology Management Conference (ICE), Lisbon, Portugal, 23–28 June 2008; pp. 1–8.
52. Flatt, H.; Koch, N.; Röcker, C.; Günter, A.; Jasperneite, J. A context-aware assistance system for maintenance
applications in smart factories based on augmented reality and indoor localization. In Proceedings of the IEEE
20th Conference on Emerging Technologies Factory Automation (ETFA), Luxembourg, 8–11 September 2015;
pp. 1–4.
53. Rao, Q.; Grünler, C.; Hammori, M.; Chakrabort, S. Design methods for augmented reality in-vehicle
infotainment systems. In Proceedings of the 51st ACM/EDAC/IEEE Design Automation Conference (DAC),
San Francisco, CA, USA, 1–5 June 2014; pp. 1–6.
54. Schroeder, G.; Steinmetz, C.; Pereira, C.E. Visualising the digital twin using web services and augmented
reality. In Proceedings of the 14th IEEE International Conference on Industrial Informatics (INDIN), Poitiers,
France, 19–21 July 2016; pp. 522–527.
55. Schneider, M.; Rambach, J.; Stricker, D. Augmented reality based on edge computing using the example of
remote live support. In Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Industrial Technology (ICIT),
Toronto, ON, Canada, 22–25 March 2017; pp. 1277–1282.
56. Blanco-Novoa, Ó.; Fernández-Caramés, T.M.; Fraga-Lamas, P.; Vilar-Montesinos, M.A. A Practical Evaluation
of Commercial Industrial Augmented Reality Systems in an Industry 4.0 Shipyard. IEEE Access 2018, 6,
8201–8218. [CrossRef]
57. SAP Official Web Page. Available online: https://www.sap.com (accessed on 1 May 2018).
58. Windchill Official Web Page. Available online: https://www.ptc.com/en/products/plm/plm-products/wi
ndchill (accessed on 1 May 2018).
59. FORAN Official Web Page. Available online: http://www.marine.sener/foran (accessed on 1 May 2018).
60. ThingWorx Official Web Page. Available online: https://www.ptc.com/en/products/iot (accessed on
1 May 2018).
61. Epson Moverio Glasses Official Web Page. Available online: https://epson.com/moverio-augmented-reali
ty (accessed on 1 May 2018).
62. ODG R-7 glasses official web page. Available online: https://www.osterhoutgroup.com/r-7-glasses-syste
m.html (accessed on 1 May 2018).
63. Vuzix Glasses Official Web Page. Available online: https://www.vuzix.com/Business-and-Enterprise-Sol
utions (accessed on 1 May 2018).
64. Daqri Smarthelmet Glasses Official Web Page. Available online: https://daqri.com/products/smart-helmet
(accessed on 1 May 2018).
65. Fujitsu Ubiquitousware HMD Official Web Page. Available online: http://www.fujitsu.com/fts/products
/computing/peripheral/wearables/hmd-iot001/ (accessed on 1 May 2018).
66. ARToolKit Official Web Page. Available online: https://artoolkit.org (accessed on 1 May 2018).
67. Mixare Official Web Page. Available online: http://www.mixare.org (accessed on 1 May 2018).
68. Vuforia Official Web Page. Available online: https://www.vuforia.com (accessed on 1 May 2018).
69. Wikitude Official Web Page. Available online: https://www.wikitude.com (accessed on 1 May 2018).
70. Blender Official Website. Available online: https://www.blender.org (accessed on 1 May 2018).
c© 2018 by the authors. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access
article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution
(CC BY) license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
sensors
Article
A Fog Computing Based Cyber-Physical System for
the Automation of Pipe-Related Tasks in the
Industry 4.0 Shipyard
Tiago M. Fernández-Caramés 1,* ID , Paula Fraga-Lamas 1,* ID , Manuel Suárez-Albela 1 ID and
Manuel A. Díaz-Bouza 2
1 Unidade Mixta de Investigación Navantia-UDC, Universidade da Coruña, Edificio Talleres Tecnológicos,
Mendizábal s/n, 15403 Ferrol, Spain; m.albela@udc.es
2 Navantia S. A., Astillero Ría de Ferrol, Taxonera, s/n, 15403 Ferrol, Spain; mdiaz@navantia.es
* Correspondence: tiago.fernandez@udc.es (T.M.F.-C.); paula.fraga@udc.es (P.F.-L.);
Tel.: +34-981-167000 (ext. 6051) (P.F.-L.)
Received: 27 April 2018; Accepted: 13 June 2018; Published: 17 June 2018
Abstract: Pipes are one of the key elements in the construction of ships, which usually contain
between 15,000 and 40,000 of them. This huge number, as well as the variety of processes that may be
performed on a pipe, require rigorous identification, quality assessment and traceability. Traditionally,
such tasks have been carried out by using manual procedures and following documentation on
paper, which slows down the production processes and reduces the output of a pipe workshop.
This article presents a system that allows for identifying and tracking the pipes of a ship through their
construction cycle. For such a purpose, a fog computing architecture is proposed to extend cloud
computing to the edge of the shipyard network. The system has been developed jointly by Navantia,
one of the largest shipbuilders in the world, and the University of A Coruña (Spain), through a project
that makes use of some of the latest Industry 4.0 technologies. Specifically, a Cyber-Physical System
(CPS) is described, which uses active Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) tags to track pipes and
detect relevant events. Furthermore, the CPS has been integrated and tested in conjunction with
Siemens’ Manufacturing Execution System (MES) (Simatic IT). The experiments performed on the
CPS show that, in the selected real-world scenarios, fog gateways respond faster than the tested
cloud server, being such gateways are also able to process successfully more samples under high-load
situations. In addition, under regular loads, fog gateways react between five and 481 times faster
than the alternative cloud approach.
Keywords: RFID; Industry 4.0; Shipyard; fog computing; identification; supply chain management;
localization; tracking; cyber-physical system; IoT; IIoT
1. Introduction
Technology is evolving at a fast pace and companies have to adapt to such a constant evolution.
In recent years, the industrial application of the paradigm of the Internet of Things (IoT) and the
principles of Industry 4.0 have derived into the introduction of the latest technologies for monitoring,
controlling and optimizing processes [1–5]. In this new industrial revolution, Navantia, a Spanish
naval company that has been building hi-tech military and civil vessels for more than 300 years,
decided that it was essential to adapt its inner workings to the Industry 4.0 principles to enhance its
competitiveness. Such a decision led to the creation of the Navantia-University of A Coruña Joint
Research Unit [6], a think tank aimed at creating a Shipyard 4.0: a modern shipyard that makes use of
the latest technologies according to the Industry 4.0 principles.
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The Joint Research Unit deals with different parallel lines that work on heterogeneous topics
like robotics, factory automation, process analysis or the application of new wireless communication
systems on a ship. One of such research lines is called “Pipe Auto-ID” and, as its name implies, it deals
with the problem of identifying pipes automatically through their life-cycle. Note that pipes are
essential in shipbuilding: a ship usually contains between 15,000 and 40,000 pipes that differ greatly in
their typology (i.e., size, material, shape, accessories), although they all are built at the same workshop
in a shipyard that Navantia owns in Ferrol (Spain). The workshop is divided into two wings (shown
in Figure 1), where pipes go through the different stages described later in Section 2.1.
(a) (b)
Figure 1. Left (a) and right (b) wings of the pipe workshop.
In the previous work to this article [7,8], active and passive Ultra High Frequency (UHF) Radio
Frequency IDentification (RFID) were selected and tested [9] in shipyard environments taking into
account their security for Industry 4.0 applications [10–12]. Although the developed systems worked
fine at a low scale, when the number of products to be tracked grew (and, as a consequence, the network
traffic they generated), an obvious bottleneck was observed in the proposed cloud-based approach,
which led to increasing latency responses and slower data processing. Among the different alternatives
for tackling this issue, the design and implementation of a fog architecture was chosen, since a fog
computing system is able to lower response latency, it provides location awareness and it is able to
cope with a large number of wireless tags.
Therefore, this paper presents a fog computing based Cyber-Physical System (CPS) that makes use
of active RFID technology to track pipes, to show information on them and, eventually, to detect and
automate certain life-cycle events related to the pipes built in a shipyard. Thus, the main contribution of
this work is the description, implementation and practical evaluation of a fog-computing architecture
of a novel CPS for an industrial environment like a shipyard.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the life-cycle of a pipe in
Navantia’s pipe workshop and reviews the most relevant traceability systems developed for shipyards
as well as their main challenges. Section 3 details the design of the proposed system. In Section 4,
the system is evaluated in different scenarios in order to determine its latency and its maximum data
processing rates. Finally, Section 5 is devoted to the conclusions.
2. Related Work
2.1. Pipe Manufacturing in a Shipyard
The life-cycle of a ship pipe begins in the pipe workshop, whose floor map is represented in
Figure 2. Initially, raw pipes are received from external providers and placed in the reception area
(shown in Figure 3, on the left), where they are collected by operators according to production needs.
The first processing stage occurs in the cutting area, where pipes are cut with high-precision saws.
After cutting, a tag is attached to every pipe in order to identify it through its life-cycle. Traditionally,
plastic labels with plain information, barcodes or QR codes have been used, nevertheless more
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sophisticated and human-centered approaches are emerging [13]. The system that is currently being
deployed by Navantia is based on active RFID tags [7]. In this stage, pipes are stacked on pallets (like
it is shown in Figure 3, on the right), which are moved throughout the workshop by using cranes.
Figure 2. Navantia’s pipe workshop in Ferrol (Spain).
Figure 3. Reception area (left) and pipes stacked on a pallet after cutting (right).
The second stage for most pipes is bending (obviously, straight pipes do not need it). The procedure
is performed with computerized bending machines (one of them is shown in Figure 4 on the left).
Next, if a pipe requires to be cleaned chemically, it has to be moved to the degreasing and rinsing area,
where acid and caustic solutions are applied in tubs (in Figure 4, on the right). After cleaning, pipes
can go to one of the two manufacturing stages in order to add accessories (e.g., hydraulic valves,
connection fittings), either by welding them or by using other techniques. Finally, the manufactured
pipes are packed into pallets that are placed in the outbound storage area until they are required to be
mounted in a ship.
Figure 4. Computerized bending machine (left) and cleaning tubs of the pipe workshop (right).
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It is worth noting that all the previously mentioned processes were traditionally carried out
manually by Navantia’s operators. As it is shown in Figure 5, many processes made use of paper
forms that, after being filled by the operators, had to be uploaded to the system by a supervisor,
which clearly decreased the productivity of the workshop. Thanks to the CPS proposed in this paper,
the vast majority of the information can be stored and modified through digital devices, removing
most of the bottlenecks and errors related to manual fillings and uploads.
Figure 5. Traditional paper-based pipe process and quality controls.
2.2. Potential Difficulties When Developing a CPS for a Shipyard Workshop
A shipyard workshop is in different aspects a tough scenario for deploying a CPS. Specifically,
the main issues that can arise, are:
• High presence of metallic objects. As it can be observed in Figures 3 and 4, the workshop contains
many elements like pipes, pallets, machines, work benches or cranes, which are made out of
metal. The problem arises when monitoring pipes or other elements of the workshop using
electromagnetic propagation, which is influenced by the reflections created by the metal objects
found in its path. This kind of signal interference is especially problematic for High-Frequency
(HF) and higher radio frequency bands [8,14–16].
• High relative humidity levels. Shipyards are built next to the sea or to rivers, so relative humidity
levels are usually high. In the case of Navantia’s pipe workshop, such levels oscillate throughout
the year between 40% and 95%. Note that high levels of relative humidity may derive into
problems with certain electronic devices. Moreover, in Navantia’s shipyard it is also common to
find salt residues, since it is close to the sea and exposed to the action of the wind.
• Exposure to high temperatures. In certain areas of the workshop (i.e., in the welding,
manufacturing and cleaning areas), pipes and some tools can be exposed to high temperatures.
• Presence of corrosive substances. In some areas of the pipe workshop (e.g., the cleaning area)
it is common to make use of different acids, caustic solutions or fuel, which may condition the
selection of sensors, actuators and other electronic devices.
• Presence of communication interference sources. The CPS communication architecture should
take into account that there are in the workshop, besides common sources of electromagnetic
interference (e.g., Wi-Fi networks or Bluetooth devices), other elements that generate electrical
and electromagnetic noise. For instance, it is difficult to make use of Power-Line Communications
(PLC) in the workshop due to the presence of mechanical saws and other AC-motor based tools
that interfere remarkably with the communication through power lines. In addition, wireless
communications can be interfered, for example, by the radar tests performed in the shipyard,
whose power can reach several KW.
• Long communication distances. Most shipyard workshops are between 100 m and 250 m long,
therefore, communications require the use of the proper technology. In the case of making use
of wireless communications, it is almost certain that a network of devices or repeaters would be
needed to cover a whole workshop. Moreover, network devices should be placed at spots with
access to the data network and to electricity.
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• Exposure to pressure sources. Like in other industries, in a shipyard workshop the products
are moved in groups from one area to another, which usually leads to collisions and to the
accumulation of weight on the products placed at the bottom. In the case of the pipe workshop,
up to 35 pipes are commonly moved together in a pallet that withstands a weight of up to 2 T.
Therefore, if sensors, actuators or other electronics are placed on the pipes or on the pallets,
they should be protected with a proper encapsulation.
2.3. Shipyard Traceability and Cyber-Physical Systems
Ships are generally built using a construction method that divides them into several blocks [17–19].
Taking into consideration that many elements are built simultaneously, the different components that
make up a block need to be managed at almost the same time across the shipyard. Furthermore,
an accurate and efficient planning of the logistics among the different production areas of the shipyard
(i.e., workshops, warehouses, stacking areas and docks) is a challenging task [20].
Traceability is a field that has evolved remarkably in the last years thanks to the progress associated
with technology and standardization. In the case of shipbuilding, some authors proposed systems
with the objective of keeping traceability of people and of diverse elements present in shipyards [21].
For instance, sensor networks have been introduced for monitoring different construction tasks [22,23].
Other authors [24] propose a Bluetooth system for positioning shipyard workers. The authors created
a mockup workshop and tested the system, achieving a 1.2 m accuracy in a cluttered environment.
A different approach is presented in [23], where the researchers detail a system that makes use of
sensor networks and RFID to monitor processes and supplies in construction and assembly industries
like shipbuilding.
With respect to cyber-physical systems, several challenges arise when they are applied to a
shipyard or to other mission-critical infrastructures, since security, safety, trustworthiness, robustness,
and interoperability are key aspects to be fulfilled for their broad adoption [25–27]. Due to this fact,
just a couple of CPS for shipyards can be found in the literature [28,29]. One of them is aimed at
monitoring vehicles [28], while the other one allows for supervising remote facilities and utilities in a
shipyard [29].
Shipbuilders usually do not develop their own cyber-physical systems, but rely on different
commercial software that, in some cases, is integrated into a common system. The latest trend
consists in incorporating a Manufacturing Execution System (MES), whose aim is very similar to
the one of an industrial CPS: to track, collect and show information on the products during the
manufacturing processes. Companies like Siemens or SAP sell their own MES, which is adapted to
the specific necessities of a field, factory or workshop. A MES usually has to be integrated with two
additional pieces of software: the Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) and the Product Life-cycle
Management (PLM) software. This integration eases data sharing between the functional areas of
engineering, workshops and the front office.
Finally, regarding the use of fog computing for cyber-physical systems, some examples
can be found in the literature for smart manufacturing environments [30–32] and high-security
applications [33], but it has been found that none adapted explicitly to the necessities of a shipyard
workshop like the CPS proposed in this article.
3. System Design and Implementation
3.1. System Architecture
The proposed system architecture is shown in Figure 6. As it can be observed, it is a three-layer
fog computing architecture. The layer at the bottom is the node layer and includes all the devices
(i.e., RFID devices, sensor networks and Industrial Augmented Reality (IAR) interfaces) that make use
of the services provided by the fog layer. The fog layer is composed by Single-Board Computers (SBCs)
that are scattered throughout the shipyard and that act as gateways. The SBCs provide fog services,
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including low-latency and data processing services like the RFID positioning service, sensor fusion,
or data caching for streaming content to IAR devices [34,35]. Since this paper is focused on traceability,
it will only detail the inner workings of the fog positioning service.
The internal cloud is in the top layer, where Navantia runs its own compute-intensive services
and the ones offered through third-party software (basically: SAP as ERP, FORAN for ship design,







































Figure 6. Fog-computing architecture of the proposed CPS.
3.2. Node Layer
At the workshop, active RFID devices, IAR interfaces and transducers from different sensor
networks constitute the node layer. Regarding the RFID devices, there is a network of RFID readers
that continuously collect data (basically, Signal Strength Indicator (SSI) readings) about the location
of the pipes, which are controlled by a software system managed by the fog layer. Active RFID fixed
readers [36] were selected due to the wide area to be covered in the workshop. In addition, active
RFID tags [37], specially designed for harsh industrial environments, are used. Such tags, which
operate at 433.92 MHz, can communicate with each other over distances of up to 100 m when using the
appropriate antennas. Each tag reports its ID every two seconds for battery saving purposes.
3.3. Fog Layer and the Cloud
The indoor positioning system is managed by a fog service that is divided into different modules,
the Location module and the Business Intelligence (BI) module being the most important (they are
described later in Section 3.4.1). The Location module estimates the coordinates of the tags after
processing the information gathered by the RFID readers. Then, the BI module detects events
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based on the movement of the pipes and decides whether to send notifications to other systems
or clients. For example, one of such systems is the SAP connector, which is responsible for creating a
communication link with the ERP and/or the MES, which are offered as third-party services by the
cloud-computing layer. It is actually in such third-party systems where pipe information is stored.
3.4. Indoor Positioning Fog Service
The indoor positioning fog service was designed as a web application that involves two main
components: a back-end and a front-end. The back-end is where all time and resource consuming
tasks happen, while the front-end acts as a user interface, providing a way for operators to interact
with the system.
The data managed by this fog service are generated by elements of the node layer (i.e., RFID tags
and readers) and by the users that interact with the system. In the case of RFID readers, they constantly
report tag SSI levels to the indoor positioning fog service. From the service perspective, the readers are
just like clients that generate data through web requests at a constant rate. Note that, as the traceability
system grows, the number of tags and readers increases, which implies that the number of requests
to be handled also increases. In a cloud-centric approach, these increases might derive into traffic
bottlenecks. Fortunately, the designed fog computing based architecture eases scalability as the indoor
positioning system grows.
Figure 7 shows how the different sources of data from the node layer (i.e., readers and operators)
interact with the indoor positioning fog service. Readers provide data to the fog service back-end in
order to process them for the location and tracking algorithms. In the case of operators, they interact
with the display module, providing certain data related to their tasks, mainly details of the pipes to
be processed.
In Figure 7, Process 1 is the one in charge of obtaining the data from the readers. Since every
reader embeds an HTTP server that must be queried periodically to obtain the SSI samples from the
tags, these communications are performed through standard HTTP requests.
The samples obtained from all the readers need to be transmitted as fast as possible.
When deploying in the same machine, both the process in charge of querying the readers and the
location service, they communicate with each other by using Redis [38], an open-source in-memory
data structure that allows for exchanging data between separate processes in a seamless and almost
instant way. However, in a fog-computing or cloud-based architecture, a network mechanism must be
used to communicate these two services, which run on different machines. Moreover, it must be taken
into account the fact that fog gateways are resource-constrained, so only mechanisms that minimize
computational requirements should be considered. Due to this reason, the execution of Redis directly
on fog gateways was discarded.
Possible alternatives to the use of Redis would consist in sending the collected samples through
standard HTTP POST requests or by using HTTP long polling, but since the number of requests per
second is very high, they would introduce latency and overhead in both the network and the machines
when sending and receiving the data. Finally, the chosen technology was web sockets [39], which are
used for establishing long-term TCP connections between a client and a server, allowing for the creation
of bi-directional full duplex communications channels. In addition, messages exchanged through web
sockets are distributed instantly, with little overhead, resulting in very low latency connections.
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Figure 7. Communications in the indoor positioning fog service.
3.4.1. Location and BI Modules
As it can also be observed in Figure 7, the fog service back-end is divided into two modules:
the location and the BI module. The location module receives data from RFID readers, processes them
and determines each tag position in the workshop (the estimation of the position is explained below).
Then, it sends the updated locations to the BI module, which is the one responsible for detecting and
notifying pipe-related events. Four types of events are currently considered by the system:
• Area change events. When a pipe moves from one area to another (e.g., from the reception area to
the cutting area) and it remains on the latter for a certain amount of time (configurable by the
system), the event is captured by the system and shown to the operators that might be interested
in it. This is especially useful for warning the operators about incoming work.
• Pipes leave the workshop towards an auxiliary company. When the workshop is overloaded,
part of the procedures performed on pipes are outsourced to auxiliary companies. Such pipes are
stacked on the outbound area of the workshop and leave it through a specific door that the trucks
of the auxiliary companies go through to collect the pipes. In this situation, three events have to
be detected. First, that some pipes have remained in the outbound stack area for a certain amount
of time. Second, that the pipes include in their life-cycle a task that requires outsourcing. Third,
that the pipes are no longer detected by the system readers either inside the workshop or in the
neighboring dock.
• Pipes leave the workshop to go to another workshop or to be mounted on a ship. Similar to
the previously described event, pipes are monitored by the system readers until they leave the
workshop and then are detected again in a dock or in another workshop of the shipyard.
• Accessories are required for pipe manufacturing. When a pipe reaches the manufacturing area,
in the case that it requires certain accessories to be added, it is automatically notified to the main
warehouse, where the operators collect the accessories and carry them to the manufacturing area.
Figure 8 shows a simplified class diagram of the developed location subsystem, where it can
be observed that Tornado [40] was used as the web server. With respect to the location algorithm,
it is first important to note that pipes cannot be located anywhere in the workshop: there are specific
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areas where the different pipe processes are performed. This leads to the creation of logic areas, which
are related to relevant physical areas of the workshop (e.g., storage areas, pipe processing machines,
work benches). Every logic area is associated with an RFID reader and, thus, one or more readers
cover a physical area.
Figure 8. Location class diagram.
For every tag, its position is associated with the RFID reader that receives the maximum power
levels from the tag (i.e., it is assumed that the higher the power level, the shorter the distance to the
tag). Therefore, the system compares in real time the power levels reported by all the readers and
chooses the highest one. Then, since only one reader is associated to one logic area, it is possible to
indicate in which logic area the pipe is most probably located.
The coarse estimations given by the location algorithm are refined in two ways to avoid false
logic area detections and to correct ambiguous readings in the limits of the areas:
• The previous locations of a tag are considered when calculating its new position. Such a list of
locations is called “tag trend” and consists in a set of data structures that store past SSI readings.
Thus, the SSIs used for selecting the closest reader are conditioned by past readings. Therefore,




where ReceivedSSIt+1,i is the actual SSI received at time instant t + 1 from the reader i and µ is
a speed conversion parameter that determines how fast the current SSI converges to the most
recent value. Note that the use of µ slows down the convergence, but it allows for avoiding
sudden changes in the SSI that occur from time to time due to signal interference (i.e., metal
reflections or the presence of operators working). From our empirical experience in the workshop,
a value of µ between 0.7 and 0.9 gives the best trade-off between convergence speed and
oscillation avoidance.
• The way logic areas are defined involves a pair of SSI thresholds that limit the size of an area,
letting the system adjust each area size independently. Thus, one threshold (called outer
threshold) limits the total size of the area, while the other one (inner threshold) is set to indicate
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that the tag is really close to the reader. It is important to point out that, since logic areas are
limited in size, blind spots exist (i.e., not every inch of the workshop is covered by a logic area).
While this fact may seem a limitation, in practice, it adds a nice feature to the system, because,
when all the possible pipe routes are covered by logic areas, it is straightforward to discover
pipes that are located out of them (i.e., in a place where they should not be) and then warn
operators about such inconsistencies.
In addition to the previous refinements, in order to avoid positioning the pipes in wrong areas
or showing the operator non-continuous positions (if the SSI oscillates heavily due to interference,
the system might show the operator that a pipe is at time instant one in a logic area, while at instant two,
it is dozens of meters away in another logic area), the life-cycle of every pipe is modeled according to
the state machine diagram shown in Figure 9.
A pipe begins its life-cycle in the workshop when it is first detected by the RFID system. In that
moment the pipe is considered to be in transit. Note that every pipe has to stop at every production
area of the workshop, but the pipe can be processed or not in such an area. If there is no need to
process the pipe (e.g., not all the pipes need to be bent), it is palletized (i.e., it is placed on a pallet).
In the case that it needs further processing, then it first would have to be moved to the processing
area, cross the outer area, be processed, and then leave the processing station towards a pallet where a
quality control would be performed.























Figure 9. Pipe life-cycle state machine.
This capacity for being able to determine when a pipe is in a specific area or next to a production
machine enables the automatic detection of pipe-related events. Specific events are notified when a
pipe moves from a processing area to another, or when it crosses from an outer area to an inner area.
Thus, the BI module receives periodic updates of pipe locations, processing them in conjunction with
past locations and pipe production orders in order to determine the next state for the pipe, which is
notified to the corresponding operator to indicate that a task will be added soon to his/her pool.
A generic notification process is presented in the sequence diagram shown in Figure 10, which
illustrates how the main components of the fog service interact through time. All the events are
generated, detected, processed and notified automatically. The only verification process that is carried
out manually is quality control, although, when a pipe is placed in a quality check area, an event is
triggered to notify the new task to the quality supervisor, who can approve digitally (i.e., by using a
tablet connected to the CPS) the quality check or disapprove it, indicating the detected problems.
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Figure 10. Generic notification sequence diagram.
3.4.2. Display Module
The display module (in Figure 11) has been developed as a web application with the objective
of being able to use it not only in specific software platforms, but in any system with a web browser
installed (e.g., tablets, smartphones, desktop PCs, Macs). It consists of a map of the workshop
where pipes are displayed together with a task list that indicates the pending work to the operators.
Both components are updated in real time by the fog service. In the case of the task list, its updating
depends on the area where the operator is located, since every operator also wears an active RFID tag
(in a pocket or hanging from his/her belt).
Regarding the interaction, operators can zoom in and out of the map by using the control panel
in the top-left corner of the canvas. In addition, logic areas (represented as blue circles) can be
clicked or tapped, opening a new window that shows details on the pipes located in such an area
(in Figure 12). The details of every pipe can be observed by clicking on its identifier (in Figure 13).
Such details include the fabrication process that must be performed on a pipe, the area where the pipe
is traveling to, a timestamp of every process already carried out, the state of the different quality check
approvals and the quality procedure to be followed in every stage.
Note that the details shown about a pipe in an area depend on the role of the operator using the
application. For example, only supervisors can make use of the sign button to approve a pipe quality
control (in Figure 12, on the right).
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Figure 11. Display module interface.
Figure 12. Details of the pipes located in a logic area.
Figure 13. Details of a specific pipe.
With respect to event detections, they are notified in the display module visually through pop-up
messages. As an example, Figure 14 shows different pop-ups that are displayed when a pipe goes
through the different processes required since it is in the cutting area until it reaches the bending
quality check area.
Figure 14. Event notifications on the display module.
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3.5. Integration with Third-Party Systems
To facilitate daily-basis operations at the pipe workshop, a MES was deployed in parallel with the
pipe CPS. The MES accesses SAP ERP information about every Fabrication Order (FO) and displays
the relevant data to the shipyard operators in a user-friendly way.
The MES back-end was developed on top of Siemens’ Simatic IT [41]. The front-end consists
in a web application designed to be accessed through tablets when wearing gloves. As an example,
in Figure 15 such a front-end shows the task pool of one of the operators at the manufacturing stage.
On the left, the system indicates for every task its state (Estado), the FO number (No de OdF), the pipe
ID (Marca tubo) and the pipe material ID (Código Material). On the right of the screen, the details on
the different sub-operations to be carried out on the selected task are shown. At the bottom, diverse
icons allow operators to begin, pause and stop the selected task/sub-operation. Other icons are
related to show the quality characteristics of the task (Car. Calidad), to transmit to the engineering
team the detected errors (NC, No Conformidades) or to show the position of the materials used in the
task/sub-operation (by clicking on the Loc icon).
Figure 15. Screenshot of a manufacturing task pool of the MES.
The ERP and MES group the individual tasks to be performed in FOs. A FO is composed
by some materials (at least one pipe and, in some cases, one or more accessories) and a series of
consecutive fabrication processes (e.g., cutting, bending, welding). Several actions regarding the FOs
can be performed through the MES, such as starting or finishing FOs, starting or stopping fabrication
processes, or outsourcing certain processes to auxiliary companies. Among the many possible actions,
the following are the most relevant when integrating the MES and the pipe CPS:
• Tag assignment to pipes. An RFID tag can be assigned to a pipe or to a pipe accessory by using
the MES. For such a purpose, first, an operator starts a cutting operation related to a FO in
the MES. After the pipe is cut and ready to be palletized, an RFID tag is attached to the pipe.
Then, the operator reads the tag ID with a reader, which is sent to the MES. Next, the MES notifies
the event to the CPS, which stores the relationship pipe-RFID tag in its internal database and
starts tracking the pipe.
• Detection of a tag when it enters or leaves a logic area. For instance, after completing a pipe
cutting operation, the next operation could consist in welding the pipe to an accessory. In such a
situation, when the fog service detects the pipe entering the welding area, it notifies the event to
the MES, which updates the welding task pool and sends a warning to the welder to let him/her
know that a new pipe is coming to the welding area.
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• An operator requests the location of a pipe using the MES. In this case the MES sends the ID of
the pipe to be located to the indoor positioning fog service. Then, the service queries its local
database of active RFID tags and looks for the one with the required ID. In the case of finding it,
the RFID tag location is returned to the MES, which presents a map to the operator that highlights
the area where the RFID tag is located.
Figure 16 shows a simplified sequence diagram that illustrates the three previous CPS-MES
interactions. In the sequence diagram, it is assumed that an FO with only one pipe is processed.
CPSMES




In order to evaluate the performance of the proposed architecture, it was tested when deploying
the indoor positioning service either in the fog or in the cloud layer. In the case of the fog layer,
the service was executed on an SBC that acted as gateway. Among the different SBCs that may be used
(some of the latest and most relevant are compared in Table 1), the Orange Pi PC [42] was selected,
since it provides a good trade-off between cost (as of writing, its price starts as low as $ 15) and features:
it embeds a low power-consumption System-on-Chip (SoC) (a 1.6 GHz quad-core ARM Cortex-A7
Allwinner H3), 1 GB of RAM, Fast Ethernet, micro-SD slot, two USB 2.0 ports and an HDMI output.
Regarding the cloud, the service was deployed on VMWare ESXi in a 64-bit Debian virtual machine
with 4 GB of RAM that ran on two Intel i7-5500U@2.4 GHz cores.
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Table 1. Characteristics of some of the latest and most relevant SBCs.
Name Clock Rate Cores RAM Cost (USD)
Banana Pi Pro [43] 1 GHz 2 1 GB $ 55
BeagleBone Black [44] 1 GHz 1 512 MB $ 56
Cubieboard 5 [45] 2 GHz 8 2 GB $ 99
ODROID-XU4 [46] 2 GHz/1.4 GHz 8 (4 + 4) 2 GB $ 59
Orange Pi PC [42] 1.6 GHz 4 1 GB $ 15
Raspberry Pi 3 Model B+ [47] 1.4 GHz 4 1 GB $ 35
UDOO X86 ULTRA [48] 2.56 GHz 4 8 GB $ 267
4.1.2. Software
To test the performance limits of the system, instead of relying on physical RFID tags and
readers, their behavior was emulated through software processes that recreated the future Shipyard
4.0 environment, where thousands of tags will be monitored at the same time. Thus, every virtual tag,
like every physical tag, sends its SSI every two seconds, which, depending on its position, is received
by one or more virtual readers. The virtual readers make use of the same access interface as the
real ones, allowing the reader subsystem to connect to them transparently and send the received SSI
samples to the indoor location subsystem like in a real deployment.
Once the emulator subsystem is started, an algorithm is used to move the tags virtually around
Navantia’s pipe workshop. A delay between two consecutive algorithm executions is randomly chosen
from a uniformly distributed interval which goes from 0 to 0.01 s. With each execution of the algorithm,
from all the available tags, one is selected randomly and its position is modified. Then, based on the
new tag position, the received SSI value of each virtual reader is recalculated. This yields an average
of 20 tags being moved every second.
Thirty virtual readers were created, since this is the number of readers actually deployed at
Navantia’s pipe workshop. Every virtual reader requires an independent process that sends HTTP
requests periodically, implementing the same randomly delayed approach used by the tag movement
algorithm, but with a delay interval ranging from 0 to 1 second.
To manage the entire process easily, the virtual reader manager software needs a way to execute
parallel code. Each virtual reader has to deploy an HTTP server that will be queried asynchronously,
at very short time intervals. One approach could consist in using Python threads, by launching a thread
for each virtual reader and then running a simple web server on each thread. This could be an option
for a reduced number of threads, but due to Python GIL limitations [49], the performance of the virtual
reader manager would be compromised when deploying several virtual readers. A better option
is to use coroutines, the alternative recommended by Python for executing asynchronous code [50].
Since both simple web servers and coroutines were needed in the implementation, the virtual reader
manager makes use of Tornado [40], a web framework and asynchronous networking library that
simplifies the process of launching different webs servers by using coroutines.
Finally, to perform stress tests on the proposed system, an HTTP benchmarking tool was needed.
There are a lot of applications aimed at benchmarking and stress testing HTTP servers, like Siege [51],
Apache Benchmark [52], httperf [53] or WRK [54]. Among them, a tool was required to query the
virtual readers in a simultaneous and asynchronous manner to represent a scenario as close as possible
to the real one. For this reason, Locust [55] was the selected benchmarking tool. Locust is a load testing
tool written in Python that allows for testing several HTTP endpoints at the same time. It allows for
defining the number of simultaneous users to be emulated and the rate at which they are launched.
Through a simple Python interface, the desired HTTP requests are generated, enabling to define the
endpoints to be accessed and the way virtual users must behave (i.e., the delay between requests). Thus,
when executing a specific Locust configuration, the virtual users are launched and the defined requests
are randomly distributed among them, initiating the stress test and showing real-time statistics. Locust
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presents clear and meaningful statistics about the connections and also provides metrics about failed
requests, median, average, minimum and maximum times, and requests per second.
4.1.3. Experimental Scenarios
Two scenarios were chosen to evaluate the proposed system. The first one was related to the
cloud-based architecture depicted on the left of Figure 17. In such an architecture, the RFID tag
information is collected by a gateway that transmits it to Navantia’s cloud, where it is processed by
the positioning service. In the second scenario (on the right of Figure 17), RFID data are collected by





































Figure 17. Implemented architectures.
In order to determine the performance of the system in both scenarios, their positioning service
response latency was measured. Two sets of tests were performed. The first one was aimed at
determining which system responded faster under regular loads (when managing less than 1000 tags).
The goal of the second test was to find out the maximum number of supported tags. For such a purpose,
both the cloud and the fog-based architectures were tested under abnormal high loads, when more
than 10,000 tags sent information concurrently.
In the case of the cloud-based system, it is important to note that the virtual machine that executed
the positioning service had no privileges over other virtual machines and it was not possible to fiddle
with advanced high availability features to optimize response latency. Specifically, the cloud-based
system shared its public network interface with another 11 virtual machines, although, during the
tests, only six of them were active (i.e., they exchanged packets through the shared network interface).
Figure 18 shows an ESXi stacked graph of the network usage of the active virtual machines. The area
in orange is related to the network usage made by the virtual machine that runs the positioning service.
It can be observed that the network load fluctuates through time and that there are certain time instants
Sensors 2018, 18, 1961 17 of 26
where relevant peaks exist (especially at the beginning of the graph, when the experiments were









Figure 18. Network usage of the active virtual machines.
4.2. Latency and Processing Rate Under Regular Loads
The pipe workshop is considered to be under a regular load when up to 1000 pipes are being
processed or stacked in the different areas. Thus, in order to evaluate the performance of the CPS
under such a regular load, 10 different tests were performed when varying the number of tags from
200 to 1000 and when using a cloud-based or a fog-based architecture. For each test, one million SSI
samples were generated.
The obtained latency results are presented in Figure 19 for the fog scenario and in Figure 20 for the
cloud scenario. In both cases, a spike can be observed on the latency at the beginning of the tests due to
the initial detection of the tags by the location subsystem. After the system gets stabilized, the latencies
oscillate due to the random behavior of the virtual readers and tags (as explained in Section 4.1.2),
but they do not increase as much as at the initial stage of every test. For the same number of tags, the
latency obtained for the fog-based architecture is clearly smaller than for the cloud scenario. In the
worst case (for 1000 tags), the maximum latency is 400 times larger than in the cloud-based architecture
(roughly 32 s versus 0.08 s).
It can also be observed in Figure 20 that, for the cloud-based system, response latency increases
with the number of tags monitored by the CPS. This behavior of the cloud-based system can be
corroborated when calculating the average latencies, which are shown in Table 2. In contrast,
the average latency for the fog computing system remains stable (in the order of milliseconds) despite
the increase in the number of tags. It is important to indicate that the averages presented in Table 2
were calculated for the full time interval, including the initial spike. Note that such an interval varies
from one scenario to another, since the stop condition consists in collecting one million SSI samples,
which requires different amounts of time depending on the number of transmitting tags.
It is worth noting the field Improvement of Table 2, which indicates how many times the average
latency of the cloud-based approach is larger than the respective latency of the fog-based architecture
(it is shown that, on average, the fog responds between five and 481 times faster than the cloud).
In addition, it can be observed that the increase in latency is not linear, what means that a cloud-based
CPS would need much more hardware resources than a fog-based system when scaling it to manage
more tags.
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Figure 19. Latencies for the fog system under regular loads.
Figure 20. Latencies for the cloud system under regular loads.
Table 2. Fog and cloud average latencies under regular loads (in seconds).
Approach/#Tags 200 400 600 800 1000
Fog 0.0076 0.0023 0.0082 0.0073 0.0069
Cloud 0.0388 0.1369 0.3485 1.0978 3.3244
Improvement ×5.10 ×59.52 ×42.50 ×150.38 ×481.80
Despite the observed latencies, it can be concluded that, even in the worst case (for 1000 tags,
cloud scenario), the latency is small (around 3.3 s on average) and should not influence the regular
operation of the positioning service, which is not a real-time service (a slight delay is not critical for
its operation). Nonetheless, it is interesting to measure the sample processing rate of the service in
every scenario (i.e., the percentage of SSIs that are processed successfully by the positioning service).
In such measurements it was obtained that, under regular loads, a processing rate of 99.99% was
always achieved.
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Note that it is not 100% because of how the number of received SSI samples is computed. Since
the location subsystem is asynchronous, the received SSI samples are processed in batch by several
parallel co-routines that end up obtaining an approximation of the number of samples. Such a number
reaches a maximum difference of 10,000 samples with respect to the real value. Therefore, due to the
fact that one million samples are processed, a maximum of a 1% error in the sample processing rate is
introduced with this measurement technique.
4.3. Latency Under High Loads
The performance of the CPS can also be evaluated when it is under high loads, which would
represent workshops with a remarkable density of monitored objects or a whole shipyard. Specifically,
the performed high load tests made use of between 10,000 to 60,000 tags. Due to the large number of
tags used, the total number of SSI samples was increased to 10 million to allow for receiving enough
SSI samples from each tag.
Figures 21 and 22 show the first time instants of the evolution of the positioning service latency
when executed on the fog gateway and on the cloud. Like in the regular load scenario, the represented
time interval was selected because it allows for observing the spike that occurs at the beginning of
most tests because many tags start to transmit data within the first seconds. Then, after the spike,
latency starts to decrease, increasing again only at certain time instants when a relevant number of tags
transmit at the same time, impeding the location subsystem to process all the received tag SSI samples.
This effect occurs periodically for every scenario, in a similar way as it can be observed clearly for the
60,000 tag curve for the fog system. In addition, as it is expected, latency increases as the number of
concurrent tags goes up.
Figure 21. Latencies for the fog and cloud based systems under high loads.
Table 3 compares the average latency responses for the fog gateway and the remote cloud
server when 10,000 to 60,000 tags transmit data. Like in the regular-load scenario, the averages were
calculated for the whole time interval of the experiment, which varies from one scenario to another,
since the 10 million SSIs were collected faster or slower depending on the number of transmitting tags.
Note that the average latencies should increase along with the number of tags, but, since the network
and the communications interfaces are shared with other users, the final results oscillate slightly. Thus,
the oscillations are not just a matter of averaging more samples, since measurements are conditioned
by the actual network traffic conditions that may occur in a real-world cloud. However, such an
oscillation has nothing to do with the fact that the fog gateway gets saturated for 50,000 tags due to its
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limited processing power. The cloud latency is also impacted by such an amount of tags, but it remains
stable between 5 and 7 s. Nonetheless, it is important to note that is not realistic to try to manage more
than 50,000 tags with a single fog gateway and that it would be straightforward to add more gateways
to distribute the traffic load generated by the tags. In the case of the cloud, the system responds slower
than the fog system for less than 50,000 tags, even when it is more powerful than the SBC, mainly
because of the communications delays, which constitute a bottleneck under high traffic loads.
Figure 22. Latencies for the fog and cloud based systems under high loads.
Table 3. Fog and cloud average latencies under high loads (in seconds).
Approach/#Tags 10,000 20,000 30,000 40,000 50,000 60,000
Fog 0.0234 0.055 0.116 0.295 8.467 7.756
Cloud 0.6899 2.027 1.339 2.980 7.406 5.834
Improvement ×29.48 ×36.48 ×11.54 ×10.10 ×0.87 ×0.75
It is worth noting that, under regular network traffic conditions, the minimum/average/maximum
round-trip times to the cloud are 47.25/49.3/62.87 ms, while the same times are 0.842/2.919/33.515 ms
for the local fog gateway. However, despite such low round-trip times, for 10,000 tags the latency
response of the cloud is almost 30 times slower than the average latency of the fog gateway.
Nevertheless, it is important to emphasize that the obtained latencies can be decreased by varying
different factors like the amount of network traffic that goes to the cloud, the physical distance from
the RFID system to the cloud server, the cloud server computing power, or the load and speed of the
devices that route the packets to the cloud.
Table 4 shows the sample processing rate for the fog and cloud-based solutions when processing
samples from different amounts of virtual tags. The difference in performance between the fog and
the cloud service is clear: although with 10,000 tags both fog and cloud systems obtain similar results,
from 20,000 onwards, the cloud system gets overflowed by the traffic, so the number of processed
samples falls dramatically. The same happens to the fog system after 50,000 tags, which indicates that
more gateways or a more powerful gateway would be needed to handle such an amount of data.
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Table 4. Sample processing success rate under high loads.
Approach/#Tags 10,000 20,000 30,000 40,000 50,000 60,000
Fog 99.99 % 99.99 % 99.99 % 99.98 % 87.92 % 76.01%
Cloud 99.99 % 71.79 % 91.72 % 82.14 % 53.28 % 61.40 %
In the case of the cloud, for 20,000 and 50,000 tags, periodic high-load intervals occur because of
sharing the system and network with other users, which impacted both the sample processing rates
shown in Table 4 and the respective latencies included in Table 3. As was previously mentioned in
Section 4.1.3, the fact of sharing cloud resources may impact the system performance, but it is not
the only factor that affects the system response delay. In order to illustrate such an impact, Figure 23
shows how bandwidth (as measured by iPerf [56], which is the speed rate at which a sample file is
transferred) fluctuates during a time interval due to the multiple user interactions through the network
and routing/switching devices that exist in the network path that goes from the workshop where RFID
readers are emulated until the data reaches the cloud. Although, for clarity, Figure 23 only represents a
five-minute interval, bandwidth was measured with iPerf during more than six hours (almost a work
shift). The results showed that bandwidth fluctuated constantly between 9.44 and 24.1 Mbps, although
most of the time it remained stable within 17 and 20 Mbps (the overall average was 18.42 Mbps and the
variance, 2.92 Mbps). Therefore, when designing a real-time positioning service like the one proposed
in a cloud-based scenario, the entire path that the data will follow from the RFID readers until the
cloud must be taken into account.
Figure 23. Bandwidth fluctuation when transmitting from an emulated tag to the cloud.
Finally, it is important to emphasize that, like in the latency tests, several factors may lower the
sample processing rate, but there exist different alternatives to tackle the traffic load, like the use of
load balancing or distributed computing.
4.4. Analysis of the Results and Key Findings
Since the different experiments performed are influenced by multiple factors (e.g., network
infrastructure, network load, obstacles, emulated tag behavior), it is difficult to establish final
conclusions, but the following are the most relevant key findings that would be preserved in similar
industrial environments despite such deployment factors:
• When there is a regular number of monitored objects in a shipyard workshop (i.e., up to 1000),
fog computing systems respond faster since they are closer to the data sources.
• For regular loads, the difference in response latency increases between the fog computing system
and the cloud because of the amount of traffic exchanged, which collapses the cloud network
progressively if no corrective measures are taken.
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• In the shipyard, it is not usual to manage more than 1000 tags with only one computational
device, but it is interesting to evaluate such a scenario to determine the performance of the
implemented architectures. Thus, it can be observed that a single inexpensive fog gateway that
runs the implemented positioning service can respond faster and with a higher sample processing
success rate than a cloud-based system for up to 40,000 simultaneous tags. For 50,000 or more
tags, the fog gateway gets saturated and the cloud system becomes a faster alternative, although
its sample processing rate is lower than for the fog gateway.
• Response latency was the metric selected to measure the architecture performance in order to
quantify user experience. Nevertheless, in certain scenarios, where it does not matter how fast
the system updates its positions, other metrics could be used (e.g., deployment cost, power
constraints, wireless range). Therefore, it is important to take the obtained results with caution
since the system was designed explicitly according to Navantia’s requirements.
• Despite the observed under-performance of the cloud-based system, it is worth noting that it
is possible to reduce the response latency by adjusting different high-availability parameters in
VMWare ESXi [57]. Nevertheless, in terms of response latency, it seems that the proximity of the
fog gateways is essential and, under regular loads, it would be difficult for the cloud to obtain
lower round-trip times than the ones obtained by such devices.
• It is also fair to indicate that, during the experiments, every fog gateway only executed
the positioning service, while, as it is illustrated in Figure 6, the fog-computing architecture
was designed to provide multiple services on the same fog gateway. Therefore, it can be
concluded that, although fog-computing services seem to be best option for providing low
response latencies, their results may be influenced by the computational and network load
associated with other services running simultaneously on the same fog gateway. However,
note that, in a fog gateway, the number of concurrent service requests is actually low in
comparison to the ones received by a cloud, since it only provides services to a reduced area
(e.g., part of a workshop), while the cloud serves the whole company.
• It must be also noted that, during the tests, the behavior of the tags was emulated in order
to evaluate the performance of the proposed architectures. In a real deployment, the results
will differ due to the emulated tag behavior and because of the characteristics of the scenario
(e.g., signal propagation, obstacles, presence of metal). Note also that, when several hundreds of
tags respond at the same time, two main issues would arise:
– Real tags implement a medium-access technique that was not emulated for the tests.
Therefore, in a real deployment, individual tag delays will be higher than the ones
obtained for the experiments, since tags have to synchronize their transmission intervals to
avoid collisions.
– In a real deployment there would be interference from other devices (the selected tags operate
in an Industrial-Scientific-Medical (ISM) band) and from signals emitted asynchronously
by other tags (e.g., signal reflections from distant tags), which, in practice, will increase
collisions and will decrease the sample processing rate (because the actual SSI values would
not be received at the positioning service).
• Finally, it is worth pointing out that the devised architecture, the technologies and the experiments
discussed throughout this article were selected explicitly for a very hostile and specific industrial
scenario, so the obtained results should not be generalized and each organization interested in
deploying a similar system would have to adapt it to its own requirements.
5. Conclusions
Pipe traceability and tracking are essential in a shipyard due to their importance in shipbuilding.
After analyzing the state of the art, this article presented the design and implementation of a CPS
developed by Navantia and the University of A Coruña. The system is aimed at automating many
of the tasks performed in a pipe workshop in order to accelerate production processes and increase
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the workshop output. Moreover, thanks to the use of a fog computing-based architecture, it is able to
reduce latency, to provide location awareness and to cope with a large number of RFID tags.
In addition, the proposed CPS was integrated and tested successfully with Siemens’ MES
(Simatic IT). Furthermore, it was evaluated in terms of latency response and sample processing rate,
showing that, in the test scenarios, fog gateways respond faster than the cloud alternative and are also
able to process successfully more samples under high traffic loads and are between five and 481 times
faster under regular loads.
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Abstract: The latest Internet of Things (IoT) edge-centric architectures allow for unburdening higher
layers from part of their computational and data processing requirements. In the specific case of fog
computing systems, they reduce greatly the requirements of cloud-centric systems by processing in
fog gateways part of the data generated by end devices, thus providing services that were previously
offered by a remote cloud. Thanks to recent advances in System-on-Chip (SoC) energy efficiency,
it is currently possible to create IoT end devices with enough computational power to process the
data generated by their sensors and actuators while providing complex services, which in recent
years derived into the development of the mist computing paradigm. To allow mist computing
nodes to provide the previously mentioned benefits and guarantee the same level of security as in
other architectures, end-to-end standard security mechanisms need to be implemented. In this paper,
a high-security energy-efficient fog and mist computing architecture and a testbed are presented and
evaluated. The testbed makes use of Transport Layer Security (TLS) 1.2 Elliptic Curve Cryptography
(ECC) and Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) cipher suites (that comply with the yet to come TLS
1.3 standard requirements), which are evaluated and compared in terms of energy consumption
and data throughput for a fog gateway and two mist end devices. The obtained results allow a
conclusion that ECC outperforms RSA in both energy consumption and data throughput for all the
tested security levels. Moreover, the importance of selecting a proper ECC curve is demonstrated,
showing that, for the tested devices, some curves present worse energy consumption and data
throughput than other curves that provide a higher security level. As a result, this article not only
presents a novel mist computing testbed, but also provides guidelines for future researchers to find
out efficient and secure implementations for advanced IoT devices.
Keywords: ECC; ECDSA; RSA; IoT; IoT security; energy efficiency; mist computing; edge computing
1. Introduction
The rise of the Internet of Things (IoT) paradigm is expected to connect to the Internet more than
30 billion devices by 2020 [1]. This unprecedented number of devices, along with their estimated fast
growth, raises two main concerns: security and energy consumption. The access and communication
flexibility that IoT brings come with numerous threats that introduce the need for computational
and energy-demanding security mechanisms. Since IoT allows sensor and actuator devices to
communicate end-to-end through the Internet, the performance and security techniques implemented
by IoT end-nodes impact the rest of the involved devices. From fog gateways to cloud and backend
infrastructures, along with routers and network devices, they are all affected by the way IoT end-nodes
Sensors 2018, 18, 3868; doi:10.3390/s18113868 www.mdpi.com/journal/sensors
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behave. Regarding energy consumption, it is estimated that the United States data centers will consume
approximately 73 TWh in 2020 [2]. A similar report from the European Union [3] estimates that data
center energy consumption in Europe reached a peak of 102 TWh in 2017 and it will slowly decay
to 87 TWh in 2020. New disruptive developments such as cryptocurrencies can also have a massive
impact on the expected trends of energy consumption. For instance, in 2014 the energy consumption of
the whole Bitcoin infrastructure was estimated to be equal to the electricity consumption of Ireland [4].
Nowadays, IoT devices are present in numerous environments, such as in agriculture [5],
home automation [6,7], transportation [8], telemetry [9,10], Industry 4.0 [11,12], defense and
public safety [13], blockchain-based applications [14,15], energy-efficiency applications [16,17],
augmented reality [18,19] or in healthcare [20], where security issues can pose risks for human safety
and privacy [21]. Nevertheless, IoT security is still a challenge and a major concern [22], with several
examples in the literature of insecure cyber-physical systems [23–26], resulting in a slowdown in the
IoT adoption due to the perception of insecurity [27]. Most of the authors that analyze these insecure
systems conclude that the main problem is addressing security as a secondary requirement instead of
building the systems with security in mind since their inception [23–26].
To guarantee a secure and energy-efficient deployment of IoT networks, three main elements
must be considered and addressed as a whole: IoT architecture, IoT hardware and the required
security mechanisms of all the involved devices. Due to the advances in System-on-Chip (SoC)
efficiency, current IoT nodes have enough computational capabilities for processing most of the data
and unburden the devices of higher layers from data processing. This movement of data processing
capabilities from the gateways to the end devices is called mist computing [28]. More powerful
and efficient IoT end-nodes allow not only for reducing the data needed to be transmitted to higher
layers, but also to implement more complex services and strong end-to-end security mechanisms.
While under the fog computing paradigm the amount of data per transaction grows as we go to
upper layers [29–31], in a mist computing architecture data are kept as close as possible to where they
are originated, providing the ability of serving complex services directly to end devices. Therefore,
a hardware and software implementation that considers the different devices involved on fog and mist
architectures will ensure greater security and efficiency levels than previous approaches that treated
separately each layer of the architecture.
This article includes three main contributions aimed at creating a testbed for determining the
impact of securing fog and mist communications. First, in order to establish the basics, it presents
a high-security fog and mist computing architecture and an analysis of the main and the latest
hardware platforms to be used as mist end devices. Second, it thoroughly explains the design and
implementation of a testbed that allows for obtaining energy and throughput measurements when
securing the communications of fog and mist devices. To maintain the interoperability between
all the layers, Hypertext Transport Protocol Secure (HTTPS) was selected as the communication
protocol. The latest Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) and Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA)-based
Transport Layer Security (TLS) cipher suites are analyzed and only the ones aligned with the
requirements of the next TLS standard (i.e., TLS 1.3) are selected. Third, multiple tests are conducted
to determine the performance and energy-consumption impact of using TLS with different RSA and
ECC implementations in a real-world scenario. It is performed an analysis in terms of security level,
scalability, energy consumption and data throughput in two different scenarios: a fog gateway to mist
end-device communication and a direct mist end-device to mist end-device communication.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the state-of-the-art hardware
platforms and describes the main characteristics of fog and mist computing systems, and their
main security challenges. Section 3 details the selected hardware, the implemented testbed and its
architecture. In Section 4, the performance of the testbed is evaluated in terms of energy consumption
and data throughput. Finally, Section 5 is devoted to conclusions.
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2. Related Work
2.1. From Fog to Mist Computing
Cloud-centric architectures allow for providing complex services with high demands on
computational power, data storage and network bandwidth that are difficult to accommodate on
personal computers or Small and Medium-sized Enterprise (SMEs) mainframes. Although the
emergence of cloud computing solutions democratized the access to High Performance Computing
(HPC) capabilities, its centralized nature comes with restrictions that are difficult to accommodate
on real-time IoT systems. To alleviate the inherent high latency of cloud computing, edge-centric
approaches [32,33] move the computational resources closer to the data generation and service access.
Fog computing has brought data processing and service provision to intermediate network layers
(i.e., fog gateways), using the highest layers of the architecture strictly when needed [29]. This allows
for a reduction on both latencies and bandwidth requirements, decreasing the deployment cost,
improving energy efficiency and accelerating service responses. It is important to note that, in the past,
the use of gateways was needed because IoT end devices did not have enough computational power to
process the data collected from sensors and actuators or to implement the security mechanisms required
for providing direct access. Thus, IoT fog systems usually isolate end devices by providing access to
them through gateways, which are in charge of translating end-device communications protocols and
implementing security mechanisms. Such a dependence on gateways for processing end-device data
and for providing security to data transmission, emptied the bottom layer of the architecture from
high-security and real-time actuation capabilities. Mist computing moves the computational resources
to the end devices, thus providing them with the capability of processing sensor and actuator data and
requiring implementation of high-security mechanisms and standard communications technologies.
In addition, mist end devices are powerful enough to access other end-device information and directly
provide lightweight services. The result is end-to-end communications and very low latencies for
IoT deployments.
An example of generic IoT edge architecture with fog and mist computing layers is shown in
Figure 1. With the computational capabilities of mist end devices, both data processing and service
provisioning can be performed on the lower layer of the architecture, alleviating higher layers from
such tasks, as pointed out by the arrow in the left of the figure. Only the most complex processes or the
ones that need to integrate data for a large set of sources are delegated to fog gateways or to the cloud
when needed. Another important difference with a typical fog architecture is the ability of the mist end
devices to communicate directly with each other, thus reducing the network traffic of the top layers.
2.2. Hardware and Software for Mist Computing Devices
In a mist computing deployment, the selected end-device hardware platform is essential.
To allow for implementing standard Internet communications protocols such as Hypertext Transport
Protocol (HTTP) or Message Queuing Telemetry Transport (MQTT) [34], IoT hardware platforms
must be equipped with relatively high bandwidth communications interfaces. In [35] it is provided a
comprehensive comparison among different wireless communications technologies for IoT, being Wi-Fi
the one that presents the best results in terms of data-rate, energy efficiency, and security for distances
between 1 to 50 m. The ability to provide real-time services directly from the end-device layer
is also a requirement for mist computing. Due to this fact, clock speed and RAM requirements,
while constrained to improve energy efficiency, are higher for mist than for fog IoT sensor networks.
Taking the mentioned limitations into account, several hardware platforms emerge as possible
candidates to be used in mist deployments (the main characteristics of some of the most popular are
summarized in Table 1).
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Figure 1. Generic IoT edge computing architecture with fog and mist computing layers.
Table 1. Main characteristics of popular IoT development boards that can be used for implementing
mist end devices.
Name Clock Rate Cores RAM Size Max. Power Connectivity References
Intel Edison Module * 500 MHz 2 1 GB 1 W Wi-Fi/BLE [36]
Arduino Tian 560 MHz/48 MHz 1/1 64 MB/32 KB 1.551 W Wi-Fi [37]
Arduino MKR WiFi 1010 48 MHz 1 32 KB 2.31 W Wi-Fi/BLE [38]
LightBlue Bean+ 8 MHz 1 2 KB MB 3.5 W BLE [39]
ESP32 240 MHz 2 512 KB 1.65 W Wi-Fi/BLE [40]
Particle Photon 120 MHz 1 128 KB 1.419 W Wi-Fi [41]
* Discontinued.
Due to the resource-constrained nature of these platforms, it is usually not possible to execute
the necessary cryptographic algorithms on the main SoC processor for securing mist devices.
In addition, hardware acceleration is often required for maintaining acceptable energy consumption
and throughput values when executing algorithms involved in public-key cryptography such as Elliptic
Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) [42]. Speed-ups can also be achieved by using specific
hardware for the execution of less demanding cryptographic algorithms such as block ciphers [43] or
hash algorithms [44], which are also required for securing IoT network communications.
It is important to note that even if a platform embeds a hardware-acceleration module into
the SoC for performing certain cryptographic functions, software implementations that make
use of the available hardware acceleration are also needed. Software optimizations to tackle
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specific hardware accelerators can impact significantly both the algorithm execution time and the
energy consumption [45].
The ESP32 is the only hardware board in Table 1 that fits all the previously mentioned
requirements. The ESP32 embeds a dedicated crypto-engine for accelerating the execution of
different cryptographic algorithms. The other hardware platform from the ones compared in Table 1
that presents hardware-acceleration capabilities is the Arduino MKR WiFi 1010, but only SHA-256
acceleration and ECC508 Crypto Authentication is provided. In comparison, the official ESP32 Software
Development Kit (SDK) implements the required software functions to make hardware acceleration
available for high-level protocols such as TLS, and supports RSA, Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA),
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) and ECDSA. These features make the ESP32 the best candidate
among the platforms compared to implement a mist end-device. The main hardware and software
characteristics of this board are further discussed in Section 3.1.
2.3. Main Security Threats for Mist Computing Devices
The main information security characteristics are confidentiality, integrity and availability,
also known as the CIA triad. Each one of them grants different properties to a communications system:
• Confidentiality: it disallows unwanted access to sensitive information.
• Integrity: it protects the transmitted data for unwanted modification or tampering.
• Availability: it is related to the ability of accessing the data when they are needed.
Different types of attacks can be performed to break one or several of these security characteristics
when targeting mist deployments. Depending on which part of the communications architecture is
targeted by the attack, they can be classified as [46]:
• Physical attacks: they target the physical device or the physical communication channel:
– Node tampering: it consists on altering the mist device itself or the sensors or actuators
connected to it to access or modify sensitive information or the device behavior [47].
– Jamming: an attacker blocks mist device wireless communications by transmitting with a
jammer device [48].
– Radio Frequency (RF) interference: it consists in introducing devices on the network that
generate signals or noise that interfere legitimate communications [49].
– Malicious node injection: it consists on adding a malicious mist node to the mist layer with
the intention of introducing tampered data or to access the data being transmitted between
the victim mist devices [50].
– Physical damage: an attacker can prevent a mist node from working properly or can
neutralize it completely by totally or partially destroying it.
– Malicious code injection: by physically accessing the mist node an attacker could change the
code controlling the node and achieve total access to the mist layer [51].
– Sleep deprivation attack: an attacker tries to maximize the energy consumption of a node,
which can have a massive effect on the overall energy consumption of the mist layer and
thus reduce the life of battery-operated nodes [52].
• Network attacks: they try to exploit some vulnerability on the way the communications are
established on the mist layer:
– Traffic analysis attacks: the attacker can somehow intercept the traffic transmitted over the
mist network and analyze it to infer any type of useful information about how the network
and the mist devices work [53].
– Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attacks: one of the most common network attacks where a third
party captures the communications between two legitimate mist nodes and accesses or
tampers the transmitted data [54].
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– Denial of Service (DoS) attack: an attacker tries to prevent legitimate access to mist nodes by
flooding the mist layer communication network with fake traffic or by tampering with the
normal functioning of the network [50].
– Message replaying attack: an attacker can capture a command sent to a mist device and
replay it at its convenience [55].
– Sybil attack: a malicious mist node can spoof the identity of other legitimate nodes and act
as them [56].
• Software attacks: malware attacks using viruses, worms or malicious scripts targeting mist devices:
– Virus and Worms: attacks that consist on some type of code that can take partial or total
control of the mist end-device firmware, and that can be easily replicated to other mist nodes
in an autonomous way [57].
– Malicious scripts: mist nodes are usually capable of executing arbitrary pieces of code.
By introducing a malicious script, an attacker can gain control of a mist node while the node
seems unaltered to the rest of the mist network.
– DoS attacks: a DoS attack can be also performed at a software level, by disallowing the access
to a service at an application level. It is usually performed by gaining control of mist nodes
or fog gateways that provide such a service.
• Encryption attacks: the last type of attacks that can be performed against mist devices are the
ones that try to break the encryption of the communications (in case encryption techniques are
used to secure communications) by obtaining the private key of one of the involved parties:
– Side-channel attacks: the attacker uses behavioral information of the device that is applying
the cryptographic algorithms. By measuring the elapsed time required for signing or
verifying on a public-key cryptographic scheme, or the energy consumption of a mist device
during certain phases of the cryptographic protocol, an attacker can infer information and
guess the encryption key being used without having a direct knowledge of the plaintext or
the ciphertext [58].
– Cryptanalysis attacks: an attacker can obtain the encryption key by obtaining the plaintext or
the ciphertext [59].
– MitM attacks: the attacker can intercept the communications between two legitimate parties
when the key negotiation phase is performed. At such a point, the attacker would be able
either to establish a spoofed shared secret or to obtain the negotiated shared secret and
decrypt or tamper any messages transmitted between the two parties [60].
2.4. Impact on Energy Consumption of Securing Mist End-Device and Fog Gateway Communications
As of writing, no references were found in the literature about the analysis on the impact of
security on a mist computing environment. As it was indicated previously in Section 2.1, the ESP32
hardware platform can fulfill the requirements of a mist deployment and, although it has not been
found specific literature on such an application of the platform, it has been already evaluated by
different authors in other fields. For instance, in [61] the characteristics of the ESP32 are described and
compared with other platforms. Such a paper describes the most relevant characteristics, but no details
are given on the available cryptographic hardware acceleration. The paper also presents a practical
application of the ESP32 module by implementing an oscilloscope, and concludes that the module is
an excellent option for creating IoT devices. Similarly, other authors describe the implementation of a
web server on an ESP32 for real-time monitoring of a photovoltaic system [62]. In such a paper the
researchers demonstrate that the implemented system allows for obtaining real-time data on the voltage
and the current from the monitored system, but they do not take advantage of the ESP32 cryptographic
acceleration or implement any security on the communications. Another implementation of an IoT
system based on the ESP32 is an emergency response system for fire hazards [63]. The only reference
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to security the authors indicate is related to the use of MQTT, but it is referred to the data security
mechanisms provided by the protocol itself, which actually needs to run over TLS to provide privacy
and data integrity [34].
Regarding energy efficiency, some authors conclude that moving the processing power closer
to the data origin could yield energy efficiency improvements [64], but they remark that there is a
great dependency with system design factors, such as the ratio between active time and idle time,
the number of downloads from other users or the number of uploads. This fact indicates that empirical
tests should be performed to determine the actual gains on a real system.
There are other works focused on improving energy efficiency of IoT systems [65,66] or on
improving energy efficiency of other systems using IoT solutions [67], but they do not address the
impact of security mechanisms on energy consumption, although security requirements should be the
core of any IoT system, and especially of the mist layer.
2.5. Security Levels
When the strength of a cryptographic algorithm is assessed, the main parameter that is usually
considered is its key size in bits. Using the same algorithm, larger key lengths make brute force attacks
more difficult, thus creating more secure systems. One important consideration is that key size defines
an upper-bound on the security an algorithm can provide, but the actual strength of the algorithm can
be lower: the security level that a certain algorithm provides is a way of measuring the effort needed
to break its trapdoor function [29]. Generally speaking, symmetric-key algorithm security level has
a direct correspondence with the selected key size (i.e., the greater the key size, the more secure the
system is), but asymmetric-key algorithms security level is lower than the key size employed.
The relationship between key size and security level of different asymmetric-key algorithms
varies greatly, as it can be observed in Table 2, where the security levels for different key sizes of RSA
and ECC curves are compared. Moreover, the relationship between security level and key size of a
certain algorithm does not have to grow linearly, like the case of RSA. Therefore, it can be concluded
that relying on the key size for comparing different algorithms, or even the same algorithm, like the
case of RSA, may be misleading. For a fair comparison between two algorithms in terms of energy
efficiency and throughput, key sizes that provide roughly the same security level in both cases must be
selected. For this reason in this paper the concept of security level is used for comparing the proposed
algorithms and to present the results for the experiments detailed in Section 4.
Table 2. Comparable security levels for RSA and ECDSA.
Security Level RSA Key Size ECDSA Key Size ESP-IDF Curves
80 1024 bits 160–223 bits secp192r1, secp192k1
112 2048 bits 224–255 bits secp224r1, secp224k1
128 3072 bits 256–383 bits secp256r1, secp256k1, bp256r1
192 7680 bits 384–511 bits secp384r1, bp384r1
256 15,360 bits 512+ bits secp521r1, bp521r1
2.6. ECC Curve Implementations for Resource-Constrained Devices
The ECC curves used by modern cryptosystems are implemented over two number fields.
The prime field Fp, where p is a prime number, and the binary field F2m , where the points of the
curves are represented as a polynomial that can be expressed as a binary number (e.g., the polynomial
x4 + x2 + 1 is represented by the binary number {1 0 1 0 1}). For both fields, p and 2m indicate,
respectively, the number of the elements in the field. Binary field curves present worse performance
and energy efficiency when executed on general-purpose processors [68], although they can outperform
prime field curves when using dedicated hardware [69]. They can also run faster and more efficiently
on general-purpose processors with optimized instruction sets for accelerating some calculations
for binary field curves [70]. Some concerns about possible security issues of binary field curves [71]
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make them not adequate for certain uses. Moreover, TLS libraries for resource-constrained devices
(e.g., mbed TLS [72]) lack the necessary implementations for using this type of curves [73].
Regarding prime field curves, there are two main subgroups that differ on how the domain
parameters of the curve are generated. There are curves generated with verifiable random domain
parameters (e.g., secp192r1) and curves that are generated with domain parameters over a prime
field associated with a Koblitz curve (e.g., secp192k1). A detailed explanation on how the domain
parameters are obtained for each curve and its implications for both prime and binary fields can be
found in [74].
The most extended curves available for TLS communications are the ones defined by the
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) [75]. The problem with these curves is the
algorithm used to generate the pseudo-random numbers needed to define their domain parameters
(i.e., the Dual_EC_DRBG (Dual Elliptic Curve Deterministic Random Bit Generator)), since there were
suspicions of a possible backdoor [76].
Another largely available set of curves is the one defined by the Standards for Efficient
Cryptography Group (SECG) [77], which uses domain parameters over a prime field associated
with a Koblitz curve. The main theoretical advantage of these curves is that their generation process
does not rely on a pseudo-random number generator, thus avoiding the possible backdoors that the
NIST curves are suspicious of having. Moreover, Koblitz curves have some properties that allow for
accelerating certain ECC calculations over them.
Finally, another option is to use the so-called Brainpool curves [78]. This Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF) [79] standard is aimed at providing a set of curves with parameters generated
in a pseudo-random, yet completely systematic and reproducible way, which can resist current
crypto-analytic attacks. The main limitation of these curves is their performance [80]. Due to the way
the random primes used in Brainpool curves are generated, there is no fast reduction possible to these
curves, in contrast to NIST and SECG curves. Therefore, although these curves are supposed to avoid
possible security issues of other curves, their limited performance makes them not appropriate for
resource-constrained devices.
3. Design and Implementation of the Fog and Mist Computing Testbed
The general architecture of the designed testbed is shown in Figure 2. It consists of two different
layers: a mist layer with two mist end devices and a fog layer with a fog gateway. To enable
the communications among the different devices, a communications gateway is placed between
the fog and the mist layers. The communications gateway can be any device capable of allowing
a relatively large number of mist devices to access the fog gateway and the upper layers of the
architecture (e.g., a Wi-Fi router, femtocell or picocell base stations). In the presented testbed, a Wi-Fi
router is used by connecting it to the fog gateway through an Ethernet cable and to the mist end
devices through Wi-Fi. A monitoring subsystem is used to execute the experiments and obtain
energy consumption measurements. Such a monitoring subsystem is formed by a Single Board
Computer (SBC) and current sensors that allow for obtaining the current consumed by each of the
devices of the fog and mist layers during the tests performed in Section 4. In the case of the mist end
devices, no transducers were embedded since the transducer energy consumption and communications
capabilities could bias the obtained results. Two different scenarios were set to illustrate two types
of communications: fog gateway to mist end-device communications and mist end-device to mist
end-device communications.















Figure 2. Testbed architecture.
It is important to note that, although the testbed architecture was designed to measure the energy
consumption and throughput of devices of the fog and mist layers, it can be easily extended to cover
other scenarios. For instance, if it is required to measure a higher number of devices it would only
be necessary to deploy more SBCs with their corresponding current sensors. Moreover, in case of
needing to perform the same measurements when the network presents long or unpredictable latencies
between the SBCs (e.g., to measure the energy consumption of IoT nodes deployed on separated
geographical locations or in scenarios where communications must go through several network layers),
advanced time synchronization approaches can be implemented. In the case of not being able to
use Network Time Protocol (NTP) servers, Global Positioning System (GPS) time synchronization
(with the simple addition of a GPS module to the SBCs) could be used to provide a common time
reference to all the SBCs. When time synchronized, each of the SBCs could start and stop the tests
and the energy measurement procedure in the same way as the implemented testbed presented in
this paper.
3.1. Selected Hardware
To perform the designed experiments, the devices in the fog layer and the mist layer (i.e., two end
devices and a gateway) must be able to support the same cipher suites, ECC curves and RSA key sizes.
For the sake of fairness, the selected devices for the hardware testbed must be constrained in terms of
energy consumption, but, at the same time, be able to execute the required cryptographic algorithms.
The traffic and data throughput requirements for a fog gateway usually imply the use of a device
powerful enough to run a Linux distribution, thus supporting well known and extensively used TLS
implementations such as OpenSSL [81]. As it was previously indicated in Section 2.2, the options for
building a mist end-device are limited, since most IoT end-nodes do not support TLS or, if they do,
they support only a few insecure cipher suites.
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Due to the previously mentioned requirements, an ESP32 module was selected as mist end-device.
It is an IoT platform that embeds an Xtensa dual-core 32-bit LX6 microprocessor (Tensilica, San Jose, CA,
USA) that runs at 240 MHz and has 520 KB of Static RAM (SRAM). With a peak energy consumption of
only 1.65 W, it presents a great balance between computational power and energy efficiency. It features
both Wi-Fi and Bluetooth v4.2 BR/EDR and Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) interfaces. The Wi-Fi interface
supports IEEE 802.11 b/g/n modes of operation and WPA/WPA2 authentication. It provides several
buses and communication interfaces that are ideal for IoT sensor nodes, such as I2C, UART and
programmable GPIOs. Moreover, a crypto-engine is integrated into its SoC, thus providing hardware
acceleration for different cryptographic algorithms such as ECC, RSA, AES and SHA, which are all
used by the cipher suites tested in Section 4.
A SBC was chosen to implement the fog gateway, since it presents a good trade-off between energy
efficiency, computational capabilities and software implementation flexibility. Specifically, Orange
Pi PCs [82] (Shenzhen Xunlong Software CO., Limited, Shenzhen, China) were selected because,
as explained in [29], they provide good performance at a reduced cost when compared to similar
alternatives. Every Orange Pi PC embeds 1 GB of Double Data-Rate (DDR) RAM and an Allwinner
H3 SoC, which includes an A7 quad-core 1.6 GHz processor. Regarding the SBC’s communication
capabilities, an integrated 100 Mbit Ethernet interface allows for transmitting large amounts of data
over the Internet or on a Local Area Network (LAN). The Orange Pi PC also includes a High-Definition
Multimedia Interface (HDMI) video output and three Universal Serial Bus (USB) 2.0 connectors for
connecting peripherals. In addition, the SBC provides 40 General-Purpose Input/Output (GPIO) pins
that support communications buses such as Inter-Integrated Circuit (I2C) or Universal Asynchronous
Receiver-Transmitter (UART), which can be used to communicate with sensors or other devices.
The available driver for the Allwinner H3 SoC still does not support hardware acceleration for RSA or
ECDSA [83], so it was not possible to use it during the tests presented in this article.
An Asus RT-N12 D1 Wi-Fi router was used as the central communication device. The Orange Pi
PCs were connected using Ethernet Cat 5e patch cables, while the ESP32 was connected through the
Wi-Fi interface. For powering up the ESP32 and the Orange Pi PC gateway, two dedicated 5 V/2 A
power sources were used. Due to the ESP32 reduced energy consumption, it is possible to use batteries
to power it up, but, in order to provide a stable and constant energy source, a dedicated power supply
was used instead.
To obtain the energy consumption values external current sensors were used (Adafruit INA219
current sensors). A second Orange Pi PC was also used as the device in charge of obtaining the energy
consumption values from the INA-219 current sensors during the tests. The INA219 can operate in
different modes: with 0.1 mA steps for a maximum of ±400 mA or 0.8 mA steps and a maximum of
±3.2 A. The maximum voltage allowed by the sensor is 26 V, far beyond the 5 V of the power supplies
used for powering up the mist device and the fog gateway. The different values measured by the
sensor can be accessed through the I2C bus, which eases the communication with the Orange Pi PC in
charge of obtaining the energy consumption measurements.
Figure 3 shows the main components of the testbed. Two different configurations of the testbed
were used, whose involved components are inside two dotted rectangles. The setup at the top (A)
represents a mist end-device to fog gateway communication scenario, while the one at the bottom (B)
is for mist end-device to mist end-device communications. Only two 5 V power supplies are used.
The laptop is the device in charge of starting and stopping the tests and of persisting the energy and
throughput measurements for further analysis. As an example, Figure 4 shows the main components
of the testbed for the scenario A (for the sake of clarity, the Ethernet connections depicted in Figure 3
are not shown in Figure 4).
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Figure 3. Testbed architecture configurations. Fog Gateway to Mist End-Device (A) and Mist
End-Device to Mist End-Device (B).
Figure 4. Main components of the testbed. (A) Orange Pi PC for performing energy measurements;
(B) INA219 current sensors; (C) 5 V power supply; (D) ESP32 (mist end-device); (E) Orange Pi PC
(fog gateway).
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3.2. Software
This Section details the main software used for implementing the testbed and executing the
experiments. For programing the ESP32 modules, the ESP32-IDF [84] release/v3.1 SDK was used.
The SDK was installed on a Windows PC under a MINGW environment [85] with OpenSSL 1.0.2n.
The ESP32-IDF is the official development framework for the ESP32 and it is based on the real-time
operating system FreeRTOS [86]. To enable the execution of the different tests, two FreeRTOS
applications were developed for the ESP32. The application for the ESP32 that acts as mist server
consisted on an HTTPS server that made available several JSON files with different payload sizes
(described later in Section 4). The second application consisted on an HTTP and an HTTPS client.
The HTTP client is used to start and stop the measuring procedure and the HTTPS client allows for
downloading the JSON files from the ESP32 module that acts as a mist server. The underlying TLS
implementation is carried out through the mbed TLS library (version 2.9.0) [72], a library aimed at
making TLS fully available on embedded devices.
The Linux distribution ARMBian [87] was installed on both Orange Pi PCs. Python [88] was used
to program the code for running the tests. Different Python scripts were used for remotely starting and
stopping the energy measurement procedure by accessing the INA219 current sensors through the I2C
bus. A Python wrapper was programed over the pi-ina219 library (version 1.2.0) [89]. The wrapper
allowed for reading two INA219 sensors over the same I2C bus and for launching an HTTP server
that can start and stop remotely the energy measurement procedure. The tested maximum sampling
rate for two sensors was 1000 Hz, resulting on a 500 Hz effective sampling rate for each of the sensors
during the tests.
Finally, a virtual machine with Debian was deployed on the laptop. The purpose of this machine
is to allow for accessing the testbed during the execution of the tests through an SSH connection.
The same virtual machine was used to download all the generated data to analyze them and to generate
the different charts presented in Section 4.
3.3. Selected Cipher Suites and Certificate Generation
Two different cipher suites were selected for the tests: One based on RSA and another one
based on ECDSA (for signing certificates). The remaining algorithms involved in the cipher suite
(e.g., key exchange, block cipher, Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC)) were identical in order
to perform a fair comparison. Taking this issue into account and following the NIST guidelines for the






The main difference between these two options is the block cipher mode of operation: one uses
Cipher Block Chaining (CBC), while the other one uses Galois/Counter Mode (GCM). Since the aim
of the experiments is to provide future-proof conclusions, the latest TLS 1.3 draft [91] was evaluated.
The draft indicates that only block ciphers with Authenticated Encryption mode of operation [92] will
be allowed in TLS 1.3, being AES-GCM one of the chosen algorithms. Thus, the only cipher suites
that accommodate all the mentioned restrictions are ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 and
ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256.
After selecting the cipher suites to be used and before generating the certificates, ECC curves
and RSA key sizes have to be selected. The limiting factor for such a selection is the available ECC
curves and the RSA key sizes supported by the ESP32 hardware and the ESP-IDF SDK. According to
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the official documentation, the hardware crypto-engine of the ESP32 SoC supports up to 512-bit ECC
curves and up to 4096-bit RSA keys.
To take advantage of the hardware-acceleration capabilities of the ESP32, an ECC software
implementation for each of the selected curves has to be available and ESP-IDF supports the ECC
curves shown in Table 2. As explained in Section 2.6, NIST and SECG curves are much faster than the
brainpool curves. Due to this fact, certificates were generated using all the NIST and SECG curves
available on the ESP32. In addition, it was evaluated the brainpool BP256R1 for comparison purposes.
Four RSA certificates with 1024-bit, 2048-bit, 3072-bit, and 4096-bit key sizes were generated. Please
note that the 4096-bit RSA key will provide a security level of roughly 150 bits, although this is an
approximate value since it is not one of the security levels considered traditionally by NIST (i.e., 80,
112, 128, 192, 256) and no equivalent value was found in the literature. Therefore, the 4096-bit RSA




To evaluate the performance of the selected devices, different tests were performed using both
configurations of the testbed previously described in Section 3. The tests consisted of transferring
a set of files from the mist end-device (ESP32 server) to the fog gateway (Orange Pi PC) and to the
second mist end-device (ESP32 client) using an HTTPS connection. As it was explained in Section 3.2,
the ESP32 server was programmed as an HTTPS server that allowed for accessing JSON files stored on
the ESP32 flash memory. All the generated JSON files have a similar structure, varying in size from
32 bytes to 8 kilobytes. The JSON files were generated using a Python script and the text generation
library Faker (version 0.7.3) [93]. The Python script allows for creating files with the desired payload
size and with a structure similar to the payloads usually transmitted by IoT sensor nodes. To verify
that the generated files were similar in terms of structure and data redundancy to the actual files
transmitted in real IoT networks, they were compressed using GZIP and the compression obtained
ratios were analyzed and compared to the values presented in [94].
Regarding the hardware-acceleration options available on the ESP32, both SHA and AES were
enabled for all the tests, since both algorithms are used by the selected cipher suites. Multi-precision
integer (MPI) acceleration was turned on only when using the RSA cipher suite. Although the official
ESP32 documentation states that its crypto-engine supports RSA operations for a key size of up to
4096 bits, it was only possible to keep MPI acceleration enabled when using the 1024-bit and the
2048-bit RSA certificates for the HTTPS server implementation. When using the certificates generated
with 3072-bit and 4096-bit RSA keys, it was only possible to establish an HTTPS communication with
the MPI acceleration disabled. This is due to the fact that when the MPI acceleration was enabled,
the ESP32 server rebooted itself as soon as the HTTPS communication was initiated. The exact
reason of this issue remains unknown, being the most probable cause a software-related bug on the
hardware-acceleration implementation. In contrast, the ESP32 client implementation allowed for
maintaining MPI acceleration enabled for all the RSA key sizes.
The NIST modulo-p optimizations for ECC were enabled for both cipher suites. It is important
to note that, as stated in [45], the ECC optimizations also impact the RSA cipher suite performance,
since they accelerate the Elliptic curve Diffie–Hellman Ephemeral (ECDHE) key exchanges where ECC
is also used.
A high-level sequence diagram of the testing procedure is depicted in Figure 5. Since the ARMbian
distribution was installed without a graphical desktop environment, the laptop was used to establish an
SSH connection to the Orange Pi PC to allow for the execution of a Python script. Such a script had a list
with the different JSON payload sizes available on the ESP32. For each of the payloads, an individual
test was executed. As it is shown in Figure 5, the first step consists in sending an HTTP request to the
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HTTP server that runs on the Orange Pi PC that is in charge of obtaining the energy measurements.
When this request is received by the Orange Pi PC, it starts obtaining current samples from both
INA219 sensors. At the same time, the fog gateway (or the mist end-device client, depending on
the configuration of the testbed) starts to download the JSON file from the ESP32 server a total of
100 times. The time spent by each request is also registered. When all the downloads are finished,
the client device sends another request to the energy meter (the second Orange Pi PC), which stops
the measurement procedure and obtains the total energy consumption of the test. Finally, the energy
consumption values are stored into a file along with a throughput value calculated considering the
100 file transactions and the total time spent in the test.
It is important to note that, although it can be considered that only two scenarios are evaluated
(i.e., fog gateway to mist end-device and mist end-device to mist end-device communications) the
use of different cipher suites and security levels gives as a result multiple combinations that can be
seen as individual scenarios. For instance, for each of the testbed configurations, two cipher suites
are used, and the selected RSA key sizes and ECC curves compare a total of 6 different security levels
provided by 13 cipher suites configurations. Those security levels can be associated with different
levels of data protection (e.g., non-confidential, confidential, restricted) and target different mist end
devices, depending on their computational capabilities. Likewise, the obtained throughput values
can be translated into different service needs, giving priority either to real-time actuation or to higher
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Figure 5. Sequence diagram of the testing procedure.
Sensors 2018, 18, 3868 15 of 26
4.2. Testbed Performance Analysis
As it was previously indicated, payloads from 32 bytes to 8 kilobytes were transmitted a total of
100 times for each of the tested RSA key sizes and ECC curves. As explained in Section 4.1, the testing
procedure is initiated by the fog gateway by sending an HTTP request to the Orange Pi PC in charge
of registering the energy consumption from the two INA219 sensors. Due to the nature of the involved
HTTP communications, delays were expected during the start and stop of the measurement procedure.
Therefore, the period during which the INA219 sensors values were recorded was slightly larger
than the actual duration of the test. To measure the impact of this expected delay in the current
measurement process, both Orange Pi PCs were synchronized using NTP [95]. Timestamps were then
recorded at both Orange Pi PCs, which allowed for determining the mentioned start and stop time
offsets. Table 3 presents the time difference average, taking into account all the performed tests for
each ECC curve and RSA key size. The formula used for obtaining the presented values is:
(EnergyMeasurementTime − FilesDownloadTime)× 100/EnergyMeasurementTime
It can be observed that the average time difference percentage considering all tests is 0.011%,
which means that the current measurement period is only 0.011% larger than the actual test, so its
impact is negligible in the experiments presented in this article.
Table 3. Time difference (in percentage) between the energy measurement process and the file
download process for the fog gateway to mist end-device scenario.














4.3. Influence of Payload Size on Energy Consumption
To determine the impact of the payload transmitted when using the selected cipher suites,
they were compared for the lowest security level of the ones evaluated in this article (80 bits). Such a
security level was selected since it requires the lowest computational resources, thus allowing for
determining in a clearer way than with higher security levels the impact on energy consumption and
data throughput related exclusively to payload size.
Figure 6 shows the energy consumption values for each payload when using a 1024-bit RSA key
and a secp192k1 ECC curve. As it can be observed, the size of the payload has little to no effect on
the total energy consumption, only showing a slight increase on payloads over 4 kB. Almost identical
figures were obtained for the rest of the tested RSA key sizes and ECC curves. These results were
expected due to the computational capabilities of the evaluated devices.
It is important to note that most of the time and computational effort of the transmission
are dedicated to the TLS Handshake, specifically to the signing and verification processes [29].
During such signing and verification processes the RSA and ECC keys of the generated certificates are
used, thus resulting in a greater impact on the energy consumption than the actual transmission of
the payload.
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Figure 6. Energy consumption for all the tested payloads when using a 1024-bit RSA key and a
secp192k1 curve.
4.4. Comparative Analysis of the Provided Security Level, Energy Consumption and Data Throughput for the
Selected Cipher Suites
The aim of this section is to present the results obtained by comparing the provided security level,
the energy consumption and the data throughput of all the tested alternatives. As explained in the
previous section, the payload effect on the energy consumption was constant through all the performed
tests, being noticeable only for payloads larger than 4 kB. For this reason, the results presented in this
section are only shown for a 512-byte payload, since the obtained results for different payloads are
almost identical. Moreover, in the Figures shown in this section, the X-axis indicates the different
security levels provided by each RSA key size and ECC curve as indicated in Table 2.
4.4.1. Fog Gateway to Mist End-Device Scenario
Figure 7 shows the combined energy consumption of the mist end-device and the fog gateway for
the different tested alternatives. The individual energy consumption of the ESP32 and the Orange Pi
PC are represented by different shades and patterns. As it can be observed, RSA presents higher energy
consumption compared to the ECC secp curves for all the security levels over 112 bits. The brainpool
curve presents a larger energy consumption than the secp alternatives and even doubles the energy
consumption of RSA for the same security level. Another interesting result is that r1 and k1 curves
outperform each other depending on the security level. Moreover, when comparing the results for ECC
curves for 112-bit and 128-bit security levels, it can be concluded that a curve providing a lower security
level can present worse results, as observed in the case of the secp_r1 curves. This can be observed
in Figure 8, where the throughput values are presented, where the secp256r1 curve provides better
throughput than the less secure secp224r1 curve. The reason for this behavior is further discussed
on Section 4.5.
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Figure 7. Fog Gateway (FG) and Mist End-Device (MED) combined energy consumption.
Figure 8. Throughput values in requests per second between the mist end-device and the fog gateway.
4.4.2. Mist End-Device to Mist End-Device Scenario
In this scenario two mist end devices communicate to each other, one acting as client and the
other one as server. As it can be observed in Figure 9, although the absolute energy consumption is
higher than in the fog gateway to mist end-device scenario, the differences between security levels and
cipher suites remain. The throughput shows a similar trend too, as it can be observed in Figure 10.
The higher energy consumption in this scenario is due to the slower response of mist end devices
in comparison to fog gateways. To measure the impact of these delays on the communications,
the network sniffer tool Wireshark was used in two different tests for recording all the timestamped
transmitted packets. The first test consisted on downloading the 512-byte JSON file from a Python
server deployed on a virtual machine using the ESP32 client. On the second test, a Python client was
used to download the same file from the ESP32 server. Table 4 presents the measured delays between
the SYN and the SYN-ACK messages of the three-way handshake of the TLS protocol and the delay
between the Server Hello Done and the Client Key Exchange messages of the TLS handshake depicted
in Figure 11. As it can be seen, the Client Key Exchange message is sent by the client after receiving
the Server Hello Done message and performing the needed cryptographic operations for generating
the client session key, which makes the delay between these two messages a good approximation to
determine how fast the client is.
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Figure 9. Mist end-device server and mist end-device client combined energy consumption for the
different tested alternatives.
Figure 10. Throughput values in requests per second between both mist end devices.
Table 4. Relevant TLS delays in mist end-device to mist end-device communications.
ESP32 Server ESP32 Client
SYN to SYN-ACK 0.27745 0.00003
Server Hello Done to Client Key Exchange 0.00189 0.97986
As it can be seen in Table 4, when the Python client starts the communications, the delay of the
ESP32 server is close to 300 ms, which is clearly higher than the 0.00003 s delay required by the Python
server when responding to the ESP32 client. Moreover, it takes almost 1 s to the ESP32 client to respond
with a Client Key Exchange message after receiving the Server Hello Done sent by the Python server,
while the Python client responded on less than 2 ms to the ESP32 server.
In order evaluate the real-time performance of the presented testbed, the average time per request
was measured on three scenarios: fog gateway to fog gateway, fog gateway to mist end-device, and mist
end-device to mist end-device. As an example of evaluation of secure cipher suites, RSA 2048 and
secp256r1 performance were compared. The obtained results are shown in Figure 12. As it can be
observed, secp256r1 is faster than RSA 2048 in two of the three scenarios, while they spend the same
amount of time (roughly 6 s) in the mist end-device to mist end-device scenario. Therefore, in this latter
scenario it is not possible for the evaluated mist end-device to provide quick and secure responses.
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Figure 11. TLS Handshake procedure for ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 and similar cipher suites [29].
Figure 12. Time (seconds) per request for fog gateway to fog gateway, fog gateway to mist end-device,
and mist end-device to mist end-device scenarios.
4.5. Analysis of the Results
To determine the reliability of the obtained results, it is first necessary to analyze the reliability of
the testbed. In this regard, the implemented software allowed for obtaining 500 samples per second
from each sensor, which is a high enough sample rate to detect any energy consumption spikes or fast
variations that occur during the tests. Moreover, the time synchronization between the two Orange Pi
PCs of the testbed allowed for determining that the current measurement period was on average only
0.011% larger than the actual test. That means that for the longest test (of 581.41 s), the measurement
procedure only required roughly 63 ms.
When analyzing the energy consumption and throughput results for the fog gateway to the
mist end-device scenario, the BP256R1 curve presented the worst results of all the tested alternatives.
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As already discussed in Section 2.6, brainpool curve calculations are slower than the secp curves. In fact,
for the same security level, the brainpool curve consumes twice the energy of the RSA-based alternative.
With respect to the secp curves, it can be concluded that both the random NIST curves and the
Koblitz SECG curves behave similarly in terms of energy consumption for both the fog gateway and
the mist end-device. They even provide almost the same throughput, outperforming slightly each other
depending on the security level. An interesting finding is the reduction in energy consumption of the
curve secp256r1 with respect to secp224r1, especially for the mist end-device: the former consumes less
energy and provides better throughput than the later. This is due to the NIST modulo p optimizations
enabled in the ESP32 (as explained in Section 4.1, these optimizations were enabled to accelerate ECC
calculations). Such optimizations are curve and platform dependent, which implies that they must be
programmed and refined for each hardware platform and curve.
It is also worth indicating that, when comparing RSA with ECC, it can be observed that, as the
security level increases, the required key sizes for ECC grow in a more linear way than the ones
required for RSA. ECC also presents less energy consumption and better throughput for each of the
tested security levels. For instance, for a 128-bit security level, RSA consumes twice the energy of both
the secp256r1 and the secp256k1 curves. The performance difference is even more noticeable as the
required security level increases since, for a security level of 256-bit, secp521r1 consumes less energy
than 3072-bit RSA, which in comparison, only provides 128 bits of security.
Finally, when comparing the mentioned results to the ones obtained in the mist end-device to mist
end-device scenario, it can be concluded that they behave almost in the same way in terms of relative
performance between ECC and RSA. However, in this second scenario, the total energy consumption is
three times larger and the throughput five times lower in some cases. This degradation in performance
is explained due to the slower response time of the ESP32 modules in comparison to the Orange Pi
PCs, so the delays between the different TCP and TLS messages are increased.
Finally, it is worth noting the slow response time observed in Section 4.4.2 for the mist end-device
to mist end-device scenario, which is due to the large delays introduced in the different phases of the
communications protocols (i.e., during the TCP and TLS handshakes). As a consequence, real-time
services cannot be provided with the evaluated mist end-device hardware, so more powerful devices
and software optimizations on the HTTPS server and clients would have to be performed. One of such
optimization would consist in the use of long-living connections such as websockets, which are able to
reduce the number of TCP and TLS handshakes and to allow for faster communications on the mist
layer, thus providing real-time or near real-time capabilities.
5. Conclusions
In this paper, it was analyzed the difference on energy consumption and data throughput
of different RSA and ECC-based cipher suites for securing the HTTP communications between
a mist end-device and a fog gateway and between two mist end devices. A real-world testbed
was implemented and evaluated, allowing for obtaining up to 1000 current samples per second.
The deviation between the tests duration and the energy measurement period of the testbed was
measured, and with only a 0.011% deviation, it was considered to have no effect on the presented
results. Two different hardware platforms were selected with different hardware and software
capabilities in order to be used as mist end devices and as fog gateways. Two different cipher suites
(i.e., ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-CBC-SHA256 and ECDHE-RSA-AES128-CBC) were chosen following
the NIST guidelines and following the restrictions of the latest TLS draft. For each cipher suite different
alternatives for providing a range of security levels were analyzed and selected. Certificates were
generated and tested using different ECC curves and RSA key sizes.
After analyzing the results, it can be concluded that, in the performed tests, ECC is a better
alternative than RSA for mist deployments, since it presents less energy consumption and better
throughput. The energy consumption values obtained for the mist end devices and the fog gateway
are always lower for the ECC certificates than for the RSA ones when compared at the same security
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level. The only exception for the previously conclusion was the brainpool ECC curve, which presented
the worst results of all the tested alternatives. When comparing the secp ECC curves, they achieve
similar performance at the same security level. An important finding regarding ECC curves is the
platform and curve dependency on the implemented optimizations. In this scenario, the most secure
secp256r1 curve presented better results than the secp224r1 curve. This fact reinforces the idea of the
need for real-world testing when throughput and energy consumption are critical for a deployment.
Thanks to the performed experiments, it was demonstrated empirically that relying on the size of the
curve alone could end up on selecting less secure curves with lower throughput and higher energy
consumption values.
Regarding the evaluation of the communications between two mist end devices, the performed
tests showed higher energy consumption and lower throughput values than in the case of the fog
gateway to mist end-device communication scenario. Specifically, the reason behind this degradation in
performance is communications delay, which derived into up to three times larger energy consumption
values and up to five times lower throughput results. Therefore, the results of the tests performed on
the mist layer indicate that further work must be done by future mist computing developers in order
to improve the mist layer communications performance.
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Abstract: Modern Internet of Things (IoT) systems have to be able to provide high-security levels,
but it is difficult to accommodate computationally-intensive cryptographic algorithms on the
resource-constrained hardware used to deploy IoT end nodes. Although this scenario brings the
opportunity for using advanced security mechanisms such as Transport Layer Security (TLS), several
configuration factors impact both the performance and the energy consumption of IoT systems. In this
study, two of the most used TLS authentication algorithms (ECDSA and RSA) were compared when
executed on a resource-constrained IoT node based on the ESP32 System-on-Chip (SoC), which was
tested at different clock frequencies (80, 160 and 240 MHz) when providing different security levels
(from 80 to 192 bits). With every tested configuration, energy consumption and average time per
transaction were measured. The results show that ECDSA outperforms RSA in all performed tests and
that certain software implementations may lead to scenarios where higher security-level alternatives
outperform cryptosystems that are theoretically simpler and lighter in terms of energy consumption
and data throughput. Moreover, the performed experiments allow for concluding that higher clock
frequencies provide better performance in terms of throughput and, in contrast to what may be
expected, less energy consumption.
Keywords: ECC; ECDSA; RSA; IoT; TLS; power consumption; IoT security; energy efficiency
1. Introduction
The rise of the Internet of Things (IoT) paradigm brings the opportunity of having any device
connected anytime and everywhere. Such a heterogeneity and ubiquity raise some challenges and
threats when compared with other more isolated and controlled communications.
Nowadays, IoT devices are connected to the Internet in diverse environments and fields such as
industry or defense and public safety [1]. Nevertheless, security issues pose risks for human safety
and privacy [2], and it can be stated that the broad adoption of IoT is slowed down due to privacy and
security requirements that have not been addressed completely [3].
Although IoT devices have many advantages in terms of scalability and cost, they are restricted in
terms of memory, battery, computing capabilities and hardware resources, thus making it difficult to
implement the complex and heavy operations needed by ciphering algorithms to encrypt and secure
Sensors 2019, 19, 15; doi:10.3390/s19010015 www.mdpi.com/journal/sensors
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communications [4]. Moreover, some resource-constrained IoT devices might be deployed in large
areas where power outlets are not available, so energy harvesting techniques have to be introduced.
Since IoT networks usually rely on TCP/IP, the use of already proven security protocols seems to
be the best approach in terms of reliability and implementation efficiency. In this scenario, Transport
Layer Security (TLS) arises as the main alternative, but it has a relevant limitation: its most popular
cipher suites were not designed for resource-constrained IoT devices [5]. In the last years, UDP-based
solutions such as Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) [6] have been introduced to provide
lightweight alternatives, but, when security is added to such solutions, their gains over TLS are
diminished, being better to make use of broadly available and optimized TLS implementations [7].
One important consideration when securing the communications of resource-constrained devices
is the possibility of modifying the hardware configuration to improve both performance and energy
consumption. In this aspect, IoT System-on-Chip (SoC) clock frequency is a factor that usually presents
a relevant impact, since cryptographic algorithms require high computational capabilities. Moreover,
it is possible to modify and test the impact of different SoC frequencies on different hardware platforms
with minimum modifications. In contrast, other hardware optimizations such as the modification of
the memory mapping [8] are platform-specific and therefore more difficult to implement and test.
This study evaluated the impact of modifying the clock frequency on resource-constraint IoT
devices when executing TLS with different cipher suite configurations, thus providing a variety of
security levels that ranges from 80 to 192 bits. First, Rivest–Shamir–Adleman (RSA) was evaluated
in terms of security, scalability, power consumption and data throughput. The results were then
compared with a more suitable approach for resource-constrained devices based on Elliptic Curve
Cryptography (ECC). The evaluated ECC key sizes were selected to maintain an acceptable security
level for the years to come, unless breakthroughs in ECC cryptography or in certain disruptive
technologies (e.g., quantum computing) happen. In fact, IoT node hardware was selected with the
intention of being as close as possible in terms of computational power to the nodes that will be
deployed in the next generation of IoT networks.
The rest of this article is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews some of the latest academic
publications that deal with IoT security energy efficiency. Moreover, it introduces the basics of TLS
and its cipher suites, and analyzes the state of the art related to the performance of RSA and ECC
when executed by resource-constrained devices. Section 3 details the design of the proposed system.
In Section 4, the experimental setup and the performed tests are described. Finally, Section 5 is devoted
to the conclusions.
2. Related Work
2.1. IoT Architectures and Resource-Constrained Devices
In the last years, IoT architectures have evolved towards hierarchical topologies such as the one
depicted in Figure 1. Figure 1 shows a generic IoT architecture, with the main elements involved
on most IoT deployments. It must be taken into account that IoT devices carry out different tasks
depending on their role on the global IoT architecture. Multiple gateways exchange data with the IoT
nodes and with the cloud in a hierarchical way. Thus, the cloud at the top of the architecture provides
a single point-of-entry for cloud-centric IoT architectures. In comparison, edge computing approaches
unburden the higher layers of the architecture and distribute the computational requirements and
system access capabilities throughout all the elements involved.




























Figure 1. Cloud-centric IoT architecture vs. edge computing IoT architecture.
2.2. IoT Security Challenges and Limitations
Recently, the number of IoT hardware boards has grown dramatically thanks to the progress
made on SoC technologies in terms of energy consumption and computational power, which
allows them to provide computer-like capabilities. For instance, in [5], the authors presented a
comprehensive analysis of the latest hardware platforms that can be used as IoT gateways and
end devices. Among such platforms, Single Board Computers (SBCs) seem to be better suited to act as
gateways due to their improved computational performance in comparison to IoT motes and other
embedded hardware platforms, which are often designed to operate as IoT end nodes. Nonetheless,
most IoT nodes embed low-power computational devices that can perform specific (but basic) tasks and
network communications through the Internet, so they are usually considered as resource-constrained
devices [9].
Due to the limited capabilities of IoT end devices, the data they capture are transferred to the
upper layers of the architecture to process them and provide the required services to users. The direct
consequence is that the amount of data per transaction increases as ascending from the bottom to the
top of the architecture due to data aggregation from the lower layers. Therefore, it can be observed
that the simplest IoT devices in terms of hardware would be at the bottom. However, more power is
required as ascending in the IoT architecture, especially for large deployments where thousands of IoT
nodes may exchange data simultaneously.
For this reason, the current tendency is to move from pure cloud architectures to edge computing
architectures [10–12]. Figure 1 presents the main elements of an IoT architecture, comparing the tasks
that each of the layers has to perform on a cloud-centric and on an edge computing architecture. As can
be observed, most of the computational resources on a cloud architecture have to be concentrated at
the cloud layer, since it performs most of the work. Edge computing approaches leverage the potential
of the lower layer devices, such as gateways and end devices, to perform either totally or partially the
tasks traditionally carried out by the cloud layer. Tasks related to provide IoT services, user access
control or to security policies, are performed by the lower layers, thus reducing the computational
requirements of the cloud infrastructure. In addition, this distributed approach also eliminates the
presence of a single point-of-failure of cloud-centric architectures. Furthermore, thanks to moving the
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computational resources to the lower layers of the architecture, it is possible to process, persist and
provide access to IoT system data closer to where they are produced and consumed, greatly reducing
service latency and energy consumption [13].
To allow IoT deployments to move from cloud to edge computing, the devices of the lower layers
must be able to perform most of the tasks previously carried out by the upper layers [14]. However,
it is important to note that the weakest link in terms of security of an IoT architecture is usually the end
device layer, since end devices have to accommodate the computational demands of robust security
schemes to their resource-constrained hardware capabilities. In practice, this situation often derives
into the fact that IoT developers overlook or address security in a light way, so weak implementations
are common, what arises public security concerns [3]. For example, in [9], TLS is used for performing
only symmetric key operations, but the proposed cipher suite is currently not recommended since it is
considered insecure [15].
Traditional IoT deployments overcome these limitations and the lack of security of the end nodes
by centralizing the access permissions and policies on gateways [16,17]. The direct consequence of
these implementations is not only an impact on the performance and throughput capabilities of the
gateways, but also the introduction of a single point of failure in IoT systems. If a gateway that
provides access to a large number of IoT end devices is compromised, all of the IoT nodes that it
serves also become compromised, and there is no straightforward mechanism to re-gain trustful access
to them.
Moreover, a relevant number of vulnerabilities has been discovered recently after analyzing
technologies related to IoT deployments. For instance, in [18], the authors analyzed the security of
communications protocols used by Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, RFID or ZigBee. Another interesting survey
is presented in [19], which addresses the challenges that arise in terms of security in heterogeneous
networks. Finally, another interesting work is presented in [20], where the main security threats that
can be exploited to compromise IoT end nodes are studied.
2.3. Alternatives for Improving IoT Security
Several authors have proposed different alternatives to tackle the issues that arise when creating
secure mechanisms for IoT networks. Some authors have already provided a good list of the security
requirements for IoT technologies [21], while other researchers have focused on creating secure IoT
architectures [22,23]. Moreover, some researchers have proposed security improvements on the
architecture by following a layered approach [24].
Another challenge arises when providing secure end-to-end communications to resource-constrained
networks [25]. Thus, the use of protocols such as Datagram TLS (DTLS) has been proposed [6],
which was developed for providing security to UDP-based protocols like Constrained Application
Protocol (CoAP) and whose overhead can be decreased for using it in sensor networks or constrained
devices [26]. Note that since CoAP was also designed for resource-constrained devices; its security is
addressed lightly, including the use of pre-shared keys or raw public key cipher suites [27]. Certificates
can be used in CoAP, but the supported cipher suites usually provide low security levels.
Finally, it is also worth mentioning a growing tendency in IoT security that is based on the use of
unique and unclonable physical structures to avoid some attacks [28].
2.4. Security Level
When comparing different cryptographic algorithms, key size (i.e., the number of bits of
the key) cannot be used directly as a measure of the strength provided by an algorithm. A better
option is to use the security level, which is a value that quantifies the required effort to break a
cryptographic primitive [29]. If the effort is 2k, it is said to offer k-bit security and, therefore, it
provides a security level k. Different types of cryptographic algorithms (e.g., symmetric, asymmetric,
and hash functions) present different relationships between the key size and the security level they
provide. For example, considering a k − bit key size, symmetric algorithms provide a k − bit security
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level while hash algorithms provide k/2 − bit security level. Asymmetric key algorithms present
different relationships between security level and key size. The National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) recommendation for key management [30] provides the reference security levels
of symmetric algorithms when compared with two asymmetric algorithms, Elliptic Curve Digital
Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) and RSA. These values are summarized in Table 1. For example, a
128-bit security level is achieved by either using 3072-bit RSA or just a 256-bit key size of an ECC curve.
For this reason, the concept of security level is used throughout this paper to present a fair comparison
among the tested algorithms. The interested reader can find in [31] a comprehensive analysis of the
relationship between cryptographic key lengths and security.
Table 1. Comparable strengths for symmetric, RSA and ECDSA ciphers [30].
Security Symmetric RSA ECDSA
Level Key Algorithms Key Size Curve
80 2TDEA 1024 bits prime192v1
112 3TDEA 2048 bits secp224r1
128 AES-128 3072 bits secp256r1
192 AES-192 7680 bits secp384r1
2.5. TLS for IoT Networks and Cipher Suites
Many IoT systems use TCP/IP communications, whose current best security alternative consists
in using TLS [32].
TLS is a standard protocol composed by the TLS Record Protocol and the TLS Handshake Protocol:
• TLS Record Protocol provides connection privacy and reliability by using symmetric cryptography
(e.g., Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) and RC4) and hash functions (e.g., SHA-1).
• TLS Handshake Protocol enables server and client authentication and helps to determine the
encryption algorithm and the cryptographic keys used by the application protocol.
Therefore, the TLS Record Protocol is responsible for securing the connection after the TLS
Handshake Protocol establishes the parameters of the TLS session. The procedure is conditioned by
the used cipher suite, whose name indicates the involved algorithms. For instance, the cipher suite
ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 makes use of ECDHE-RSA for the key-exchange, AES128-GCM as
block cipher and SHA256 as the hash function that preserves the integrity of the handshake messages.
RSA and Elliptic Curve Diffie–Hellman Ephemeral (ECDHE) are the most popular cipher suites
recommended for TLS [15]. The cipher suites based on RSA make use of it for the key-exchange.
In contrast, ECDHE-based cipher suites use Ephemeral Diffie–Hellman based on Elliptic Curves for
the same purpose.
2.6. RSA and ECC Performance Comparisons
Currently, RSA and ECC are not often used by IoT nodes due to their resource demanding
requirements, although some researchers proposed resource-efficient hardware implementations of
both [33] and evaluated their performance on resource-constrained devices. For example, in [34], the
authors evaluated the performance of RSA and ECC on a smart card. Another example is described
in [35], where an ECC versus RSA time performance comparison is carried out by using 8-bit CPUs.
In this paper, the authors concluded that, for the tested key sizes, ECC outperforms RSA. It is also
worth mentioning a report from ATMEL [36] that compares RSA and ECC for embedded systems and
concludes that RSA is 10 times slower than ECC for a 128-bit security level while, for a 256-bit security
level, ECC is 50–100 times faster.
ECC and RSA have also been studied in terms of power consumption in different scenarios
(e.g., [37,38]), but such studies fall short in some aspects (e.g., security levels are not taken into account,
the consumed energy is just estimated or outdated hardware platforms and insecure/deprecated
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cipher suites are used). No paper providing a fair comparison of power consumption in real-world IoT
devices with proper security levels, which is presented in Section 4, was found.
2.7. Hardware Configuration and Energy Efficiency for IoT Secure End Nodes
There are different approaches when trying to improve the energy efficiency of IoT deployments
that target hardware platforms and their configuration. One option is to develop mechanisms that
allow for reducing the time end nodes are in an active state [39]. When it is possible to put the
nodes to sleep, the reduction in the up-time can yield interesting results on energy consumption, but
this is not applicable when real-time constraints or constant availability are required. Some authors
investigated energy harvesting techniques [40–42], which allow IoT end devices to obtain energy
from their environment, and thus remove the need for external power sources and increase battery
replacement periods. Other works are focused on improving the network routing protocols of IoT
networks to accelerate communications, which has a positive effect on energy consumption [43].
These approximations, although practical in some scenarios, do not address the security mechanisms
required to deploy secure IoT networks.
Regarding the modification of the actual hardware configuration parameters of IoT end nodes for
improving their energy efficiency, there are few examples in the literature. For instance, the authors
of [44] presented an interesting approach that consists of using Dynamic Voltage Scaling (DVS) to
improve the energy efficiency of IoT control devices. The proposed scheduling algorithm allows for
obtaining significant energy consumption gains while maintaining real-time capabilities. Another
example of hardware configuration for improving the energy efficiency of IoT end nodes is presented
in [8], where the authors provided energy consumption values for different memory mappings when
executed on Ferroelectric RAM (FRAM)-based IoT devices. While both approximations could yield
significant energy reductions, they fall short in their applicability: they are complex to implement,
platform-dependant and application-specific, narrowing the application of the obtained conclusions to
specific hardware platforms and use cases. It is also worth mentioning that the impact of cryptographic
algorithms on the energy consumption of IoT end devices can be estimated by means of proper
mathematical models [45,46].
2.8. Feasibility and Impact of Implementing High Security Mechanisms on IoT End Devices
As explained above, to move from cloud-centric to edge computing IoT implementations, IoT
end-devices have to perform tasks previously carried out by the powerful hardware of cloud systems.
There are modern hardware boards capable of acting as end-devices, of processing the captured data
and of providing complex services, but no actual work was found in the literature that assesses the
impact of implementing advanced security mechanisms on such a kind of hardware platforms. There
are works evaluating the feasibility and impact of securing IoT communications, but the selected
methods do not provide the needed security levels for edge computing deployments. Moreover,
although in the literature there are comparisons between different IoT security techniques or algorithms,
they are not based on the concept of security level, providing misleading conclusions. Regarding
hardware configurations and their impact on securing IoT devices, the works presented in the previous
subsections propose complex techniques that cannot be tested on different hardware platforms and
whose conclusions are difficult to extrapolate to different systems.
The presented study compared the broadly used RSA algorithm with ECDSA, with keys that
provide equivalent security levels. For protecting communications, it uses TLS, one of the currently
most used protocols for securing any type of Internet communication. To compare the hardware
impact on both tested security schemes, different clock frequencies are tested, since clock frequency is
a parameter that can be configured in most hardware platforms and with a presumably high impact
on the execution performance of such computational demanding algorithms.
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3. System Overview
The proposed testbed architecture is presented in Figure 2 and, as can be observed, it is aimed at
recording the energy consumption and throughput of an IoT end device. The testbed coordinator is
the device in charge of starting, stopping and recording the measurements during the tests. Such a
device can be a PC, a laptop or a virtual machine. To power up the IoT end device, a dedicated power
supply is used to obtain stable and accurate current measurements. A current sensor is placed between
the power supply and the IoT end device to register the current consumed by the end device. The
sensor is then connected to an SBC, which is in charge of starting the test procedure when requested
by the testbed coordinator. Such a test procedure consists on downloading multiple files from the IoT
end device while measuring the energy consumption with the help of the current sensor. To enable
the communications among all the computational devices of the testbed, a dedicated communications
gateway is used. The gateway is connected to the SBC and the testbed coordinator through a wired













Figure 2. General testbed architecture.
3.1. Implemented Testbed
The IoT end device was implemented using an ESP32 module [47] since, to perform the designed
tests, an IoT-oriented hardware platform that supports ECDSA and RSA is needed. Moreover, it is
required that the SoC of the selected platform allows for using different base clock frequencies. Both
requirements are met by the official ESP32 Software Development Kit (SDK), thus making the ESP32 a
good alternative against other IoT oriented hardware platforms [14]. The actual IoT board that was used
for implementing the testbed was the ESP32-DevKitC [48], which is the official prototyping-oriented
version of the ESP32. Such a board integrates all the needed electronic components and a USB
connection, easing the development and its integration on final products. The ESP32 embedded on
this board provides an IEEE 802.11b/g/n interface and supports Bluetooth 4.2. The core of the SoC
is a 32-bit LX6 dual-core microprocessor that operates at up to 240 MHz with 520 KB of SRAM. The
hardware acceleration engine for cryptographic algorithms supports AES, SHA-2, RSA, and ECC
and also includes a Random Number Generator (RNG). In addition, the ESP32 configuration utility
allows for setting three different frequencies when flashing the firmware to the device: 80, 160 and
240 MHz. The module can be powered by a 3.3 V or a 5.0 V power source or by using a micro-USB
connector. The selected power supply provides 5 V and a maximum of 2 A, enough for the reduced
energy requirements of the ESP32-DevKitC module.
The energy measurement subsystem was formed by an INA219 current sensor and an Orange
Pi PC SBC [49] that reads the values reported by the sensor. The INA219 is capable of measuring
voltages of up to 32 VDC and currents of up to 3.2 A. However, it can be configured to measure lower
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voltage and current ranges. For the performed tests, a maximum value of 800 mA was configured,
which allows for a resolution of 18µA. The Orange Pi PC was selected among the different available
SBCs because it provides a good compromise between hardware capabilities, energy consumption
and cost. With a cost of around $12, it is one of the most affordable SBCs on the market. Moreover,
it features an Allwinner H3 SoC, which integrates a Quad-core ARM Cortex A7 that runs at 1.6 GHz.
Regarding its communications capabilities, it integrates a Fast Ethernet interface, as well as 40
General Purpose Input/Output (GPIO) pins, which enable the use of the most common standard
communications protocols for accessing sensors and actuators (e.g., Inter-Integrated Circuit (I2C),
Universal Asynchronous Receiver–Transmitter (UART), and Serial Peripheral Interface (SPI)). These
features make the Orange Pi PC ideal for performing the required tasks of the implemented testbed.
Regarding the testbed coordinator, a virtual machine with Debian 9 was used. Such a virtual
machine was configured with 4 GB of RAM and four processors. It was executed on a 64-bit Windows
10 PC with 16 GB of RAM and an Intel i7 8550U processor.
To communicate all the wireless components of the testbed, an Asus RT-N12 Wireless N Router
was used as communications gateway.
Figure 3 shows a picture of the most relevant elements of the testbed. Specifically, it shows the
ESP32-DevKitC (Figure 3A) powered up through the INA219 sensor (Figure 3B), which is connected to
the Orange Pi PC (Figure 3C).
Figure 3. Implemented energy measurement testbed.: (A) ESP32-DevKitC; (B) INA219; and (C) Orange
Pi PC.
3.2. Software
The ESP32-DevKitC module was programmed using ESP32-IDF [50]. For each combination of
cipher suite, signing algorithm and frequency, a different version of the firmware was uploaded to the
ESP32 by using the official flashing tool provided by IDF. Specifically, an Hypertext Transport Protocol
Secure (HTTPS) server was implemented for the ESP32 using mbedTLS [51]. The server provides
remote users a 512-byte JSON file randomly generated with the Python library Faker v0.73 [52]. The test
procedure was started by the Debian 9 virtual machine, which executed a Python script that defined
the cipher suite to be used, started the energy measurements using the Application Programming
Interface (API) that runs on the Orange Pi PC, and then requested the 512-byte JSON file from the
ESP32 a number of times. The time taken by each of the HTTPS transactions was measured and
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registered. When all transactions were finished, it requested the accumulated energy consumption
value from the Orange PI PC and stored all the data into a JSON file. When all the tests were finished,
an HTML page used Javascript to parse the collected JSON files and generate charts and tables that
show the relevant test data to ease their analysis.
To obtain the current values from the INA219, a Python script was developed. This script first
sampled the INA219 sensor by accessing the I2C bus, then collected the obtained values and finally
reported the final energy consumption values. Several tests and optimizations to the Python code
in charge of sampling the I2C bus were performed, which led to achieving a final sampling rate of
1000 Hz. The script was launched from a Python Hypertext Transport Protocol (HTTP) server that
runs on the same Orange Pi PC. The HTTP server provided a REST API, which enables the current
measurement procedure to be managed remotely by the testbed coordinator implemented on the
Debian 9 virtual machine.
3.3. TLS Certificate Selection and Generation
The aim of the proposed tests was to provide a comparative analysis of the performance of RSA
and ECDSA in terms of energy efficiency and response time, when securing IoT node communications
at different SoC clock frequencies. To provide a fair comparison among the selected algorithms, the tests
were driven by the concept of security level. Thus, four different security levels were chosen following
the NIST guidelines on TLS implementations, which establish a 112-bit security level as the minimum
for public keys. Accordingly, 80-bit (deprecated), 112-bit (minimum), 128-bit (recommended) and
192-bit (future-proof) security levels were selected. Several of the available TLS 1.2 [32] cipher suites
that implement RSA and ECDSA signing algorithms were evaluated. To provide valid and applicable
results to future standards, the latest TLS standard (TLS 1.3 [53]) was also analyzed. Such a standard
establishes the need to implement authenticated encryption algorithms for all the available cipher suites.
Thus, two cipher suites that comply with the NIST guidelines and that also provide authenticated
encryption (i.e., its block cipher implementation operates in Galois/Counter Mode (GCM)) were
selected: ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 and ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384. These
two cipher suites only differ on their signing algorithm: the former uses RSA and the latter ECDSA.
The rest of the algorithms are exactly the same.
Seven different certificates that provide the previously mentioned security levels were generated.
For RSA, three key sizes were used (1024, 2048 and 3072 bits), while, for ECC, the certificates were
generated using four curves (prime192v1, secp224r1, secp256r1 and secp384r1). In the case of RSA, no
certificate was generated for providing a 192-bit security level, since it would require using a 7680-bit
key size, which cannot be handled by the ESP32 crypto engine (it only supports up to 4096-bit RSA
operations) and, currently, it would make no sense to use it in IoT applications.
4. Experiments
The experiments were designed with two major goals in mind: to provide valid conclusions
for current and mid-term IoT deployments, and to be easily contrasted and compared with other
hardware and software implementations. Specifically, the experiments were designed with the aim
of providing insightful results about three different aspects: (1) to test the feasibility of using high
security communications mechanisms on the lower layers of the IoT architecture (i.e., the end-devices);
(2) to determine whether the use of different ECC curves may yield energy consumption and data
throughput improvements over RSA when comparing implementations that provide the same security
level; and (3) to determine the impact of modifying the clock frequency of the SoC when executing the
computationally-intensive algorithms required to provide the selected security levels.
With the mentioned goals in mind, the ESP32 module was tested for the 21 scenarios that result
as a combination of the seven generated certificates and the three available SoC frequencies. For each
scenario, the 512-byte JSON file provided by the ESP32 HTTPS server was downloaded 100 times by
the virtual machine, while obtaining different measurements of energy consumption and throughput.
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4.1. Initial Setup
Before performing the experiments, the ESP32-DevKitC module was programmed with each
of the selected configurations to verify the proper functioning of the generated certificates and the
involved cipher suites. The ESP32 was configured for all the tests with Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA)
and AES hardware acceleration enabled. NIST modulo p optimizations for ECC were used in all tests
because they improve the performance on both cipher suites (during the ECDHE key exchange phase,
ECC operations are performed). For RSA certificates with a key size of 1024 and 2048 bits, hardware
acceleration for Multi-Precision-Integer (MPI) was used. For the 3072-bit RSA certificate, it was not
possible to use MPI hardware acceleration: when such an acceleration was enabled, the ESP32 module
rebooted as soon as the HTTPS connection was initialized. Considering that the ESP32 datasheet [54]
states that the crypto engine supports up to 4096-bit operations for RSA, the problem seems to be
software related. With the ECC certificates, no further issues were found.
4.2. Energy Consumption Results
Energy consumption was obtained for each of the previously described test scenarios.
Figures 4 and 5 show, respectively, the obtained results for ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384
and ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 cipher suites. The x-axis represents the SoC frequency.
For each of the frequencies, the security level increases from the left to the right. The actual RSA key
size and used ECC curve is depicted on the legend of the figure. The bars in the same color correspond
to security levels that are equivalent for RSA and ECC.
To ease the comparison, Table 2 presents the energy reductions obtained when using the tested
ECDSA and RSA cipher suites for different security levels and SoC frequencies. As can be observed,
RSA is outperformed by ECDSA on every scenario. Even though the differences between RSA and
ECDSA cipher suites decrease as the frequency increases, ECDSA consumes less energy than RSA
for all tested configurations of SoC frequency and security level. In particular, when configured at
a frequency of 240 MHz (the scenario in which less differences are obtained), ECDSA reduces RSA
energy consumption by a 35.75% for an 80-bit security level, a 22.65% for a 112-bit security level and a
remarkable 65.59% for a 128-bit security level.
Regarding the impact of the frequency on the reported energy consumption, it can be
concluded that the use of the highest available SoC frequency provides the bests results in terms
of energy efficiency.
Figure 4. Energy consumption grouped by SoC frequency for the different tested RSA key sizes.
Sensors 2019, 19, 15 11 of 16
Figure 5. Energy consumption grouped by SoC frequency for the different tested ECDSA curves.
Table 2. Energy consumption reduction (in percentage) of ECDSA in comparison to RSA.
Frequency (MHz) 80-bit 112-bit 128-bit
80 39.64 42.76 68.21
160 26.36 35.30 65.64
240 35.75 22.65 65.59
When comparing only the energy consumption of the ECDSA cipher suite, it can be seen
that the curve secp224r1 performs worse than the curve secp256r1 when the SoC is configured to
run at the maximum frequency. This because the NIST modulo p optimizations are platform and
curve-dependent, which means that, even if a curve uses fewer bits (and as a consequence provides a
lower security level), it can be outperformed (in terms of energy efficiency) by a more secure curve.
Since such optimizations are based on software implementations, increasing SoC frequency will have
a greater impact on the curves whose implementations are optimized. Thus, the relative performance
between these two curves varies with the frequency. Specifically, it can be observed that at 80 MHz
secp256r1 performs worst, at 160 MHz both curves present similar energy consumption and at 240 MHz
the secp224r1 is outperformed by the more secure and more optimized secp256r1 curve.
To verify that the secp256r1 curve actually outperforms secp224r1 due to the previously mentioned
platform-specific optimizations, the same tests were performed at 240 MHz but disabling the NIST
modulo p optimizations. The results are shown in Figure 6. As expected, the less secure secp224r1 curve
presents lower energy consumption values than the secp256r1 curve, which confirms the hypothesis
and thus illustrates the impact of the NIST modulo p optimizations.
Figure 6. Energy consumption of secp224r1 and secp256r1 curves without NIST modulo p optimizations
(ESP32@240 MHz).
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4.3. Throughput Results
Regarding throughput, the conclusions that can be drawn are very similar to the ones obtained for
energy consumption in Section 4.2. Table 3 show the average time required per each of the 100 HTTPS
requests performed for the different RSA and ECDSA configurations. As can be observed, ECDSA
outperforms RSA in all scenarios. Specifically, when running at 240 MHz and for a 128-bit security
level, the secp256r1 is roughly three times faster than 3072-bit RSA. Moreover, the secp384r1, which
provides a 192-bit security level, is as fast as the weaker 2048-bit RSA that provides only 112 bits of
security. For each of the tested configurations, the fastest result is achieved when configuring the
SoC at 240 MHz, which provides more than a 50% time per request reduction when compared to
running the SoC at 80 MHz. The only exception occurs when using the secp224r1 curve, where a
46.2% reduction in time per request is achieved. This fact is related to the observed behavior of the
secp224r1 curve regarding the NIST modulo p optimizations. In fact, when comparing the throughput
performance of the secp224r1 curve with one obtained by the secp256r1 curve when the SoC runs at
240 MHz, the latter outperforms the former, presenting a time per request reduction of over 10%.
Table 3. Average time per request (seconds) for the tested RSA key sizes, ECC curves and SoC
frequency combinations.
RSA Key Sizes ECC Curves
Frequency (MHz) RSA 1024 RSA 2048 RSA 3072 prime192v1 secp224r1 secp256r1 secp384r1
80 2.11 3.33 7.51 1.21 1.84 2.31 3.23
160 1.16 1.86 3.84 0.83 1.16 1.27 1.75
240 0.89 1.21 2.63 0.55 0.99 0.88 1.20
4.4. Comparative Analysis of ECDSA and RSA Cipher Suites for the Obtained Results
The obtained results show huge differences for the same security level when comparing ECC
and RSA, being ECC a better alternative, since it presents less energy consumption and higher
data throughput values. However, the results also present interesting findings when different
implementations and key sizes of the same algorithm are compared.
Regarding ECC curves, the most interesting finding is the fact that the security level provided by
a curve is not always proportional to its performance. With the ESP32-IDF version used for the tests in
this article, the secp256r1 curve presented lower energy consumption and higher throughput values
than the weakest secp224r1 curve when the SoC is running at 240 MHz. This fact is explained because
the software optimizations performed to speed up the mathematical operations of the algorithms
involved in the curves are platform and curve dependent. This fact was empirically demonstrated by
repeating the same test with the NIST modulo p optimizations disabled, causing the secp256r1 curve
to consume more energy than the secp224r1 curve.
With respect to the RSA key sizes, the main problem is that, for a 3072-bit key size, it was not
possible to use the hardware acceleration for Multi-precision integer (MPI) operations, which would
have a great impact on speeding up RSA calculations and, consequently, reducing energy consumption.
When comparing the general performance of the two tested ciphers suites, it can be concluded
that, for the same security level, ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 always outperforms
ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 in both energy consumption and throughput.
When taking into account the SoC frequency, another interesting behavior was discovered:
increasing the frequency, instead of increasing the energy consumption (as it may be expected),
actually improved energy efficiency in all tested configurations. Similarly, as discussed in Section 4.3,
it was observed that the SoC frequency also has a major impact on the time per request required when
carrying out HTTPS communications. Therefore, the increase in energy consumption caused by using
a higher frequency is compensated with shorter communications times, resulting in a reduction of the
total energy consumption. Moreover, the obtained results show the impact of the ECC NIST modulo p
optimizations on different curves and confirmed the platform and curve dependency of this type of
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optimizations. Specifically, when running the SoC at 80 MHz, the secp256r1 performed worse than the
secp224r1 curve, but when rising the frequency to 240 MHZ the secp256r1 outperformed the weakest
secp224r1. This fact, along with the test performed with the NIST modulo p optimizations disabled,
confirmed that the observed behavior was produced by these optimizations.
5. Conclusions
The aims of this study were to compare the performance of ECDSA and RSA TLS cipher suites
and evaluate the energy consumption impact of the different ECC curves and RSA key sizes when
using a resource-constrained IoT node capable of running at different clock frequencies.
After analyzing all the tests, it can be concluded that, in the selected scenarios, ECDSA can be
presented as a greener alternative than RSA for securing resource-constrained IoT devices. Regarding
clock frequency, the selected hardware platform presented better results in terms of energy efficiency
and response time when using the highest available frequency. By testing different working frequencies,
it was possible to show the impact of software optimizations that can improve individual ECC
curve performance.
The obtained results also emphasize the importance of testing and measuring empirically the
performance of the different algorithms supported by hardware platforms. The created testbed
allowed accurately comparing the different cipher suites and configurations in terms of security,
energy consumption and throughput. For instance, the impact of certain software implementations
and optimizations was demonstrated, which can make weaker security alternatives perform worse in
terms of energy consumption than more secure approaches. To sum up, real-world scenario testing is
a good tool for accurately finding which security algorithm and configuration is the best fitted for an
IoT application.
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